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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  BIA: Bossing Indians Around 
 
Congress formally established the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 
the Department of War in 1834,1 ostensibly to assist Indians, but also to 
subjugate and in some cases to exterminate them.2 Transferred to the 
newly created Department of the Interior in 1849,3 the BIA oversaw 
gradual but dramatic shifts in federal Indian policy,4 including the end of 
the Treaty Era in 1871.5 The nineteenth century movement of tribes onto 
 1. Act of June 30, 1834, Ch. 162, 4 Stat. 735 (codified in part as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 9, 
40, 45, 48, 60, 62, 68). The origins of the Indian Service in the War Department far preceded this 
statute, however. See e.g., Act of August 7, 1789, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49 (creating the Department of War, 
with responsibilities including those as assigned by the President, “relative to Indian affairs.”). The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs itself is typically said to date from 1824, when the War Department, 
without Congressional authorization, created an Office of Indian Affairs. See, e.g., HOUSE RPT. NO. 
108-542, at 68. 
 2. See, e.g., Kevin Gover, (former) Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs, Remarks at the 
Ceremony Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (Sept. 8, 2000) reprinted in 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 161, 161-62 (2000-2001). In 
acknowledging the historic roots of the Agency, Gover cited, among other things, BIA’s historic 
complicity in 
[T]he deliberate spread of disease, the decimation of the mighty bison herds, the use of 
the poison alcohol to destroy mind and body, and the cowardly killing of women and 
children . . . . [And] acts so terrible that they infect, diminish, and destroy the lives of 
Indian people decades later, generations later. 
 3. Act of March 3, 1849, Ch. 108, §§ 1, 5, 9 Stat. 395. 
 4. See generally, F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 117 (1982) [hereinafter 
COHEN]; CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 8-9 (Yale University 
Press 1987). Indian law is also the subject of an excellent “Nutshell.” WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (West, 4th ed. 2004). Regarding the history of the BIA, see 
COHEN, at 108-09, 117-21, 673-75. Archival Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs may be found 
at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C., Record Group 75. See 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides/native_american/bia.asp (Records of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, 1907-1939). See also Edward E. Hill, Preliminary Inventory 
of the Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, PI 163, Washington, DC: National Archives and 
Records Service, GSA (1965). 
 5. The Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, put an end to treaty making between the 
federal government and the tribes, but upheld the obligation of existing treaties. 16 Stat. 544, 566 
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Indian Reservations was followed by the breaking up of tribal land 
holdings and distribution of individual allotments to tribal members, with 
the “excess” lands becoming available for settlement by non-Indians.6
In 1928, a study known as the Meriam Report delivered a harsh 
indictment of federal Indian policy, and called for sweeping changes.7 
There followed a period known as the “Indian New Deal,” the 
centerpiece of which was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,8 which 
put an end to allotment of tribal lands, and promoted the revitalization of 
tribal governments. This tribal renaissance was short-lived, however, as 
Congress declared in 1953 a goal of terminating the special status of 
Indian tribes and repudiation of the federal trust responsibility.9 By the 
1970s, Congress had again changed course, opting to reject policies of 
assimilation and termination in favor of policies that promote tribal self-
determination.10
Throughout the zigzag course of federal policy with respect to Indian 
affairs, administrative responsibility for those policies has rested 
primarily with the BIA, or its predecessor agency, principally under the 
direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.11
 
B.  Bashing the BIA 
 
Throughout its existence, the BIA may be the most maligned agency 
in the entire United States Government. The BIA has been vilified from 
all sides, adjudged “incapable” by a federal court,12 condemned by 
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)). 
 6. General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (current version, as amended, at 25 U.S.C. § 
331). 
 7. INSTITUTE FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) 
[hereinafter MERIAM REPORT]. 
 8. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current 
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000). 
 9. H. R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). 
 10. E.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 
2214 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 458-458(e) (2000)). 
 11. The Act of July 9, 1832, first authorized the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Ch. 
174, 4 Stat. 564 (codified in part as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 8). Three statutes are often cited 
as authority for a wide range of BIA actions. “The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may 
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian 
relations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). “The President may prescribe such regulations as he may deem fit 
for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the 
settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs.” 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). “The Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such 
moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assistance of the 
Indians throughout the United States . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by, in part, and 
remanded by 334 F. 3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The Department of Interior’s administration of the 
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members of Congress,13 deemed “incompetent” by a Presidential 
Commission,14 and eviscerated in countless editorials.15 On many 
reservations, tribal members wryly joke that the acronym stands for 
“Bossing Indians Around.” Perhaps the harshest criticism has come from 
the most unexpected source, when, in the year 2000, the agency’s head 
offered a moving apology for “the fact that the works of this agency have 
at various times profoundly harmed the communities it was meant to 
serve.”16
As the oldest federal agency in continuous existence, BIA has been 
the subject of criticism and proposals for its abolition almost since its 
birth.17 The Congressional Research Service reported to Congress in 
Individual Indian Money (‘IIM’) trust has served as the gold standard for mismanagement by the 
federal government for more than a century.”); see also id. at 125 (“The Department of Interior is 
truly an embarrassment to the federal government in general and the executive branch in particular. 
The 300,000 individual Indian beneficiaries deserve a better trustee-delegate than the Secretary of 
Interior.”). 
 13. E.g., “‘BIA seems to now stand for Bureaucratic Indecision Always,’ said Rep. J.D. 
Hayworth (R-Ariz.), the Republican co-chair of the Congressional Native American Caucus . . . . 
Rep. Joe Baca (D-Ariz.) . . . said the agency’s initials should stand for ‘bureaucratic inaction.’” 
House Panel Sympathetic to Tribes on Recognition, ¶¶ 5-6 (Apr. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/archive/000971.asp. The website Indianz.Com is a comprehensive 
digest of news on current Native American issues, with links to relevant resources. 
 14. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 41-54 (1984) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION], reprinted in Federal Government’s Relationship with American 
Indians: Hearings Before the Special Committee on Investigations of the Senate Select Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. (Part 1) 277, 368-73 (1989) [hereinafter, Special Committee on 
Investigations]. 
 15. E.g., DWI Morass Bolsters Call for BIA Revolution, ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 
2004, at C2, (“The BIA is an agency in serious need of reform.”); A Continuing Shame, N.Y. TIMES, 
September 26, 2004, at 4-10, (attributing to the BIA “a century of disarray and dishonesty” in 
dealing with Indians); Mark Anthony Rolo, Guest Opinion: BIA’s Top American Indian Official 
Should Go, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.billingsgazette.com/index.php?display=rednews/2004/06/25/build/opinion/40-guest-
op.inc (charging the BIA with a “history of indifference to tribes”); Settle a Shameful Case of Indian 
Trust Money, SEATTLE TIMES, April 12, 2004, at B6, (calling BIA management “alternately inept 
and malicious”). 
 16. Gover, supra note 2, at 161. 
 17. In 1834, when Congress sought to reorganize the “Indian Department,” it noted that “[i]ts 
administration is expensive, inefficient, and irresponsible.” COHEN, supra note 4, at 117 (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 23-474 at 2-3 (1834)). Late into the nineteenth century, Congress debated transferring 
Indian affairs back to the War Department. See also id. at 119 (citing e.g., S. Rep. No. 39-156, 6 
(1867) [PEACE COMMISSION]. “In the period from 1867 to 1887, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was 
noted for its corruption and cynicism, along with some honest efforts at reform.” Odie B. Faulk, 
Book Review, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 535 (reviewing LORING BENSON PRIEST, UNCLE SAM’S 
STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORMATION OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1887 (Octagon 
Books, 1972)). In 1869, an independent Board of Indian Commissioners was created to correct BIA 
mismanagement in the purchase and handling of Indian supplies. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 121 
(citing Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 16, § 4, 16 Stat. 13, 40 (superceded by Executive Order No. 6145, 
May 25, 1933) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 23 (1928)). The Meriam Report criticized 
inefficient, paternalistic administration of Indian policy in 1928. See COHEN id. at 144. A Senate 
Report issued in 1943 castigated the BIA and called for a drastic reduction in its funds, staff and 
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1996 that there had been more than 1050 investigations, reports, 
commissions, and studies on BIA reorganization compiled since 1834.18 
In recent decades, those calls for reform have been virtually continuous, 
and the criticism more strident. 
A 1976 Report on BIA Management Practices to the American 
Indian Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) found “a notable absence of 
managerial and organizational capacity throughout the BIA.”19 The 
AIPRC Task Force on Federal Administration and Structure of Indian 
Affairs criticized in particular “Area Office staff [that] has been 
delegated too much authority by the Central Office and basically serves 
as a ‘bottle-neck’ designed and motivated to systematically undermine 
Indian self-development progress.”20
The Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies 
castigated the BIA in 1984 for “incompetent” management of trust 
assets; excessive regulations and “red tape;” “incompetent” technical 
assistance to tribes; and “deficient” performance of activities such as 
credit, finance, contracting, and procurement.21 The Commission 
recommended the abolition of the BIA and its replacement with a new 
agency to be called the “Indian Trust Services Administration,” which 
would have granted funds to tribes to contract for their own services.22
A series of articles in the Arizona Republic in 1987 “startled” the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs into establishing a special 
committee to investigate stunning allegations of BIA mismanagement.23 
The committee held extensive hearings in response to charges that 
included breach of trust, criminal fraud, child abuse in BIA schools.24 
activities. See COHEN id. at 155 (citing S. REP. NO. 78-310, pt. 1 (1943)). The BIA underwent yet 
another reorganization in 1950 in order to carry out a range of termination policies. See COHEN id. at 
158-59 (citing, e.g., SEC’Y INTERIOR ANN. REP. 343 (1950)). 
 18. S. REP. NO.104-227 (1996). 
 19. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MGMT. STUDY, REPORT ON BIA MGMT. PRACTICES TO THE 
AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 6 (1976). 
 20. REPORT ON FED. ADMIN. AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 49 (1976). 
 21. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 31. 
 22. Id., at 31-32. Current BIA reorganization proposals hearken back to the controversial 
1984 report of the Presidential Commission, which was headed by the Assistant Secretary for Indian 
Affairs at the time, Ross Swimmer, who now serves as Special Trustee, and included as a member 
Neal McCaleb, who served as Assistant Secretary for a brief time during which the new 
reorganization plans were announced. 
 23. Special Committee on Investigations, supra note 14, Part 1, at 1 (statement of Senator 
Inouye, Chairman, Select Committee on Indian Affairs). 
 24. Id. The Special Committee on Investigations published the transcripts of its hearings in 
eleven volumes, or, “Parts.” In addition, it issued a Final Report and Legislative Recommendations, 
stating that “BIA’s mismanagement is manifest in almost every area the Committee examined.” 
Special Committee on Investigations, FINAL REP. AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. 
NO. 101-60, at 10 (1989). 
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The committee’s investigation preceding the hearings had already led 
Senator DeConcini, its Chairman, to conclude that “[m]any of the 
Federal Indian programs are fraught with corruption and fraud. Most of 
the others are marred by mismanagement, and some by incompetence.”25
In 1990, Secretary Lujan chartered a Joint Tribal/BIA/DOI 
Reorganization Task Force. Over the next four years, the Joint 
Reorganization Task Force met twenty-two times across the country and 
developed forty-four recommendations for BIA reorganization, 
regulatory reform, educational reform, and budgetary reform, reportedly 
with little success.26
In 2000, the report of the National Academy of Public 
Administration questioned the overall competence of BIA management 
and administrative staff, citing in particular a lack of expertise in the 
areas of planning, budgeting, human resources management, and 
information resource management.27 The top job in the BIA continues to 
be a political hot potato, which often changes hands amidst charges of 
cronyism and incompetence.28
 
C.  Defending the BIA 
 
Despite this constant drumbeat of disparagement, the BIA seems to 
have been remarkably immune to change. Moreover, when 
condemnation turns to calls for the abolition of the BIA, as it often does, 
prominent Indian leaders, tribes, and their supporters rush to the BIA’s 
defense.29 Some critics have argued that the BIA manipulates such tribal 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. See S. REP. NO. 104-227 (1996). 
 27. Study of Management and Administration: The Bureau of Indian Affairs: Report of the 
National Academy of Public Administration Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (April 12, 2000) 
[hereinafter NAPA] (testimony of Mr. Royce Hanson, Panel Chair and Academy Fellow, National 
Academy of Public Administration). 
 28. See, e.g., BIA official says he won’t resign, RAPID CITY J., October 14, 2004, at 
http://www.rapidcityjournal.com/articles/2004/05/09/news/state/news04.txt (reporting that Assistant 
Secretary Dave Anderson rejected calls for his resignation from Connecticut Sen. Christopher 
Dodd); Rolo, supra note 15; See also, Top-level aides in BIA Washington office removed, 
Indianz.com, August 13, 2004, at http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/003825.asp?print=1. 
 29. Leading the defense has been the National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”). 
Founded in 1944, the NCAI is the oldest, largest and most representative American Indian and 
Alaska Native organization in the country. See http://www.ncai.org. The NCAI and other tribal 
advocates have been vocal in the support of the BIA. See, e.g., Reorganization of Trust Mgmt. at the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Office of the Spec. Trustee, Hearing Before the House Resources 
Comm., 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.resourcescommittee.house.gov/archives/ 
108/testimony; Proposed Reorganization of Major Agencies and Functions Related to Indian Trust 
Reform Matters Within the Dep’t of the Interior, Hearing Before the S. Comm. of Indian Affairs, 
108th Cong. (March 10, 2004), available at http://indian.senate.gov; Trust Reform And Related 
Matters, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http://indian.senate.gov. See also Indian Country’s Ugly Baby ¶¶ 1-3 (Nov. 5, 2003) at 
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demonstrations of support with the selective distribution of rewards and 
punishments, especially at the Area (now Regional) Office level.30
Others might argue that Indian tribes view the BIA as their main 
advocate, however weak, within the federal bureaucracy, in part because 
BIA personnel are largely drawn from tribal ranks, thanks to Indian 
preference in BIA hiring.31 The long-time Director of the American 
Indian Law Center recently expressed his own ambivalence about the 
notion that “if you attack the Bureau of Indian Affairs, you are attacking 
Indians.”32
Perhaps the main reason that tribal advocates continue to defend the 
BIA in the face of persistent attack, however, is that the BIA has become 
emblematic of the federal government’s commitment to tribal 
sovereignty and the individual well-being of Native Americans. This 
commitment, combined with the obligation to manage Indian lands and 
funds, is commonly referred to as the federal trust responsibility to 
Indians. Although rooted in the United States Constitution, the trust 
responsibility has been developed and defined through a series of 
opinions by the United States Supreme Court, and exercised primarily by 
the BIA. Threats to the continued existence of the BIA naturally arouse 
concern that the United States may be backing away from this 
commitment. 
 
 
http://www.indianz.com/News/archives/002380.asp (“When the Bush administration in November 
2001 proposed creating a new agency to handle Indian trust assets, tribal leaders rushed to keep the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs from certain death. Without the BIA, they argued, there was no trust 
responsibility. ‘If it’s our ugly baby, then we need to fix it,’ one tribal leader said. The spirited 
defense befuddled the Republicans, who thought they were doing Indians a favor. ‘To my great 
surprise, the tribes are very strongly attached to the Bureau of Indian Affairs,’ Secretary of Interior 
Gale Norton would later tell a House committee.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsch, The BIA Reorganization Follies of 1978: A Lesson in 
Bureaucratic Self-Defense, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (1980). “The Area Director’s ‘bundle of 
carrots and sticks seems endless. If a tribe is cooperative, special funds are found to meet special 
tribal projects . . . [if not, a]pproval of tribal actions are often delayed or have to be changed.’” Id. 
(citing Hearings, Bureau of Indian Affairs Organization, Senate Select Comm. On Indian Affairs, 
95th Cong. 97, 114 (1978). 
 31. Act of June 18, 1934 § 11, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000). BIA regulations are found at 25 
C.F.R. pt. 5 (2004). The preference also extends to employment in connection with BIA grants. See 
25 C.F.R. § 276.13 (2004). The hiring preference has been upheld against a constitutional 
discrimination claim, as a being “political rather than racial in nature.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535, 553 n.24 (1974). Emphasizing the political nature of such a preference, a recent ruling upheld 
the awarding of a military contract to a Native American firm pursuant to a preference for such firms 
embodied in the statute authorizing the contract, even though the preference at issue does not involve 
a matter unique to Native Americans, nor does it implicate any political relationship between tribes 
and the federal government. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 517-18 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 32. Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 55 (2002). 
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D.  Reforming the BIA 
 
Yet, in the wake of federal policies that for more than three decades 
have increasingly emphasized greater tribal control over Indian 
programs, many question whether a legitimate trust role remains for the 
BIA. This transfer of administrative responsibility from the BIA to the 
tribes, under the mantle of “Indian Self-Determination,”33 has led even 
the United States Supreme Court to suggest that the trust responsibility 
may be incompatible with Indian self-governance.34 A top Indian affairs 
official has forthrightly proposed the abolition of the BIA, the 
termination of the trust responsibility, and the transfer of all remaining 
responsibilities to the tribes themselves.35
Such developments alarm tribal advocates, who fear that a policy 
they have encouraged and embraced for the past thirty years, Self-
Determination,36 could turn out to be something of a Trojan horse, 
ushering in a full-scale assault on the single most cherished attribute of 
federal Indian policy–the federal trust responsibility.37 Although they 
raise serious questions about the motivations and objectives of some of 
the proponents of BIA reorganization, few tribal advocates deny that 
there is plenty of room for regulatory reform. Thus, they ask whether 
reform can be accomplished in a way that both strengthens tribal 
sovereignty and reinforces the federal trust responsibility. 
The original architects of the Self-Determination policy suggested 
one possible answer. Believing that many of the alleged failures of the 
BIA were attributable less to incompetence of BIA employees than to 
institutional conflicts of interest within the Department of the Interior 
 33. This policy of “Self-Determination” has its origins in President Nixon’s 1970 message to 
Congress on Indian affairs. See President’s Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 
PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970); see also H.R. REP. DOC. NO. 91-363 (1970) (outlining tribal self-
determination policy). 
 34. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003) (suggesting that the 
government has a lesser trust responsibility where the tribe assumes more control over decision-
making concerning its resources.) 
 35. Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Capacity and Mission, Oversight Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (Testimony of Ross O. Swimmer, Former Assistant Secretary 
for Indian Affairs). Mr. Swimmer currently serves as Special Trustee for American Indians. 
 36. The policy is immensely popular with tribes and Congress alike. On its thirtieth 
anniversary, the United States Senate praised the Self-Determination policy as “the most successful 
policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian tribes.” See S. Res. 106-277, 106th Cong. 
(2000). The resolution praised the policy because “it rejects the failed policies of termination and 
paternalism . . . recognizing that cultural pluralism is a source of strength.” Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29 (May 21, 2003) (Testimony 
of Clifford Marshall, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribe, rejecting the notion that “contracting and 
compacting under the Self-Determination and Self-Governance Acts somehow relieves the United 
States of their trust obligations to tribes and individual Indians.”). See also Raymond Cross, The 
Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 369 (2003). 
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(DOI), which houses the BIA, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
American Indian Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) recommended in 
1977 that Indian affairs be elevated to cabinet-level status.38 President 
Nixon wrote to the Senate Indian Affairs Committee in 1989 to remind it 
of his twenty-year-old proposal to create an “Independent Trust Counsel 
Authority” to advocate for the trust responsibility to Indians.39 Numerous 
witnesses told the Committee of the need for independent legal 
representation of the trust responsibility, including such former 
administration officials as Reid Chambers (Associate Solicitor for Indian 
Affairs), Leonard Garment (Special Counsel to President Nixon), and 
Louis Clairborne (Solicitor General).40
The Senate Indian Affairs Committee has observed that, “[d]espite 
the federal government’s long-standing obligation to protect Indian 
natural resources, they have been left unprotected, subject to, at best, 
benign neglect and, at worst, outright theft by unscrupulous 
companies.”41 The Committee laid much of the blame on agencies other 
than the BIA, including the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management, 
Minerals Management Service, and Office of the Solicitor.42 Others note 
that it is not merely a lack of administrative capacity and bureaucratic 
independence that handicaps the BIA, but also federal policy itself. An 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs commented upon this simple fact. 
 
The mission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs has changed dramatically 
 38. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM., FINAL REPORT 287-89 (1977) [hereinafter 
AIPRC]. This recommendation was reflected as well in the testimony of many tribal leaders who 
appeared before the various AIPRC task forces. See, e.g., REPORT ON FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 
AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW 
COMMISSION 61-63 (1976); REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN 
RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING TREATY REVIEW, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 
REVIEW COMMISSION 3-6 (1976). 
 39. Special Committee on Investigations, supra note 14, part 3, at 256-57. 
 40. Id., at 662-65 (letter to President Bush from Committee Co-Chairs). See also R. 
Chambers, Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong., A Study of Admin. Conflicts of Interest in the Protection of Indian Natural Resources 
(Comm. Print 1971). Mr. Chambers is also the author of a seminal article concerning the trust 
responsibility. Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to 
Indians, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1213, 1226-27 (1975). Support for the creation of a separate litigating 
agency outside of the Departments of Justice and Interior has not lessened noticeably in the 
intervening years. See, e.g., Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict 
of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (Summer, 2003). Some 
Indian advocates fear, however, that a separate trust counsel would isolate Indian interests from 
agency decision-making. See, e.g., Colloquium, Federal Trust Responsibility and Conflicts of 
Interest: Environmental Protection or Natural Resource Development?, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 365, 374-
75 (1995) (comments of Professor Sam Deloria). 
 41. Special Committee on Investigations, FINAL REP. AND LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24, at 105. 
 42. Id. at 113-40. 
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from its intended mission 150 years ago to what it has become today. In 
fact, the mission of the Bureau has changed on average about every 25 
years as American Indian policy has changed. Simply stated, the 
mission of the Bureau is to promote and execute the policy of the day 
of any given Administration and Congress dealing with American 
Indians and their governing organizations.43
 
United States Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman of the 
Indian Affairs Committee, acknowledges the role of Congress in creating 
the conditions that result in allegations of BIA failure. 
 
For too many years, the bureau has been one of the most under-rated 
and overly-criticized agencies in the federal government. It is the 
agency that Indian country and appropriators love to hate. In recent 
years, the administrative capabilities of the bureau of Indian affairs 
have been decimated by government-down-sizing, early retirement 
authority, and diminishing resources. Nonetheless, we continue to 
charge the bureau with an ever-increasing and wider range of 
responsibilities — in furtherance of the United States trust 
responsibilities — while failing to provide the bureau with the 
resources any agency would need to carry out these duties. Add to that 
the impact of self-determination contracting and self-governance 
compacting on the ranks and functions of the bureau — and it is a small 
wonder that this agency is perceived by its critics to be operating under 
siege and unable to meet the task.44
 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights45 recently issued a report that 
cites the inadequacy of federal programs intended to assist Native 
Americans not only at the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”), but 
also at the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”), the U.S. Department of Education 
(“DOEd”), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“DOA”).46 The 
 43. Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Capacity and Mission, supra note 35 (Testimony of Ross O. 
Swimmer, Former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs). 
 44. Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Capacity and Mission, supra note 35 (Chairman Campbell’s 
Opening Statement). 
 45. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, bipartisan agency established by 
Congress in 1957 pursuant to Public Law No.103-419. 
 46. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS, FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2003), at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0731.pdf [hereinafter A QUIET 
CRISIS]. In addition to the BIA, a wide variety of federal agencies administer programs that provide 
assistance to Native Americans. See, e.g., ROGER WALKE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE TO 
NATIVE AMERICANS, A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN 
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Commission found that significant disparities in federal funding exist 
between Native Americans and other groups in our nation, as well as the 
general population.47 The Commission also reported a finding by the 
Congressional Research Service that, when adjusting for inflation 
between 1975 and 2000, Indian programs at the DOI experienced a 
yearly appropriations decline of $6 million, leaving unfunded $7.4 
billion in unmet needs among Native Americans in 2000.48
As a result, according to the Commission, “Native Americans 
continue to rank at or near the bottom of nearly every social, health, and 
economic indicator,” as compared to other groups in American society. 
Native Americans suffer “higher rates of poverty, lower educational 
achievement, more substandard housing, and higher rates of disease and 
illness.”49
This multi-faceted critique of federal Indian policy provides a 
historic backdrop for today’s BIA-bashing and the current debate over 
BIA reorganization and reform. The most immediate impetus for 
renewed scrutiny of the BIA, however, is a class action lawsuit filed by 
Native American beneficiaries of individual Indian money (“IIM”) 
accounts held in trust by the BIA, seeking an accounting of all funds 
collected by the BIA on behalf of individual Indian landowners over the 
course of the last century.50 The DOI has launched a massive program of 
trust reform51 in response to a seemingly endless stream of court orders 
in Cobell v. Babbitt (renamed Cobell v. Norton after the substitution of 
the current Secretary of the Interior).52
AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 102-62 (1991). 
 47. A Quiet Crisis, supra note 46, at 10-12. 
 48. Id. at 24. 
 49. Id. at ix. 
 50. Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub. nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 
F. 3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 51. The Department’s Comprehensive Trust Management Plan is online at 
http://www.doi.gov/indiantrust/pdf/doi_trust_management_plan.pdf. 
 52. Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27-29 (D.D.C. 1998) (certified the class); Cobell v. 
Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (held then-Secretary Babbitt and then-Assistant Secretary 
Gover in civil contempt for violating two discovery orders); Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11, 34 
(D.D.C. 1999) (denied government motion for summary judgment); Cobell v. Babbitt, 188 F.R.D. 
122 (D.D.C. 1999) (ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses and attorneys’ fees); Cobell v. 
Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999) (ordered defendants to take certain steps the court 
deemed necessary to provide an accounting of the IIM trust); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 
(2001) (affirmed the district court’s holding that the officials, who serve as trustee delegates for the 
federal government, had breached their fiduciary duties, and remanded for further proceedings); 
Cobell v. Norton, 175 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordered Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, 
and Neal McCaleb, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, to show cause why they 
should not be held in civil contempt of court); Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 161 (D.D.C., 
2002) (“Contempt Order,” held Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb “in civil 
contempt of court . . .”), vacated by, in part, remanded by Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Monitor Order” and “Special 
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E.  Understanding the BIA 
 
Whereas there are serious issues to be addressed to ensure the fair 
and accurate accounting of individual trust funds, the current rush to 
reform may threaten to throw out the baby with the bathwater while 
failing to address more basic problems with federal Indian policy. This 
article attempts to chronicle proposals for BIA reform and reorganization 
in the context of the vast array of BIA duties and programs, the federal 
trust responsibility, and overall federal Indian policy. Rather than 
scapegoat the agency and its employees for the sometimes tragic 
consequences of such programs and policies, however, the article seeks 
to illuminate the many competing forces that historically shape such 
outcomes. At the same time, by focusing on the nuts and bolts of the 
agency’s work, the article seeks both to provide firm ground for reform 
proposals and to facilitate the implementation of the BIA’s truly 
admirable mission. 
Today, that mission is ambitious in scope: 
 
The [BIA’s] responsibility is the administration and management of 
55.7 million acres of land held in trust by the United States for 
American Indians, Indian tribes, and Alaska Natives. There are 562 
federal recognized tribal governments in the United States. Developing 
forestlands, leasing assets on these lands, directing agricultural 
programs, protecting water and land rights, developing and maintaining 
infrastructure and economic development are all part of the agency’s 
responsibility. In addition, the Bureau of Indian Affairs provides 
education services to approximately 48,000 Indian students.53
 
Part II of the article provides an overview of the BIA, its history, and 
Master-Monitor Order”), vacated in part, remanded by Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cobell v. Norton, 274 F. Supp. 2d 111, 
135 (D.D.C. 2003) (preliminary injunction requiring the Department of the Interior to “immediately 
disconnect from the Internet all Information Technology Systems within [its] custody or control . . . 
until such time as the Court approves their reconnection to the Internet. . . .”); superseded and 
replaced, by Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring disconnection of 
substantially all of the Department of the Interior's computer systems from the Internet, and ordering 
the Secretary to submit a plan for secure reconnection of Interior's computer systems), vacated by,  
remanded by Cobell v. Norton, No. 03-5262, 2004 WL 2753197 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2004); Cobell v. 
Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2003) (structural injunction imposing deadlines to complete 
accounting of Native American trust account funds), vacated by, in part, remanded by Cobell v. 
Norton, No. 03-5314, 2004 WL 25473 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2004);  Cobell v. Norton, No. 03-5262, 
2004 WL 2753197 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2004); Cobell v. Norton, No. 03-5314, 2004 WL 25473 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec. 10, 2004). These orders may be found at http://www.doi.gov/pfm/5year2004/index.html. 
All orders of the Court and Special Master in the Cobell case are also available at 
http://www.indiantrust.com/rulings. 
 53. http://www.doi.gov/bureaus.html. 
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its current structure and responsibilities. Thereafter, the article describes 
in some detail the ways in which the agency carries out its statutory 
mandates, citing the BIA’s regulatory code,54 highlighting current issues, 
noting conflicting federal policy priorities, and documenting the 
persistent shortage of resources to address unmet Indian needs. 
Administrative and judicial construction of the Indian laws and 
regulations, in the context of appeals from BIA actions, provides an 
additional counterpoint to each of the subsequent parts of this article. 
The article concludes with observations regarding the prospects for a 
revitalized BIA, one that has the support and confidence of tribal 
governments and the resources to make a significant contribution, as 
pledged by a former BIA leader, to “the rebirth of joy, freedom, and 
progress for the Indian Nations.”55
 
II.  THE BIA AND THE FEDERAL TRUST OBLIGATION TO AMERICAN 
INDIANS
 
A.  The BIA and the Department of the Interior 
 
The DOI is a massive federal agency that manages one out of every 
five acres of land in the United States; provides the resources for nearly 
one-third of the Nation’s energy; provides water to thirty-one million 
citizens through 824 dams and reservoirs; administers 388 units of the 
national park system, 544 wildlife refuges and vast areas of multiple-use 
lands; facilitates hunting and fishing on millions of acres of public and 
private lands.56 It comprises numerous bureaus and offices, including the 
Fish and Wildlife Service;57 the Bureau of Reclamation;58 the Office of 
Surface Mining;59 the Minerals Management Service;60 the National Park 
 54. 25 C.F.R. 
 55. Gover, supra note 2, at 161. 
 56. See http://www.doi.gov. 
 57. The mission of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) is to conserve, protect, and 
enhance fish, wildlife, and their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people. Primary 
responsibilities are for migratory birds, endangered species, freshwater and anadromous fisheries, 
and certain marine mammals. FWS also has a continuing cooperative relationship with a number of 
Indian tribes throughout the National Wildlife Refuge System and the Service’s fish hatcheries. See 
generally 50 C.F.R. pts. 1-199, 400-499 (2004). 
 58. The Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) operates a wide range of water resource 
management projects for irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, municipal and industrial water 
supplies, flood control, outdoor recreation, enhancement of fish and wildlife habitats, and research. 
Most of Reclamation’s activities involve construction, operations and maintenance, and management 
of water resources projects and associated facilities. See generally 43 C.F.R. pts. 200-499 (2004). 
 59. The Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement regulates surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations, and reclaims abandoned coal mines, in cooperation with States 
and Indian tribes. See generally 43 C.F.R. pts. 700-999 (2004). 
 60. The Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) provides stewardship of America’s 
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Service;61 the Bureau of Land Management;62 and the U.S. Geological 
Survey.63 The Office of the Solicitor provides legal counsel to the 
various DOI agencies, and ultimately to the Secretary.64
The BIA, in turn, is itself a complex organization, with twelve 
Regional offices, nearly 100 agencies and field offices located throughout 
the country, and approximately 10,000 employees.65 Although Indian 
preference creates a relatively small pool from which BIA fills its 
employee ranks, the history of relationships between the United States 
and the Indian Nations is marked by Indians’ deep and understandable 
mistrust of the government. The fact that BIA employees are drawn from 
tribal ranks helps to introduce a small measure of trust and is sometimes 
perceived as one small way in which the United States fulfills its trust–
through the provision of employment and business contracting 
preference to Indians. Moreover, many BIA employees have 
demonstrated, at the grassroots level, that their commitment to serve 
Indians is more than just a job.66
offshore resources and collects revenues generated from mineral leases on Federal and Indian lands. 
MMS is responsible for the management of the Federal Outer Continental Shelf, which are 
submerged lands off the coasts that have significant energy and mineral resources. Within the 
offshore minerals management program, environmental impact assessments and statements, and 
environmental studies, may be available if a self-governance tribe demonstrates a special 
geographic, cultural, or historical connection. See generally 43 C.F.R. pts. 200-299 (2004). 
 61. The National Park Service (“NPS”) administers the National Park System made up of 
national parks, monuments, historic sites, battlefields, seashores, lake shores and recreation areas. 
NPS maintains the park units, protects the natural and cultural resources, and conducts a range of 
visitor services such as law enforcement, park maintenance, and interpretation of geology, history, 
and natural and cultural resources. See generally 36 C.F.R. pts. 1-199 (2004). 
 62. The Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) responsibilities cover a wide range of 
areas, such as recreational activities, timber, range and minerals management, wildlife habitat 
management and watershed restoration. In addition, BLM is responsible for the survey of certain 
Federal and tribal lands. Two programs provide tribal services: (1) Tribal and allottee minerals 
management; and (2) Survey of tribal and allottee lands. See generally 43 C.F.R. Chapter II, pts. 
1000-9999 (2004). 
 63. The mission of the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) is to provide information 
on biology, geology, hydrology, and cartography that contributes to the wise management of the 
Nation’s natural resources and to the health, safety, and well-being of the American people. 
Information includes maps, data bases, and descriptions and analyses of the water, plants, animals, 
energy, and mineral resources, land surface, underlying geologic structure and dynamic processes of 
the earth. Information on these scientific issues is developed through extensive research, field 
studies, and comprehensive data collection to: evaluate natural hazards such as earthquakes, 
volcanoes, landslides, floods, droughts, subsidence and other ground failures; assess energy, mineral, 
and water resources in terms of their quality, quantity, and availability; evaluate the habitats of 
animals and plants; and produce geographic, cartographic, and remotely-sensed information in 
digital and non-digital formats. See generally, 43 C.F.R. pts. 400-499 (2004). 
 64. See http://www.doi.gov/sol. 
 65. The twelve BIA Regional Offices are located in Portland, Oregon; Sacramento, 
California; Phoenix, Arizona; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Anadarko, Oklahoma; Muskogee, 
Oklahoma; Nashville, Tennessee; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Aberdeen, South Dakota; and Billings, 
Montana. See http://www.doi.gov/bureaus.html. 
 66. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-343 (2004), to accompany H.R. Con. Res. 237, honoring the 
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Like all federal employees, those at the BIA are subject to civil 
and/or criminal penalties for violation of certain laws concerning ethical 
conduct and financial conflict of interest.67 Among these are post-
government employment restrictions against representing anyone in a 
matter that the former employee previously represented the government, 
and in which the government has a continuing interest.68 There is an 
exception, however, for former officers and employees of the United 
States who are employed by Indian tribes as agents or attorneys in such 
matters.69 Several ethics statutes are unique to DOI employees, including 
laws that prohibit certain employees from acquiring interests in federal 
lands.70
Federal ethics regulations applicable to all federal employees provide 
that “[p]ublic service is a public trust, requiring employees to put loyalty 
to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.”71 
The regulations set forth fourteen general principles of ethical conduct 
and several sections of detailed rules regarding matters such as accepting 
gifts from outside sources, gifts between employees, conflicting financial 
interests, impartiality in performing official duties, seeking other 
employment, misuse of position, and outside activities.72 They also set 
forth a long list of related statutory authorities.73 Interior has promulgated 
supplemental regulations with specific standards of ethical conduct for 
DOI employees.74 Among other things, these regulations prohibit all DOI 
employees from acquiring rights granted by the Department in federal 
lands.75
late Rick Lupe, Lead Forestry Technician for the BIA Fort Apache Agency, available at 
http://www.resourcescommittee.house.gov. (Mr. Lupe, a member of the White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, died on June 19, 2003, from burns sustained in a prescribed fire. He had participated in 
fighting multiple fires over the years in Arizona and was honored in particular for helping to save 
communities like Show Low, Arizona, from the Rodeo-Chediski fire.) See also Linda Sue Warner & 
Jim Hastings, A Research Study to Determine Perceptions of Job-Related Stress by Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Education Employees, 35 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 1 (Oct. 1995). (A study that examined 
perceptions of job-related stress by BIA education employees in day schools and education 
employees in boarding schools found that employees in boarding schools are frequently involved in 
all aspects of the students’ lives, that many employees act in roles designed to serve as surrogate 
parents or family members, that some employees recognize tribal kinship ties and maintain current 
interest in the academic, behavioral, mental, and physical aspects of students’ lives, all without any 
extra recognition or compensation.). 
 67. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 203-209. 
 68. See 18 U.S.C. § 207. 
 69. See 25 U.S.C. § 450i(j). 
 70. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 11 (BLM); 43 U.S.C. § 31(a) (USGS). 
 71. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(1). 
 72. See generally, 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635. 
 73. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.902. 
 74. 5 C.F.R. pt. 3501. 
 75. 5 C.F.R. § 3501.103(c). 
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B.  Statutory and Regulatory Authorities 
 
Title 25 of the United States Code is dedicated exclusively to Indian 
affairs, with many of the statutes relating to the responsibilities of the 
Secretary of the Interior and the BIA.76 The AIPRC Task Force on 
Consolidation, Revision and Codification of Federal Indian Law 
recommended in its 1976 Report that Title 25 be thoroughly revised, 
noting that “Title 25 is now packed with statutory provisions which are 
either superceded by subsequent legislation, obsolete by virtue of 
passage of time, redundant to prior legislation, or in total conflict with 
present policies relating to the administration of Indian affairs.”77 
Similarly, Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) contains 
the rules the BIA has promulgated to implement these laws and the 
agency’s responsibilities thereunder.78 Title 43 of the CFR contains 
 76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-17, Bureau of Indian Affairs; §§ 21-68(a ), Officers of Indian Affairs; §§ 
70-70(w) (omitted or repealed), Indian Claims Commission; §§ 71-88, Agreements with Indians; §§ 
91-166, Performance by United States of Obligations to Indians; §§ 171-202, Protection of Indians; 
§§ 211-266, Government of Indian Country and Reservations; §§ 267-304(b), Education of Indians; 
§§ 305-310, Promotion of Social and Economic Welfare; §§ 311-328, Rights-of-way Through Indian 
Lands; §§ 1451-1544, Allotment of Indian Lands; §§ 371-380, Descent and Distribution; Heirs of 
Allotee; §§ 381-90, Irrigation of Allotted Lands; §§ 391-416(j), Lease, Sale or Surrender of Allotted 
or Unallotted Land; §§ 331-358 (transferred), Ceded Indian Lands; §§ 441-1300(n), Miscellaneous 
(Indian self-determination and education assistance as well as many tribe-specific statutes); §§ 1301-
1341, Constitutional Rights of Indians; §§ 1401-1408, Distribution of Judgment Funds; §§ 1451-
1544, Financing Economic Development of Indians and Indian Organizations; §§ 1601-1683, Indian 
Health Care; §§ 1701-1778(h), Indian Land Claims Settlements; §§ 1801-1900, Tribally Controlled 
Community College Assistance; §§ 1901-1963, Indian Child Welfare; §§ 2001-2026, BIA Programs; 
§§ 2101-2108, Development of Tribal Mineral Resources; §§ 2201-2219, Indian Land 
Consolidation; §§ 2301-2307, Old Age Assistance Claims Settlement; §§ 2401-2478, Indian Alcohol 
and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment; §§ 2501-2511, Tribally Controlled School Grants; 
§§ 2601-2651 (repealed), Indian Education Program; §§ 2701-2721, Indian Gaming Regulation; §§ 
2801-2809, Indian Law Enforcement Reform; §§ 2901-2906, Native American Languages; §§ 3001-
3013, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation; §§ 3101-3120, National Indian Forest 
Resources Management; §§ 3201-3211, Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention; §§ 
3301-3371, Indian Higher Education Programs; §§ 3401-3417, Indian Employment, Training and 
Related Services; §§ 3501-3506, Indian Energy Resources; §§ 3601-3631, Indian Tribal Justice 
Support; §§ 3651-3681, Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance; §§ 3701-3746, 
American Indian Agricultural Resources Management; §§ 3801-3804, Indian Dams Safety; §§ 3901-
3908, Indian Lands Open Dump Cleanup; §§ 4001-4006, American Indian Trust Fund Management 
Reform; §§ 4101-4142, Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination; §§ 4301-
4307, Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism. 
 77. AIPRC, supra note 38, PETER S. TAYLOR, LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, CONSOLIDATION, 
REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF FED. INDIAN LAW, FINAL REP. TO THE AIPRC, at iv (1976). 
 78. 25 C.F.R. pts. 1-5 (2004), procedures and practice; pts. 10-13, law and order; pts. 15-17, 
probate; pts. 20-27, human services; pts. 31-46, education; pts. 61-91, tribal government; pts. 101-
143, financial activities; pts. 150-183, land and water; pts. 200-227, energy and minerals; pts. 241-
249, fish and wildlife; pt. 256, housing improvement program; pts. 262-265, heritage preservation; 
pts. 273-276, Indian self-determination and education assistance programs; pts. 286-291, economic 
enterprises; pts. 301-310, Indian Arts and Crafts Board; pts. 501-599, the National Indian Gaming 
Commission; pts. 700-899, the Office of Navajo and Hopi Relocation; pt. 900, contracts under the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act with BIA and the Indian Health Service; 
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additional DOI rules, some of which pertain to the BIA.79
In addition to regulations promulgated in the CFR, BIA publishes a 
mind-numbing series of instructions to its employees in form of the BIA 
Manual (“BIAM”). Although the content of the BIAM is beyond the 
scope of this article, it has been described as “a confusing, often 
contradictory, and generally inefficient compilation of policy and 
procedure ranging from generally inadequate . . . to absolutely 
unfathomable.”80 A Senate Committee once set out to require BIA to 
“revoke all provisions of the BIA Manual that are not promulgated as 
proposed regulations,” noting that the BIAM comprised some 14,000 
pages at that time.81
 
C.  Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility 
 
Foremost among the responsibilities historically delegated to the 
BIA is the duty to manage Indian lands and funds, often thought of as the 
essence of the federal trust responsibility to Indians. Although its roots 
are in the United States Constitution,82 the federal trust responsibility has 
been developed and defined through a series of opinions by the United 
States Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall first invoked the 
concept in 1831, characterizing the relation of the Cherokee Nation to the 
United States as that of a ward to his guardian.83
Subsequent Court opinions have relied upon the guardian-ward 
analogy to uphold the “plenary power” of Congress to enact statutes 
extending federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians,84 and allotting tribal 
lands without obtaining tribal consent.85 The Court has also recognized 
that the trust relationship places some limits on the power of the 
pts. 1000-1001, annual funding agreements and tribal self-governance programs; and pt. 1200, 
Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians and the Trust Fund Reform Act. 
 79. Foremost among these are 43 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2003), practices before the DOI; pt. 2, records, 
testimony and Freedom of Information Act regulations; pt. 4, DOI hearings and appeals procedures; 
pt. 7, protection of archaeological resources; and pt. 10, Native American graves protection and 
repatriation. 
 80. AIPRC, supra note 38, CONSOLIDATION, REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF FED. INDIAN 
LAW, FINAL REP. TO THE AIPRC, 343 (1976). 
 81. S. REP. NO. 104-227 (1996) (providing for the reorganization of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and for other purposes). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congressional power to regulate commerce with the Indian 
tribes); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presidential power to make treaties); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2 (Congressional power to make regulations governing the territory of the United States). 
 83. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 84. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886); United States v. Sandoval, 231 
U.S. 28 (1913). 
 85. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
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government to infringe upon Indian property rights.86
In the seminal case of Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell II),87 the 
Supreme Court held that statutes and regulations pertaining to timber 
management by the BIA created a judicially enforceable trust 
responsibility upon the U.S. to follow those statutes and regulations. In 
an earlier ruling (Mitchell I),88 the Court had found the General 
Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1331, created only a minimal trust 
relationship between the Indian landowner and the U.S. concerning 
timber management. In the second case, that responsibility was made 
enforceable in damages by the more specific laws regarding timber 
management.89
In two cases decided in 2003, the Supreme Court clarified the 
parameters of the trust responsibility where there is no express statutory 
mandate.90 In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Court 
ruled the United States was liable in money damages for failing to 
maintain and repair buildings placed into trust for the White Mountain 
Apache Tribe under a 1960 statute that allowed the BIA to use and 
occupy the buildings.91
The Tribe had sued the United States for the amount necessary to 
rehabilitate the property occupied by the Government in accordance with 
standards for historic preservation, alleging that the United States had 
breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve the 
trust property.92 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint, 
reasoning that no statute or regulation could fairly be read to impose a 
legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone 
authorize compensation for breach. The Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded on the understanding that the Government’s property use 
under the 1960 Act triggered a common law trustee’s duty to act 
reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary chose to utilize, an 
obligation fairly interpreted as supporting a money damages claim.93
The Supreme Court held that the 1960 Act gives rise to Indian 
Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe’s 
suit for money damages against the United States.94 The Court held that 
 86. Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919); Seminole Nation v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). 
 87. 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II). 
 88. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I). 
 89. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226. 
 90. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); United States v. 
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 91. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 474-75. 
 92. Id. at 470. 
 93. See id. at 471. 
 94. The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2004), invested the Court of Federal Claims 
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it is not necessary to find an explicit money-mandating provision in the 
relevant statute, but rather the less demanding requirement of “fair 
inference that the law was meant to provide a damage remedy for breach 
of a duty.”95
The Supreme Court focused not just on the wording of the 1960 Act, 
but on the actual control asserted by the United States over the trust 
property. 
 
As to the property subject to the Government’s actual use, then, the 
United States has not merely exercised daily supervision but has 
enjoyed daily occupation, and so has obtained control at least as 
plenary as its authority over the timber in Mitchell II. While it is true 
that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in that case, expressly 
subject the Government to duties of management and conservation, the 
fact that the property occupied by the United States is expressly subject 
to a trust supports a fair inference that an obligation to preserve the 
property improvements was incumbent on the United States as trustee. 
This is so because elementary trust law, after all, confirms the 
commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust 
property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch.96
 
On the same day that it ruled in the White Mountain Apache case, the 
Court issued an opinion in United States v. Navajo Nation,97 holding the 
United States was not liable for damages in failing to obtain the highest 
possible royalty rate for the Tribe in a coal mining lease with a third 
party, where the relevant statute merely requires federal approval of the 
lease negotiated between the parties.98 Initially, the Court of Federal 
Claims found that the government owed general fiduciary duties to the 
Tribe, which the Secretary had “flagrantly dishonored by acting in the 
best interests of Peabody Coal Company rather than the Tribe.” 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Tribe had entirely failed to 
link that breach of duty to any statutory or regulatory obligation that 
could be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation for the 
government’s fiduciary wrongs.99
with jurisdiction to render judgments in certain claims by Indian tribes against the United States, 
including claims based on an Act of Congress. 
 95. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475. 
 96. Id. at 475. 
 97. 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 98. Id. at 503. The statute primarily at issue was the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) of 
1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)-396(g) (2000). In addition, all leases of coal on Indian lands must comply 
as well with the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 
1201 (2000) and regulations promulgated at 30 C.F.R. pt. 750 (2004). 
 99. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 501 (citing 46 Fed. Cl. 217 (2000)). 
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The court of appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of 
Federal Claims, finding that the government’s liability to the Tribe 
turned on whether “the United States controls the Indian resources.” The 
Court of Appeals determined that the measure of control the Secretary 
exercised over the leasing of Indian lands for mineral development 
sufficed to warrant a money judgment against the United States for 
breaches of fiduciary duties connected to coal leasing. The appeals court 
agreed with the Federal Claims Court that the Secretary “favored 
Peabody interests to the detriment of Navajo interests.”100
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Navajo Nation, 
holding that “to state a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a 
rights-creating source of substantive law that ‘can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages 
sustained.’”101 Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion implied that the 
Government has a lesser trust responsibility where the tribe assumes 
more control over decision-making concerning its resources. “The IMLA 
aims to enhance tribal self-determination by giving Tribes, not the 
Government, the lead role in negotiating mining leases with third parties. 
(Citation omitted.) As the Court of Federal Claims recognized, ‘the ideal 
of Indian self-determination is directly at odds with Secretarial control 
over leasing.’”102
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stevens and 
Justice O’Connor, suggested that the Tribe’s theoretical control was 
something of an illusion. 
 
What is more, the Tribe has made a powerful showing that the 
Secretary knew perfectly well how his own intervention on behalf of 
Peabody had derailed the lease adjustment proceeding that would in all 
probability have yielded the 20 percent rate. After his ex parte meeting 
with Peabody’s representatives, the Secretary put his name on the 
memorandum, drafted by Peabody, directing Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Fritz to withhold his decision affirming the 20 percent rate; 
directing him to mislead the Tribe by telling it that no decision on the 
merits of the adjustment was imminent, when in fact the affirmance had 
been prepared for Fritz’s signature; and directing him to encourage the 
Tribe to shift its attention from the Area Director’s appealed award of 
20 percent and return to the negotiating table, where 20 percent was 
never even a possibility. App. 117-118. The purpose and predictable 
effect of these actions was to induce the Tribe to take a deep discount 
 100. Id. (citing 263 F.3d 1325, 1329-32 (2001)). 
 101. Id. at 503 (quoting U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983)). 
 102. Id. at 508 (quoting 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230 (2000)). 
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in the royalty rate in the face of what the Tribe feared would otherwise 
be prolonged revenue loss and uncertainty. The point of this evidence is 
not that the Secretary violated some rule of procedure for 
administrative appeals, ante, at 21-22, or some statutory duty regarding 
royalty adjustments under the terms of the earlier lease. What these 
facts support is the Tribe’s claim that the Secretary defaulted on his 
fiduciary responsibility to withhold approval of an inadequate lease 
accepted by the Tribe while under a disadvantage the Secretary himself 
had intentionally imposed.103
 
The majority did not completely close the door on the trust 
responsibility, leaving open the question of liability for breach of trust 
where the pertinent regulations impose more specific duties. 
 
We rule only on the Government’s role in the coal leasing process 
under the IMLA. As earlier recounted, see supra, at 2-3, both the 
IMLA and its implementing regulations address oil and gas leases in 
considerably more detail than coal leases. Whether the Secretary has 
fiduciary or other obligations, enforceable in an action for money 
damages, with respect to oil and gas leases is not before us.104
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Navajo Nation105 has caused a good deal of concern over the future of the 
federal trust doctrine. Professor Raymond Cross has written a 
particularly alarming article concerning the Court’s apparent suggestion 
that the federal trust responsibility may be incompatible with Indian Self-
Determination.106 Professor Mary Christina Wood had earlier proposed 
an alternative paradigm that seeks to harmonize the two, arguing that the 
federal trust duty should be seen as encompassing a sovereign trust in 
favor of Indian Self-Determination.107
Whereas recent litigation has dealt with enforcement of the federal 
trust responsibility for management of trust resources, questions linger 
regarding the extent of such a responsibility with respect to issues of 
tribal sovereignty and the overall welfare of tribal members. Congress 
routinely acknowledges a trust responsibility for management of Indian 
 103. Id. at 520 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 507, n.11. 
 105. Id. at 508. 
 106. Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determination: An 
Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369 (2003). 
 107. Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust 
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, UTAH L. REV. 109, 139-49 
(1995). 
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lands, such as in the American Indian Agricultural Resource 
Management Act (“the United States has a trust responsibility to protect, 
conserve, utilize and manage Indian agricultural lands consistent with its 
fiduciary obligation and its unique relationship with Indian tribes”),108 
and Indian funds, as in the American Indian Trust Fund Management 
Reform Act (“consistent with the trust responsibility of the United 
States”).109
Explicit reference to the trust responsibility is contained as well in 
such statutes as the Indian Tribal Justice Act (“the United States has a 
trust responsibility to each tribal government that includes the protection 
of the sovereignty of each tribal government.”);110 the Native American 
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (“the Congress, through 
treaties, statutes, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has 
assumed a trust responsibility for the protection and preservation of 
Indian tribes and for working with tribes and their members to improve 
their housing conditions and socioeconomic status”);111 and the Higher 
Education Tribal Grant Authorization Act (“these services are part of the 
Federal Government’s continuing trust responsibility to provide 
education services to American Indian and Alaska Natives.”).112
Other statutes appear to reference the trust responsibility without 
using the word “trust,” for example: The Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act (“special responsibilities and legal obligations to the 
American Indian people”);113 the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act (“the Federal Government’s historical and 
special legal relationship with, and resulting responsibilities to, American 
Indian people”);114 the Indian Child Welfare Act (“the special 
relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and their 
members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people”).115 Similar 
language is contained in the Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act,116 the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 
1988,117 and the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention 
 108. 25 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000). See also The National Indian Forest Resources Management 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3101(2) (2000) (“[T]he United States has a trust responsibility toward Indian forest 
lands . . . .”). 
 109. 25 U.S.C. § 4021 (2000). 
 110. § 3601(2). 
 111. § 4101(4). 
 112. § 3302(7). 
 113. § 1602(a). 
 114. § 450(a). 
 115. § 1901. 
 116. § 2401(1). 
 117. § 2501. 
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Act.118
The existence of the trust responsibility with respect to these various 
duties and programs is not in doubt, yet it is far from clear whether each 
of these laws may be enforced either by suits for damages or injunctive 
relief. Presumably, entitlement to damages would depend upon a court 
finding that the substantive law “can fairly be interpreted as mandating 
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.”119 
Injunctive relief may require a lesser standard.120
 
III.  BIA DECISION-MAKING, RECORDS AND APPEALS 
 
A.  Administrative Appeals 
 
Although carried out within the confines of policies established in 
Washington, the vast majority of BIA decisions and actions that directly 
affect tribes and tribal members are made every day on Indian 
reservations throughout the nation. Authority to make appealable 
decisions rests not with BIA social workers, educators, or realty officers, 
but normally with an Agency Superintendent, or, in smaller Field 
Offices, with Field Representatives. No decision is final for the DOI for 
purposes of administrative review under the Administrative Procedures 
Act (“APA”)121 so long as it is subject to appeal to superior authority in 
the Department.122 BIA decisions must include written notice to all 
interested parties and, unless final for the Department, must include 
notice of the right to appeal.123 BIA decisions are effective when the time 
for filing a notice of appeal has expired and no appeal has been filed.124
In appeals of actions of persons under the Regional Director’s 
authority, the Regional Director must issue a written decision within 
 118. § 3201(a). 
 119. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 503 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 
463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983)). 
 120. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974) (trust responsibility requires fair 
treatment of Indians with respect to general assistance, provided pursuant to the Snyder Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 13 (2000)); McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000), the court held that for the Indian Health 
Service to refuse to pay for medical care for an Indian child, when the State would not, was 
“inconsistent with the trust doctrine.”). Professor Wood argues that effective protection of tribal 
lands may depend more upon common law injunctive relief, rather than seeking damages for federal 
mismanagement of tribal lands. Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting 
Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims Of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 355 (2003). 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
 122. See 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(a) (2004). 
 123. See § 2.7. 
 124. See § 2.6(b). 
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sixty days after the time for all pleadings has expired.125 Within thirty 
days of receipt of the Regional Director’s decision, an interested party 
may appeal the decision to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals 
(“IBIA”). A copy of such an appeal must be sent to the Assistant 
Secretary–Indian Affairs, who may assume jurisdiction of the appeal 
within fifteen days of its receipt and issue a decision that is final for the 
Department. Decisions of the Assistant Secretary are immediately final 
unless the decision provides otherwise.126
Notice of appeal must be filed with the official whose decision is 
being appealed, with copies sent to the officer who will hear the appeal 
and to all interested parties.127 A statement of reasons for the appeal must 
be filed within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal.128 Any 
interested party may file a written answer within thirty days after receipt 
of the statement of reasons.129 All documents filed in an appeal must be 
served on all interested parties by personal service or mail.130 A 
document filed in the wrong office will be forwarded to the correct 
office, however no extension of time will be granted for the document to 
be filed in the correct office, unless the misdirection is the fault of the 
government.131 An official deciding an appeal may for good cause grant 
an extension of time for filing any document except the notice of 
appeal.132 Failure to timely file the notice of appeal will result in 
summary dismissal.133
An interested party who believes he or she may suffer substantial 
financial loss as a direct result of the delay caused by an appeal may 
request that the appellant be required to post bond.134 Appeals from 
inaction of officials of the BIA may be taken in the same manner if 
within ten days of a written request, the official fails to either make a 
decision or establish a reasonable date by which he or she will make a 
decision.135
The Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”) is one of three 
appeals boards within the Appeals Division of the Department’s Office 
of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”).136 The IBIA exercises the authority 
 125. See § 2.19. 
 126. See § 2.6(c). 
 127. See § 2.9. 
 128. See § 2.10. 
 129. See § 2.11. 
 130. See § 2.12. 
 131. See § 2.13. 
 132. See § 2.16. 
 133. See § 2.17. 
 134. See § 2.5. 
 135. See § 2.8. 
 136. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2004). 
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of the Secretary to issue decisions in (1) appeals in Indian probate 
matters, (2) appeals from decisions of BIA officials, and (3) other 
matters pertaining to Indians which are referred to it by the Secretary.137
The Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) hears appeals from 
BIA decisions concerning the use and disposition of public lands, 
including mineral resources, and the conduct of surface coal mining.138 
The IBLA is involved in Indian resource issues in matters such as Indian 
mineral royalties,139 Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) decisions 
concerning Indian allotments,140 Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”) 
decisions regarding reclamation of Indian lands,141 and other decisions 
concerning Alaskan Native lands.142
The Interior Board of Contract Appeals (“IBCA”) hears appeals from 
decisions of BIA contracting officers concerning BIA procurement 
contracts,143 including tribal contracts under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”).144
General delegations of authority to each of the Boards are found in 
43 C.F.R. Part 4. General regulations that apply to all of OHA, unless 
superceded by specific regulations of a particular component, are found 
in Subpart B. Specific rules applicable to the IBCA are in Subpart C; 
IBIA rules are in Subpart D; and IBLA rules are in Subparts E, J, and L. 
The OHA has a Hearings Division as well as an Appeals Division.145
Once an appeal is made to the IBIA, the regulations at 43 C.F.R. Part 
4 supercede those of 25 C.F.R. Part 2. In addition, some BIA programs 
have special appeals procedures, including procedures for establishing 
that an American Indian group exists as an Indian Tribe;146 decisions to 
contract or not to contract with an Indian tribe under the ISDEAA;147 
decisions of Education Program officials, which are appealed not to the 
 137. See § 4.1(b)(2). 
 138. See § 4.1(b)(3). 
 139. 30 C.F.R. § 290.7 (2004); 43 C.F.R. § 4.330(b)(3) (2004). 
 140. 25 U.S.C. §§ 334, 336 (2004). 
 141. 43 C.F.R. § 4.1100-4.1296 (2004). 
 142. E.g., 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(b) (2004). 
 143. Id. § 4.1(b)(1). 
 144. 25 U.S.C. § 450-450(n) (2004). 
 145. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(a) (2004). The Hearings Division has Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJ’s) located throughout the country, who hear all cases in which a hearing on the record is 
required by the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2004), including Indian probate cases. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.210-
308 (2004). They also hear cases that are referred to them by one of the appeals boards, where the 
Board concludes a hearing is warranted. Id. § 4.1(a). The party requesting an evidentiary hearing 
must affirmatively show the existence of a controversy concerning a genuine issue of material fact, 
the resolution of which is necessary for a decision in the appeal. See, e.g., All Materials of Montana, 
Inc. v. Billings Area Dir., 21 IBIA 202, 212 (1992). 
 146. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2004). 
 147. Id. § 900.150-176. 
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IBIA but to the Director of Education Programs then to the Assistant 
Secretary;148 and decisions in tribal enrollment disputes and issues 
concerning an individual’s degree of Indian blood, which are appealed to 
the Assistant Secretary.149
Decisions of the OHA appeal boards since November 1, 1996 are 
reported on the Department’s website.150 Unfortunately, the Department 
is subject to an order of the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia that limits its ability to utilize the Internet, due to a finding 
that inadequate Internet security measures put Indian trust assets at 
risk.151 A cursory review of reported OHA decisions shows that the vast 
majority of appeals from decisions of BIA officials are to the IBIA, 
rather than to the IBLA or IBCA. Unfortunately, IBIA review of cases 
regularly takes up to two years, or more, except for those that can be 
summarily decided (e.g. dismissals),152 and those subject to regulatory 
timetables requiring expedited consideration (i.e. certain ISDEA 
appeals). Normally, BIA decisions become effective only when the time 
for filing an appeal has passed without such appeal being filed,153 
although the official to whom an appeal is made may declare that public 
safety, protection of trust resources, or other public exigency requires 
that the decision be made effective immediately.154
In an appeal to the IBIA, the burden is on the appellant to show that 
a notice of appeal was timely mailed or delivered.155 An untimely appeal 
cannot be cured by attempting to appeal on remand.156 An appeal filed 
 148. Id. § 2.4(e). 
 149. Id. pt. 62. 
 150. http://www.doi.gov/oha. (The Office of Hearings and Appeals Web site is currently 
unavailable. Fortunately, OHA decisions are also available on the Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis 
databases. The Indian Law Reporter prints some Board decisions. The OHA also offers a 
subscription service.) 
 151. Cobell v. Norton, 274 F. Supp. 2d 111, 135 (D.D.C. 2003), superseded and replaced, by 
Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2004).  
 152. 25 C.F.R. § 2.17. 
 153. Id. § 2.6(b). 
 154. Id. § 2.6(a). 
 155. See American Land Dev. Corp. v. Acting Phoenix Area Dir., 25 IBIA 120, 125, recon. 
denied, 25 IBIA 197 (1994); see also, Howard Crow Flies High v. Rocky Mountain Reg’l Dir., 38 
IBIA 3 (2002). 
 156. In Jackson County, Kansas, v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 6 (2002), the Board 
affirmed the decision of the Regional Director to take a tract of land into trust for the Prairie Band of 
Potawatomi Indians (Tribe). The Regional Director’s decision was issued following the Board’s 
remand in Kansas v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 152 (2001), wherein the Board expressed 
concern that the Regional Director had alluded to pending regulations (although he properly based 
his decision on regulations then in effect). Appellant Jackson County, Kansas, filed a second notice 
of appeal which sought review of the decision at issue here, as well as a different decision 
concerning another tract of land. Appellant’s second appeal was dismissed as untimely. Jackson 
County, Kansas v. Acting S. Plains Reg. Dir., 37 IBIA 68 (2001). The State of Kansas appealed both 
of the decisions. Its appeals were dismissed as untimely. Kansas v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 37 
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more than thirty days after notice of the decision will be dismissed as 
untimely, even where it is related to an ongoing dispute.157 “Even where 
appellant has not received the Board’s order, that fact would not 
constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration.”158 A 
third party may request to appear as amicus curiae before the IBIA.159
The IBIA lacks jurisdiction to review decisions made by the 
Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs, except where a matter is specially 
referred to the Board by the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary or where 
a right of review is established by regulation.160 Just as it lacks authority 
to review decisions made by the Assistant Secretary, the Board also lacks 
authority to review inaction by the Assistant Secretary.161 The IBIA also 
lacks jurisdiction to review a BIA decision when a program regulation 
makes that decision final for the Department.162
The IBIA has stated on numerous occasions that it is not a court of 
general jurisdiction, but instead has only that authority delegated to it by 
the Secretary of the Interior.163 Although frequently requested by 
appellants, the IBIA has not been delegated authority to declare a duly 
promulgated Departmental regulation invalid.164 The Board has no 
authority to waive Departmental regulations.165 The Board may, 
IBIA 61, recon. denied, 37 IBIA 67 (2001). 
 157. In Rocky Crossing Ranch Co. & Sam J. Bitz v. Rocky Mountain Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 1 
(2002), the Board dismissed an appeal from a decision concerning plans for removal of stockpiled 
gravel from property in which Appellant owned the surface estate. The Board held in an earlier 
appeal concerning the same property that gravel underlying the surface estate was owned by the 
Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation. Bitz v. Acting Billings Area Dir., 23 IBIA 
286 (1993), recon. denied, 24 IBIA 10 (1993). 
 158. Louis W. Ballard v. Acting E. Oklahoma Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 IBIA 
255 (2000). 
 159. 43 C.F.R. § 4.3(c) (2004). 
 160. § 4.331(b); see, e.g., Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Assistant Sec’y–Indian 
Affairs, 35 IBIA 89 (2000), and cases cited therein. 
 161. Miller v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 32 IBIA 294 (1998), recon. denied, 33 IBIA 60 
(1998). 
 162. Stogsdill v. S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 35 IBIA 157 (2000) (interpreting 25 C.F.R. § 62.10(a) 
(2004) concerning adverse enrollment decisions); Welch v. Minneapolis Area Dir., 17 IBIA 56 
(1989) (interpreting 25 C.F.R. § 88.1(c) (2004) in regard to decisions approving, disapproving, or 
conditionally approving attorney contracts); Split Family Support Group v. Northwest Reg’l Dir., 36 
IBIA 5 (2001) (interpreting 25 C.F.R. § 82.10(b) (2004) concerning adequacy of petition for 
Secretarial election.). 
 163. See, e.g., Dailey v. Billings Area Dir., 34 IBIA 128, 129 (1999), and cases cited therein. 
 164. See, e.g., Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Portland Area Dir., 35 IBIA 242, 247 (2000), and 
cases cited therein; Debra Louriero v. Acting Pac. Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 158 (2002) (Board cannot 
disregard regulation that limits burial assistance to members of federally-recognized tribes as 
violative of the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13); Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc. v. Acting Assoc. 
Alaska State Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., 33 IBIA 51, 53 (1998), and cases cited therein; 
Hannahville Indian Cmty. v. Minneapolis Area Educ. Officer, 34 IBIA 4, 10 (1999). 
 165. Ballard v. Acting E. Okla. Reg’l Dir., 35 IBIA 255 (2000). Nor will the IBIA hear 
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Thomas E. Edwards v. Portland Area Dir., 29 
IBIA 12, 15 (1995). 
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however, refer a request for a waiver of the regulations to the Assistant 
Secretary–Indian Affairs.166
The OHA, as an Executive Branch agency, has no authority to 
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.167 Because they only have 
that authority delegated to them by the Secretary, the boards normally 
have no authority to review decisions of the Assistant Secretary168 or to 
award money damages against the BIA.169 The IBIA may not substitute 
its judgment for that of the BIA in a matter that involves the exercise of 
discretion,170 although the IBIA may review for abuse of discretion.171 
An appellant who challenges a BIA discretionary decision bears the 
burden of proving that the BIA did not properly exercise its discretion.172
The IBIA has repeatedly stated that it lacks authority to issue 
advisory opinions.173 An appellant who fails to make any allegation of 
error in the decision under appeal, let alone any argument in support of 
such an allegation, has not carried its burden of proof.174 The Board will 
not consider arguments or evidence presented for the first time on 
appeal.175 If Appellant believes it is entitled to an award of costs or 
attorney fees under any law, it may submit an application for such an 
award, identifying the law it believes is applicable.176
 166. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 35 IBIA 281 (2000) (minimum 
acceptable reservation rental rate for grazing). 
 167. See, e.g., Estate of Annie Greencrow Whitehorse, 27 IBIA 136 (1995); Kansas v. Acting 
S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 152, 154 (2001), and cases cited therein. 
 168. 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(c) (2004); see also § 2.4(e). 
 169. Dailey v. Billings Area Dir., 34 IBIA 128 (1999). 
 170. 43 C.F.R. § 4.330(b) (2004) provides: “Except as otherwise permitted by the Secretary or 
the Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs by special delegation or request, the Board shall not 
adjudicate: . . . (2) Matters decided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs through exercise of its 
discretionary authority.” 
 171. See, e.g., Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. E. Area Dir., 35 IBIA 93, 96 (2000), and 
cases cited therein. 
 172. E.g., id. 
 173. Narconon Chilocco New Life Ctr. v. Superintendent, Pawnee Agency, 29 IBIA 234 
(1996); Umpqua Watersheds, Inc., v. Northwest Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 10 (2002) (Federal court 
litigation involved some or all of the same issues and parties, and Appellants sought Board’s rulings 
on their standing to challenge timber sales and on BIA procedures under the National Environmental 
Policy Act, for purposes of future timber sales). 
 174. E.g., OK Tank Trucks, Inc. v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 33 IBIA 119 (1999), and 
cases cited therein. 
 175. E.g., Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Credit Program v. Portland Area Dir., 35 IBIA 110, 114-
15 (2000); Welk Park North v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 29 IBIA 213, 219 (1996), and cases 
cited therein. 
 176. The Department’s regulations implementing the Equal Access to Justice Act are at 43 
C.F.R. § 4.601-4.619 (2004). See Abbott v. Billings Area Dir., 21 IBIA 137 (1992), and Utu Utu 
Gwaitu Paiute Tribe v. Sacramento Area Dir., 17 IBIA 141 (1989), construing the regulations. An 
applicant may receive fees unless the Department’s position was substantially justified or special 
circumstances make the award unjust. No presumption arises that the Department’s position was not 
substantially justified simply because the Department did not prevail. An award will be reduced or 
denied if the applicant has unduly or unreasonably protracted the proceeding. The application must 
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To correct prior error, an official of the BIA may change an 
administrative interpretation of a statute as long as the reason for the 
change is clearly set forth and the departure from the prior administrative 
position is not arbitrary or capricious.177 Appellants have unsuccessfully 
sought to estop the Department in such situations.178 Estoppel will not 
run against the Government when it acts as trustee for Indians.179 The 
six-year statute of limitations for the commencement by the United 
States of civil actions for money damages180 does not limit administrative 
action within the Department.181
 
B.  BIA Records 
 
The DOI has established a national repository for the consolidated 
non-active records of the BIA and the OST. The American Indian 
Records Repository is located at the National Archives and Records 
Administration facility in Lenexa, Kansas. Haskell Indian Nations 
University, a BIA-operated post-secondary school located in Lawrence, 
Kansas, has simultaneously established an archival records management 
studies program to train and certify Indian students.182
Although the BIA makes daily decisions affecting not only Indians 
and their property interests, but also many non-Indians, BIA records–like 
itemize the amount of fees, which are limited to no more than $75 per hour and expenses for which 
an award is sought. Where a court reviews the decision on the merits in an adversary adjudication, 
the court shall make any award for the administrative stage as well as the judicial review stage of the 
proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). EAJA limits attorney 
fees to no more than $125 unless special factors justify a higher rate. For administrative proceedings, 
agencies must make any determination that special factors justify a higher rate by regulation. 5 
U.S.C. § 504(a)(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 177. See Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., IBIA 92-211-A 
(1993); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Director, Office of Trust and Econ. Dev., 22 IBIA 10, 16 (1992); Noyo 
River Indian Cmty. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 19 IBIA 63, 67 n.10 (1990); Kiowa, Comanche 
& Apache Intertribal Land Use Comm. v. Deputy Assistant Sec’y–Indian Affairs (Operations), 14 
IBIA 207, 214 (1986); Bonaparte v. Comm’r of Indian Affairs, 9 IBIA 115 (1981). 
 178. See e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., IBIA 92-211-A 
(1993); Bradshaw v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 18 IBIA 339, 343-44 (1990); Falcon Lake 
Properties v. Assistant Sec’y–Indian Affairs, 15 IBIA 286, 298 (1987); Linmar Petroleum Co., 153 
IBLA 99 (2000) (A claim of estoppel against the United States will be rejected in the absence of 
affirmative misconduct in the nature of an erroneous statement of fact in an official written decision 
or if the effect of allowing the estoppel would be to grant a right not authorized by law; reliance on 
incomplete or inaccurate information provided by Federal employees cannot create any rights not 
authorized by law.). 
 179. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957). 
 180. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1994). 
 181. Union Texas Petroleum Energy Corp., 153 IBLA 170 (2000). 
 182. See DOI, American Indian Records Repository Dedicated, PEOPLE, LAND & WATER, at 
45 (August, 2004) (the publication is a monthly employee news magazine produced by the 
Secretary’s Office of Communications). 
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those of other federal agencies–are not always open to public review. 
The Privacy Act generally prohibits federal agencies from disclosing any 
record which is contained in a system of records, unless otherwise 
authorized.183 Authorization may be found in the Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”), which mandates broad disclosure of government 
documents, except for certain exempt categories of information.184
The BIA sometimes withholds records involving Indian trust 
property pursuant to Exemption Four, “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”185 For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the BIA’s refusal to release information related to a lease of Indian lands 
for storage of approximately 40,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel, on the 
basis of evidence demonstrating the existence of potential economic 
harm.186
The BIA may also withhold records pursuant to Exemption Three to 
FOIA, which exempts information that is exempted from disclosure by 
another federal statute.187 For example, BIA has successfully relied on 
Exemption Three with reference to the Archeological Resources 
Protection Act of 1979 (“ARPA”),188 which generally prohibits the 
disclosure of information concerning the nature and location of 
archeological resources.189
A “trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to disclose to a third 
person information which he has acquired as trustee where he should 
know that the effect of such disclosure would be detrimental to the 
interest of the beneficiary.”190 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
declined to recognize an “Indian trust responsibility” exception to the 
FOIA, at least in the context of Exemption Five for intra-agency 
communications. 
 
The Department does not attempt to argue that Congress specifically 
envisioned that Exemption 5 would cover communications pursuant to 
 183. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). 
 184. FOIA exempts from the disclosure requirement the following types of information: 
classified information, internal administrative matters, information exempt by statute, confidential 
commercial data, “privileged” information, personnel and medical files, law enforcement 
information, bank records, and data concerning wells. Id. 
 185. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000). 
 186. Utah v. United States, 256 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 2001). In a separate action, the Court also 
ruled that federal law preempts state laws aimed at blocking the controversial facility. Skull Valley 
Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, No. 02-4149 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 187. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000). 
 188. 16 U.S.C. § 470(aa) (2000). 
 189. Starkey v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. s (1957). 
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the Indian trust responsibility, or any other trust responsibility. 
Although as a general rule we are hesitant to construe statutes in light 
of legislative inaction, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 600, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), we note that 
Congress has twice considered specific proposals to protect Indian trust 
information, see Indian Amendment to Freedom of Information Act: 
Hearings on S. 2652 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1976); Indian Trust Information Protection Act of 1978, S. 2773, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). We do so because these proposals confirm the 
commonsense reading that we give Exemption 5 today, as well as to 
emphasize that nobody in the Federal Government should be surprised 
by this reading.191
 
Congress has specified certain types of Indian land ownership 
information that must be released to certain types of requesters. The 
Indian Land Consolidation Act (“ILCA”)192 provides that the BIA shall 
make available certain information about Indian landowners to certain 
categorical requesters, including other Indian owners of interests in trust 
or restricted lands within the same reservation; the tribe that exercises 
jurisdiction over the land; and prospective applicants for the leasing, use, 
or consolidation of interests in trust or restricted lands. FOIA and Privacy 
Act regulations applicable to BIA are found at 43 C.F.R. Part 2. When 
BIA contracts with an Indian tribe or any other party to accomplish a 
Department function and the contract provides for the operation of a 
system of records, the contract must also require the contractor to comply 
with the Department’s Privacy Act regulations.193 The regulations 
provide for administrative appeal of a records denial by the BIA.194
 
C.  APA Review 
 
The United States is immune from suit absent its express consent.195 
The APA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with 
respect to non-monetary claims to provide for judicial review of “final 
 191. Dep’t of The Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective 
Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 16 n.7 (2001). 
 192. 25 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). 
 193. 43 C.F.R. § 2.53 (2004). 
 194. Appeals are addressed to the Freedom of Information Act Appeals Officer, Office of 
Information Resource Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, MS-5312-MIB, 1849 “C” 
Street, N.W., Washington, DC, 20240. 
 195. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 539 (1983) (“A waiver of sovereign 
immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
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agency action.”196 The APA does not permit judicial review where a 
statute expressly or implicitly precludes review.197 Nor does the APA 
authorize judicial review of “agency actions committed to agency 
discretion by law.”198
A jurisdictional barrier that frequently confronts those seeking 
judicial review of BIA administrative action is Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires dismissal of an action where a 
necessary and indispensable party cannot be joined. Many BIA decisions 
affect one or more Indian tribes, who normally cannot be joined without 
their consent due to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, a Court is without 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the complaint should be dismissed.199 However, a 
tribe will not be found to be indispensable in every case in which its 
interests are affected.200
 
IV.  TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 
 
A.  Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes 
 
The United States maintains government-to-government 
relationships with 562 Indian tribes.201 Although only fourteen states are 
without federally recognized tribes, the tribes are concentrated primarily 
in the West. Absent federal recognition, a tribe could not exercise 
 196. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
 197. § 701(a)(1). 
 198. § 701(a)(2). 
 199. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978); Okla. Tax Comm’n 
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1991); Enter. Mgmt., Inc. 
v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 893-94 (l0th Cir. 1989); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfr. Tech., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1461 (l0th Cir. 1987); Wichita 
& Affiliated Tribes of Okla. v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 777 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 200. E.g., Sac and Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) (challenge to 
a decision accepting lands in trust for tribe did not require joinder of tribe where BIA was defending 
its own decision to accept the land and the tribe’s position was virtually identical to the BIA’s 
position). 
 201. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 FR 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003). The BIA annually publishes a list of such 
tribes pursuant to section 104 of the Act of Nov. 2, 1994 (Pub. L. 103-454; 108 Stat. 4791, 4792), 25 
U.S.C. § 479(a-1) (2000). There are over 200 federally recognized tribes in Alaska; over 100 in 
California; 37 in Oklahoma; 28 in Washington State; 24 in Nevada; 22 in New Mexico; 20 in 
Arizona; 12 each in Minnesota and Michigan; 11 in Wisconsin; 9 in Oregon; 8 in South Dakota; 7 
each in Montana and New York; 5 each in Idaho, North Dakota and Maine; 4 each in Utah, Kansas, 
Nebraska and Louisiana; 3 in Texas; 2 each in Wyoming, Colorado, Florida, Connecticut and 
Delaware; and 1 each in Iowa, Missouri, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont. There are no recognized tribes in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Maryland, Arkansas, 
Georgia, New Jersey, or Hawaii. Id. 
  
1] BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 35 
 
sovereign powers or receive services from the BIA, as described herein. 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power “to 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”202 Under long-standing 
precedent, the Supreme Court generally defers to a determination by the 
Congress or the Executive branch that a tribe exists.203 Federal 
recognition historically resulted from a course of dealing over time, a 
treaty, a statute, or executive order. Although Congress terminated 
recognition by treaty in 1871, it still may extend recognition to a 
particular tribe through special legislation.204
Nevertheless, most groups seeking federal recognition today face a 
daunting administrative procedure. Until 1978, the BIA made tribal 
recognition decisions on a case-by-case basis, when it established a 
formal regulatory process for recognizing tribes.205 Now, BIA will grant 
recognition only to a petitioner who can meet a series of difficult tests: 
that it has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since 1900; that it has existed as a historically distinct 
community from historical times to the present; that it has maintained 
political influence or authority over its members from historical times to 
the present; that it maintains governing documents or procedures, 
including membership criteria; that its membership descends from a 
historical Indian tribe that functioned as a political entity; that its 
members are not members of any other tribe; and that it has not been the 
subject of congressional legislation expressly terminating the Federal 
relationship.206
Before implementing the current recognition regulations, the BIA 
had received forty petitions from groups seeking formal tribal 
recognition. Since 1978, BIA has received an additional 254 petitions. 
As of February, 2004, a total of 57 petitions had been resolved, 13 
petitions were ready for dispensation, 9 petitions were in active status, 2 
in post-final decision appeals, 1 in litigation, and 213 were not yet ready 
 202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 203. See, e.g., United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903); United States v. Holliday, 
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419(1866). The only limitation on Congressional power to define tribal status 
is that it not be exercised arbitrarily. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
 204. See, e.g., Ponca Restoration Act of October 31, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-484, 25 U.S.C. § 
983-983(h) (2000) (Federal recognition of the Tribe had been terminated by the Act of September 5, 
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 25 U.S.C. §§ 971-980 (2000).). 
 205. 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2004). 
 206. Id. pt. 83.7. The BIA’s Office of Federal Acknowledgment has compiled over 600 MB of 
documents for dozens of groups that have made it through the federal recognition process. Initially, 
the BIA planned to post the recognition compilation online but still hasn’t received approval to 
restart its web site. To make it more accessible, Indianz.Com converted the database to a web page at 
http://64.62.196.98/adc/adc.html. See BIA recognition decision database now online, Indianz.com, 
July 16, 2004, at http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/003428.asp. 
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for evaluation.207 The glacial pace of the recognition process, combined 
with the high stakes and strong feelings associated with such decisions, 
have led to accusations of corruption and proposals to change the 
system.208
Tribal recognition presents unique issues in several parts of the 
country. The BIA has extended federal recognition to more than 200 
Alaska Native organizations as Indian tribes,209 however, Alaska Native 
groups have limited authority to govern Indian lands as “Indian 
country.”210 Nevertheless, Congress has included Alaska native villages 
and corporations as the equivalent of federally recognized Indian tribes 
in various legislation.211 The Alaska Inter-tribal Council is a statewide, 
tribally-governed non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of 
tribal governments throughout the state.212 The unique status of Indian 
lands in Alaska is discussed infra. 
The United States has recognized no federal trust relationship with 
Native Hawaiians.213 Nevertheless, Congress has endorsed a process that 
may end in the establishment of a government-to-government 
relationship with Native Hawaiians.214 In 1993, Congress enacted a 
resolution extending an apology on behalf of the United States to Native 
Hawaiians for the illegal overthrow of the Native Hawaiian government 
100 years earlier and calling for a reconciliation of the relationship 
 207. Committee on Gov’t Reform, U.S. House Rep., Hearing on the Process for Recognition 
by the Fed. Gov’t of Am. Indian Tribes as Sovereign Indian Nations (May 5, 2004) (opening 
statement of Chairman Tom Davis). 
 208. E.g., S. 297, 108th Cong. (A bill to provide reforms and resources to the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs to improve the Federal acknowledgement process, and for other purposes, introduced Feb. 4, 
2003, by Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell.). 
 209. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
 210. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). The only statutory 
reservation in Alaska is that established in 1891 for the Metlakatla Indians of the Annette Islands. 25 
U.S.C. § 495 (2000). The Secretary of the Interior has established six more reservations under the 
authority of Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. § 473(a) (Venetie, Karluck, Akutan, Diomede, 
Unalakleet, and Wales). 
 211. E.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) 
(2000); Tribally Controlled Community College or University Assistance Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 
1801(2) (2000); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2000). 
 212. See http://www.aitc.org.
 213. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that Native Hawaiian class 
recognized under state law is not analogous to an Indian tribe, thus an electoral restriction based on 
Native Hawaiian ancestry violates due process because it uses ancestry as a racial definition and for 
a racial purpose). The Ninth Circuit has upheld Interior’s exclusion of native Hawaiians from the 
federal acknowledgement regulations.  Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 214. See S. REP. NO.108-085 (2003), Committee on Indian Affairs, Expressing the Policy of 
the United States regarding the United States Relationship with Native Hawaiians and to Provide a 
Process for the Recognition by the United States of the Native Hawaiian Governing Entity, and for 
Other Purposes, June 27, 2003, available at http://indian.senate.gov. 
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between the United States and Native Hawaiians.215
In December of 1999, the Departments of Interior and Justice 
initiated a process of reconciliation in response to the Apology 
Resolution, resulting in a report, entitled “From Mauka to Mauki: The 
River of Justice Must Flow Freely” (“Reconciliation Report”), issued on 
October 23, 2000. The principal recommendation contained in the 
Reconciliation Report is that the Native Hawaiian people should have 
self-determination over their own affairs within the framework of 
Federal law, as do Native American tribes.216
In 1848, Mexico ceded to the United States more than 70 million 
acres in California, land to which the California Indians had aboriginal 
title.217 Over the next few years, the United States negotiated 18 treaties 
with 139 California Indian groups.218 The Senate refused to ratify the 
treaties, however, instead passing the California Land Claims Act of 
1851, which effectively passed Indian aboriginal title into the public 
domain, except for lands occupied by certain bands of Mission Indians 
that had received Spanish land grants.219 California Indians continued to 
receive sparse federal aid, including the purchase of small parcels of land 
in central and northern California that became known as the California 
Rancheria System.220
In the 1930s, many California tribes reorganized their tribal 
governments under the auspices of the IRA. The revival was short-lived, 
however, as the Rancheria Act of 1958 slated 41 California rancherias 
 215. Apology Resolution of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). 
 216. U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of Justice, from Mauka to Makai: 
The River of Justice Must Flow Freely: Draft Report on the Reconciliation Process between the 
Federal Government and Native Hawaiians 17 (Aug. 23, 2000). 
 217. Advisory Council on California Indian Policy, Final Reports and Recommendations to 
the Congress of the United States Pursuant to Public Law 102-416 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter ACCIP 
Report], citing Bruce S. Flushman and Joe Barbieri, Aboriginal Title: The Special Case of 
California, 17 PAC. L.J. 391, 403 (1986). In 1992, Congress established the Advisory Council on 
California Indian Policy (“ACCIP”), which was directed to submit recommendations to Congress 
regarding remedial measures to address the special status problems of California’s terminated and 
unacknowledged tribes, and the needs of California Indians relating to economic self-sufficiency, 
health and education. Advisory Council on California Indian Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
416, 106 Stat. 2131 (1992), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-109 (1996). The ACCIP Report to 
Congress documents a tragic history of federal policy with respect to California Indians, resulting in 
“institutionalized injustice . . . which has evolved from state-sanctioned efforts to ‘exterminate’ the 
Indians, to federal policies that perpetuate various forms of economic and social oppression, 
deprivation of rights, and poverty within California’s Indian communities.” ACCIP Report, supra 
note 217, Executive Summary at 2. 
 218. ACCIP Report, supra note 217, Executive Summary at 2, citing Act of Sept. 30, 1850, 9 
Stat. 519; 9 Stat. 558; the California Indian Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 572. 
 219. ACCIP Report, supra note 217, Executive Summary at 2, citing An Act to Ascertain and 
Settle the Land Claims in the State of California, 9 Stat. 631 (1851); ACCIP Recognition Report, at 
11-12. 
 220. ACCIP Report, supra note 217, Executive Summary at 3; ACCIP Recognition Report at 
13-14. 
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for termination of federal recognition. Eventually, most of the rancherias 
regained federal recognition, but another 40 tribes in California continue 
to be denied acknowledgement.221
 
B.  Tribal Constitutions 
 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”) authorized tribes to 
revitalize their tribal governments by adopting constitutions subject to 
the approval of both the tribal membership and of the Secretary of the 
Interior.222 The IRA also permitted tribes to incorporate under a charter 
issued by the Secretary and approved by tribal members.223 BIA 
regulations govern Secretarial elections concerning tribal constitutions 
adopted pursuant to the IRA.224 The IRA requires only that tribal 
constitutions and bylaws adopted thereunder, or amendments thereto, 
obtain BIA approval; it does not require that tribal ordinances be made 
subject to BIA approval.225 The Supreme Court has noted that tribes with 
ordinance approval provisions in their constitutions “are free, with the 
backing of the Interior Department, to amend their constitutions to 
remove the requirement of Secretarial approval.”226 In a Secretarial 
election for tribal constitutional amendments under the IRA, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished a federal responsibility imposed 
upon the BIA by an Act of Congress, and a BIA responsibility 
undertaken as a matter of tribal law.227
 
At its base, this lawsuit is a challenge to the way certain federal 
officials administered an election for which they were both 
substantively and procedurally responsible. It bears emphasizing that 
Secretarial elections, such as the one at issue here, are federal–not 
tribal–elections. 25 C.F.R. § 81.1(s). Tribes are sovereign only to the 
extent that their sovereignty has not been qualified by statutes or 
 221. ACCIP Report, supra note 217, Executive Summary at 2-4; ACCIP Recognition Report 
at 15-22; ACCIP Termination Report at 6-34. 
 222. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000). The Native American 
Technical Corrections Act of 2004 amended the IRA to recognize that tribes retain inherent 
sovereign powers to adopt governing documents under procedures other than those specified in § 
476. Some tribes have no constitution or other governing documents, choosing to be guided by 
“tradition.” 
 223. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000). Provisions similar to those in the IRA were adopted in 1936 to 
cover Oklahoma, Ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (2000)), and the Alaska 
Territory, Act of May 1, 1936, Ch. 254 § 1, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473(a) (2000)). 
 224. 25 C.F.R. pts. 81, 82 (2004). 
 225. Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985). 
 226. Id. at 199. 
 227. Thomas v. United States, 189 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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treaties. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
10, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). The IRA explicitly reserves to the federal 
government the power to hold and approve the elections that adopt or 
alter tribal constitutions. 25 U.S.C. § 476.228
 
C.  Tribal Resolutions and Elections 
 
Where a tribe has given BIA formal authority to review tribal actions 
through its constitution or ordinances, that authority must be narrowly 
construed, and BIA review must be undertaken in such a way as to avoid 
unnecessary interference with the tribes’ right to self-government.229 
Intra-tribal disputes, including disputes concerning the validity of tribal 
council actions, should be resolved in tribal forums. 230 The guiding 
principle of these IBIA decisions is the federal policy of respect for tribal 
self-government, which counsels that the federal government should 
refrain from interfering in intra-tribal disputes.231
There are, however, some circumstances in which the BIA must act. 
The courts have recognized that “the DOI has the authority and 
responsibility to ensure that the Nation’s representatives, with whom it 
must conduct government-to-government relations, are the valid 
representatives of the Nation as a whole.”232 The IBIA also recognizes 
that the BIA must at times intrude into intra-tribal disputes. 
 
Both the Federal courts and the Board have recognized that there are 
times when, despite the lack of specific statutory authority, BIA must 
make determinations concerning intra-tribal disputes, most often those 
disputes involving tribal elections or the removal of tribal officials from 
office. BIA’s authority to make these determinations derives from its 
responsibility to carry out the government-to-government relationship 
and its concomitant need to know whether a tribal governing body is 
properly constituted and therefore qualified to represent the tribe in 
 228. Id. at 667. See also, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1088 (8th 
Cir. 1977); Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Cmty. v. Babbitt, 107 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 229. See, e.g., Wells v. Acting Aberdeen Area Dir., 24 IBIA 142, 145 (1993); Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Phoenix Area Dir., 21 IBIA 24, 28 (1991). 
 230. See, e.g., Madison v. Acting Portland Area Dir., 33 IBIA 278 (1999). 
 231. See Yeahquo, et al. v. S. Plains Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 11 (2001). 
 232. The Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122, 140 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(upholding Department’s refusal to recognize tribal officials elected in violation of tribal and federal 
laws); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (“Payment of funds at the 
request of a tribal council which, to the knowledge of the Government officers charged with the 
administration of Indian affairs and the disbursement of funds to satisfy treaty obligations, was 
composed of representatives faithless to their own people and without integrity would be a clear 
breach of the Government’s fiduciary obligation.”) Id. at 297. 
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dealings with BIA. [Citations omitted.] Even in these circumstances, 
however, BIA must avoid unnecessary intrusions into tribal self-
government.233
 
The IBIA also has held that, in cases where the BIA has authority to 
review a tribal action, it has the authority and the responsibility to review 
the tribal action for violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(“ICRA”),234 which applies most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
tribal governments.235 However, the IBIA has also held that ICRA is not 
an independent grant of authority and does not authorize BIA to 
scrutinize tribal actions not otherwise properly within its jurisdiction.236
The IBIA has held that a valid tribal election held during the 
pendency of an appeal from a prior leadership dispute moots the earlier 
appeal.237 The Board has held on several occasions that individual tribal 
members lack standing to appeal a BIA action based on a personal 
assessment as to what is in the best interest of the tribe.238 Tribal 
remedies must normally be exhausted before a tribal member may seek 
relief from the IBIA.239
 
D. Tribal Membership 
 
“Indian” is a term that has different meanings for different purposes. 
In the most common sense, the term implies that a person has some 
Indian blood, and is recognized as an Indian by the relevant 
community.240 However, an even broader definition is employed in the 
U.S. Census, where being “Indian” is a purely a matter of self-
identification as part of a racial or ethnic group.241 At the other extreme, 
 233. Wells v. Acting Aberdeen Area Dir., 24 IBIA 142, 145 (1993). See also Cahto Tribe v. 
Laytonville Rancheria v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 38 IBIA 244, 248 (2002). 
 234. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000). 
 235. See, e.g., Torres v. Acting Muskogee Area Director, 34 IBIA 173 (1999); Naylor v. 
Sacramento Area Director, 23 IBIA 76 (1992); Greendeer v. Minneapolis Area Director, 22 IBIA 91 
(1992). 
 236. See, e.g., Welmas v. Sacramento Area Dir., 24 IBIA 264, 272 (1993). 
 237. See, e.g., Rosales v. Sacramento Area Dir., 32 IBIA 158, 167 (1998); Villegas v. 
Sacramento Area Dir., 24 IBIA 150 (1993). 
 238. E.g., Hunt v. Aberdeen Area Dir., 27 IBIA 173 (1995), and cases cited therein. 
 239. E.g., Wanatee v. Acting Minneapolis Area Dir., 31 IBIA 93 (1997). 
 240. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 241. In the 2000 Census, nearly 2.5 million Americans identified themselves as American 
Indian or Alaska Native (about one percent of the population); another 1.6 million identified 
themselves as part American Indian or Alaska Native. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2000, (February 2002) [hereinafter CENSUS 
BUREAU, AI/AN POPULATION: 2000]. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Americans claiming 
some Indian blood grew at a rate of 110%, compared to an increase of 13% in the overall United 
States population. Id. at 3. Two-thirds of this group reported being enrolled in or affiliated with a 
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as a matter of political status, to be considered an Indian one must be a 
member of a federally recognized Indian tribe.242
Normally, tribes retain complete control over their membership 
determinations.243 Several federal courts have held that the IRA does not 
confer jurisdiction to consider claims of improper membership 
determinations or election procedures.244 The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has found the tribal government to be indispensable in intra-
tribal membership disputes on at least two occasions. 
In Davis ex rel Davis v. United States,245 plaintiffs alleged the BIA 
wrongfully allowed the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma to deny to 
members of African ancestry certain benefits routinely provided to other 
members of the Tribe. Plaintiffs did not sue the Tribe itself but instead 
brought suit against the United States and various federal agencies and 
officials. Plaintiffs sought an order requiring the BIA to issue Certificates 
of Degree of Indian Blood (“CDIBs”) to members of the Plaintiff-bands. 
The district court dismissed the case for failure to join an indispensable 
party, the Seminole Nation.246 The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Seminole 
Nation is an indispensable party with respect to the wrongful exclusion 
claim, and (2) the district court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the CDIB claim because Plaintiffs failed to show that they had 
exhausted their administrative remedies.247
In a suit against the government seeking a change in federally 
tribe, with the largest numbers by far identifying as Cherokee or Navajo. Id. at 8. Almost two-thirds 
reside in just eleven states, with almost half living in the Western United States. The states with the 
largest Native American populations, in descending order, are California, Oklahoma, Arizona, 
Texas, New Mexico, New York, Washington, North Carolina, Michigan, Alaska, and Florida. 
California and Oklahoma combined account for 25% of the total Native American population. Id. at 
4. 
 242. See supra note 31; see also, e.g., Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Professor Carole E. Goldberg asserts that “[m]ost 
contemporary scholars concerned with what may be called tribal revitalization - the strengthening of 
political and cultural sovereignty for Native nations - treat individual rights as an impediment to 
achieving that objective, not a positive tool.” Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal 
Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889 (Fall 2003). She argues that “Federal courts should also refrain 
from making tribal jurisdiction turn on slavish adherence to the Bill of Rights, and should craft 
doctrines that end the excessive constitutionalizing of tribal members’ relationships to their nations.” 
Id. at 937-38. 
 243. See, e.g., Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978); Cherokee 
Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897). 
 244. See Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Cmty., 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. 
Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1362-63 (D. Minn. 1995), aff’d, No. 95-1784, slip op. (8th Cir. Nov. 4, 
1996). 
 245. 343 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 246. Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Okla. 2002). 
 247. Davis ex rel Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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mandated membership for the Osage Tribe, the Tenth Circuit ruled that 
the Tribe itself is still an indispensable party. 
 
Tribal Defendants were necessary parties whether this test is applied in 
relation to the relief requested by Individual Plaintiffs, the invalidation 
of the franchise restriction and what amounted to the revival of the 
tribal government under the 1881 Constitution, or in relation to the 
relief actually granted, the franchise extension and a new constitution 
and government. The relief requested in the second amended complaint 
posed a practical threat to the ability of Tribal Defendants to protect 
their interest as the sole governing body of the Tribe as well as to meet 
their obligations to protect the Osage mineral estate, while the actual 
results of the district court proceedings directly compromised those 
interests. Moreover, Tribal Defendants were indispensable because the 
case, essentially an internal tribal dispute, could not in equity and good 
conscience proceed in their absence, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b), in light of 
Tribal Defendants’ interests. We have dismissed cases under Rule 
19(b) when a tribe cannot be joined to a suit on account of sovereign 
immunity. (Citations omitted.)248
 
Congress has the power to determine tribal membership for federal 
administrative purposes and that definition of membership may differ 
from one established by the tribe itself.249 Congress normally exercises 
this power where federal recognition is restored to a tribe250 or to provide 
a basis for the distribution of judgment funds.251 BIA regulations at 25 
C.F.R. Part 61 govern the compilation of “Rolls of Indians” where 
federal statutes place that responsibility with the Secretary of the 
Interior.252
 248. Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 249. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-86 (1977); Wallace v. Adams, 
204 U.S. 415 (1907); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff’d, 384 
U.S. 209 (1966). 
 250. See, e.g., Coquille Restoration Act of June 28, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-42 (codified as 25 
U.S.C. § 715-715(g) (2000)). 
 251. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1300d-3 (2000) (directing BIA to prepare a roll of the lineal 
descendants of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Mississippi Sioux Tribe, for purposes of Mississippi 
Sioux Tribes Judgment Fund Distribution Act of 1998). 
 252. 25 C.F.R. § 61.2.R (2004). The BIA enrollment regulations currently apply to the 
Pembina Band of Chippewa Indians, Act of December 31, 1982, Pub. L. 97-403, 96 Stat. 2022; 
Cherokee Band of Shawnee Indians, Act of December 20, 1982, Pub. L. 97-372, 96 Stat. 1815; 
Miami Indians of Indiana, Act of December 2, 1982, Pub. L. 97-376, 96 Stat. 1828; Cow Creek 
Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians, Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians Distribution of 
Judgment Funds Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-139, 101 Stat. 823; Indians of the Hoopa Valley 
Indian Reservation, Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-580, 102 Stat. 2924 (1988); 
Coquille Tribe of Indians, Coquille Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 101-42, 103 Stat. 91 (1989); 
Mdewakanton and Wahpakoota Tribe of Sioux Indians, the Indian Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 
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E.  The Politics of Tribal Recognition 
 
The BIA has been harshly criticized for allegedly allowing political 
considerations to enter into recognition determinations regarding tribal 
status, membership and leadership. Charges of influence peddling have 
been lodged against both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.253 
Additionally, both the BIA and the Office of the Solicitor have been 
criticized for violating the due process rights of petitioners.254
Critics also contend that some Interior decisions affecting casinos are 
politically motivated.255 A Deputy Assistant Secretary was promptly 
fired after his former business partner reportedly asked at least three 
tribes for a high consulting fee and implied an ability to influence 
decisions pending before the BIA.256
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interior’s Inspector General, 
and the General Accounting Office of Congress all launched an 
No. 92-555, 86 Stat. 1168 (1972); Sisseton and Wahpeton Mississippi Sioux Tribe, 25 U.S.C. § 
1300(d-3) (2000); Lower Skagit Tribe of Indians, 25 C.F.R. § 61.4(w) (2004); Kikiallus Tribe of 
Indians, id. § 61.4(x); Swinomish Tribe of Indians, id. § 61.4(y); and Samish Tribe of Indians, id. § 
61.4(z). Separate regulations are provided for preparation of a roll of Independent Seminole Indians 
of Florida, Id. pt. 67; see Act of Apr. 30, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-277, 104 Stat. 143; and revision of 
the membership roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina, 25 C.F.R. pt. 75 
(2004); see Act of August 21, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-154, 71 Stat. 374. Applicants for enrollment may 
appeal an adverse decision made by BIA officials. 25 C.F.R. pt. 62 (2004). 
 253. See, e.g., Sean P. Murphy, US: Documents on Indians Backdated; No Prosecution of 
Former Official, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2002, at B2 (“[t]he Inspector General’s report portrays the 
BIA as being in a frenzy to conclude recognition of two tribes before the Bush administration took 
over on Jan. 20, 2001 . . .”). See also Michelle Malkin, More Clintonian Deeds Go Unpunished, 
JEWISH WORLD REVIEW, Mar. 6, 2002, available at http://www.NewsAndOpinion. 
com (describing the backdating of tribal recognition forms after the end of the administration, 
Malkin charges “the Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . has become a career slot machine for government 
officials who parlay their public positions into lucrative lobbying jobs and consulting gigs.”). 
 254. A “particularly egregious” example involved a battle for recognition by the Samish Tribe, 
which began with the filing of their petition in 1972 and resulted in an administrative denial in 1987, 
a decision later vacated on due process grounds. Greene v. Lujan, 1992 WL 533059 (W.D. Wash. 
1992), aff’d, 64 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1995). On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) made 
certain findings in support of recognition, which were then arbitrarily reversed by the Assistant 
Secretary after an ex parte meeting with an attorney for the BIA. Ruling on a supplemental 
complaint by the Tribe, the Court reinstated the ALJ’s findings, holding that the BIA had again 
violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment and finding the attorney, an Assistant Solicitor for the 
Department, in contempt of court. Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
 255. See, e.g., William Safire, The Interior Decorator, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at sec. 4, p. 
15; David E. Rosenbaum, Interior Secretary Denies Politics had Role in Dispute Over Casino, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, at A1; Susan Schmidt, Probe is Sought on Potential Corruption, 
WASHINGTON POST, February 5, 2004, at A23; Ashcroft urged to charge BIA officials, Indianz.Com, 
March 1, 2002 (reporting that Virginia Congressman Frank Wolf Department had asked the Attorney 
General to bring criminal charges against former and current BIA officials in relation to their 
handling of federal recognition petitions), at http://64.62.196.98/
News/printme.asp?ID=law02/0312002-1. 
 256. See, Wayne Barrett, Inside Bush’s Indian Bureau, VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 2004, at 30; 
Wayne Barrett, A Dirty Trickster’s Bush Bonanza, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 27, 2004, at 26. 
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investigation into claims that the lure of gaming profits led BIA officials 
in California to manipulate tribal membership rolls in order to gain 
enrollment for themselves and their families and to override tribal 
resistance to establishment of a potentially lucrative casino.257 The 
Inspector General subsequently cleared the BIA of any wrongdoing in 
the matter.258
Critics similarly failed to prove wide-ranging charges of corruption 
at a May 5, 2004, hearing before the House Government Reform 
Committee. The DOI’s inspector general testified that his investigations 
uncovered “harassment” of the staff that handles recognition, but by top 
officials at the BIA, not by lobbyists. He also contended that the 
recognition process is “one of the more transparent processes at 
Interior.”259
More recently, the DOI Inspector General found no wrongdoing in 
the federal recognition of the Schaghticoke Indians of Connecticut. The 
investigation found that despite spending more than $12 million on 
recognition efforts, the Tribe did not improperly influence BIA officials. 
The state’s top elected officials, who oppose the tribe’s recognition, 
responded angrily to the report. Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell 
termed the Schaghticoke decision “incomprehensible,” Attorney General 
Richard Blumenthal said he was “disgusted and disappointed” with the 
report, and U.S. Rep. Rob Simmons called it “just a bunch of b.s.”260
Critics say gambling interests, in particular, have too much influence 
over the recognition process, with some claiming that two-thirds of 
groups seeking federal recognition as Indian tribes are being bankrolled 
by casino investors.261 The National Indian Gaming Association 
(“NIGA”), an organization of gaming tribes, has endeavored to dispel the 
notion that tribal recognition decisions are linked to gaming interests. 
NIGA notes that of fifteen Tribes that have received federal recognition 
since 1988, only one has gaming.262
Yet there is no question but that recognition efforts have attracted 
 257. See, e.g., Don Thompson, Congress Begin Probe of Alleged BIA Conflict, NATIVE 
AMERICAN TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at 11. 
 258. See, e.g., BIA Official is Cleared in Influence Probe, July 2. 2004, at A13. As of this 
writing, the FBI probe continues. See Jim Reece, FBI Tribal Probe Continues, AMADOR LEDGER 
DISPATCH, Aug. 04, 2004, available at http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/sacramento/. 
 259. See, e.g., Frederic J. Frommer, BIA Reorganization Plan Called ‘Insulting’ to Tribes, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 12, 2004 at F-5; Critics Take BIA to Task Over Federal 
Recognition, May 6, 2004, at http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/001644.asp. 
 260. Rick Green, Probe Upholds Ruling on Tribal Recognition, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 1, 
2004, at B-1; Inspector General investigation called ‘bunch of b.s.’, Sept. 1, 2004 at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/004028.asp. 
 261. See Iver Peterson, Would-Be Tribes Entice Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at A1. 
 262. http://www.indiangaming.org/library/index.html#facts. 
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powerful financial backing. Over the past decade, for example, Donald 
Trump invested more than $10 million in a group seeking recognition as 
the Paucatuck Eastern Pequots in Connecticut. However, in June 2002, 
the BIA granted recognition to another group claiming to represent the 
tribe, which then “fired” Trump in favor of its own financial backers. 
Trump is asking a court to order the Tribe to return his money.263
 
V.  LAW AND ORDER IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
A. Tribal Jurisdiction 
 
The United States has consistently recognized Indian tribes as 
“distinct, independent political communities,”264 with inherent powers of 
self-government.265 The Supreme Court long ago upheld “the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”266 The 
Court has recognized the authority of tribal governments to provide for 
the protection of health and safety of reservation residents and the 
political integrity of the tribe.267
Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as “appropriate 
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important 
personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”268 The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the breadth of tribal court jurisdiction, 
stating: “If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian 
lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the 
state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal 
law.”269 The Court has ruled that a question of a tribal court’s jurisdiction 
over a reservation-based suit against a non-Indian must be determined in 
the first instance not in federal court but in tribal court.270 The Court has 
also observed that “[n]onjudicial tribal institutions have also been 
 263. See Rick Green , Casino Investors’ ‘Survivor’, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 24, 2004, at 
B-1; Karen Florin, “Sorting Out Trump Suit Isn’t Easy,” THE NEW LONDON DAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 
http://www.theday.com/eng/web/store/itm.aspx?re=71a5328e-9a6c-4991-9262-4a3aa991f139&itm= 
art; Hearing held in suit over recognition backers, Aug. 25, 2004, at http://www.indianz.com/ 
News/2004/003926.asp. 
 264. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
 265. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978). 
 266. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
 267. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
 268. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). 
 269. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
 270. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found it proper to require even the Federal government 
to resort to tribal court to enforce a Federal statute concerning trespass on tribal lands. United States 
v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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recognized as competent law-applying bodies.”271
Although tribes retain considerable authority over the conduct of 
both tribal members and nonmembers on Indian land, or land held in 
trust for a tribe by the United States,272 Congress and the Court have 
imposed a number of restrictions on tribal jurisdiction, sometimes by 
expanding state and federal jurisdiction into Indian country.273 A series 
of Congressional enactments in the 19th century extended federal 
criminal jurisdiction into Indian country, without eliminating concurrent 
tribal jurisdiction, beginning with the Indian Country Crimes Act274 and 
culminating in the Major Crimes Act.275
Congress extended state jurisdiction into Indian country in 1953 with 
the passage of Public Law 280,276 which gave several states extensive 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian Country and allowed others to 
acquire such jurisdiction at their option. Although Public Law 280 was 
initially intended to extend state criminal jurisdiction to certain 
California reservations, by the time the bill was passed, it had been 
transformed into a general measure conferring criminal and civil 
jurisdiction on several states.277
Public Law 280 eliminates federal criminal jurisdiction for certain 
crimes committed in Indian Country,278 however, the federal government 
retains authority to enforce federal criminal laws of general application 
in Indian Country. Public Law 280 also granted states concurrent civil 
jurisdiction with regard to most matters in Indian country.279 This grant 
 271. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66. 
 272. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997). 
 273. “Indian country” is the term commonly applied to territory under the jurisdiction of a 
tribe, although the statutory definition is both more expansive and more precise. 
[T]he term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2004). Adopted for purposes of the criminal code, the definition applies as well in 
determining questions of civil jurisdiction. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 
(1998). 
 274. 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)) (crimes by non-Indians against 
Indians and non-major crimes by Indians against non-Indians). 
 275. 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)) (major crimes committed 
by Indians). 
 276. 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000)). 
 277. C. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 
22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1975). 
 278. Indian Crimes Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1153 (2004). 
 279. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2004). 
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did not include the application of local law,280 nor does it include the 
power to regulate land use.281
The most important affirmative limitation imposed by Congress on 
tribal criminal jurisdiction is the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(“ICRA”),282 which applies most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
tribal governments and limits the maximum sentence that may be 
imposed by a tribal court to one year in prison and a $5,000 fine.283 The 
ICRA also amended Public Law 280 by making further state assumption 
of jurisdiction contingent upon tribal consent.284
The Supreme Court has held that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not 
give jurisdiction to Federal courts to review tribal compliance with the 
Act, except in the case of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.285 The 
Court stated “[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by 
the ICRA . . . .”286 The Court also suggested an additional alternative to 
federal habeas corpus and tribal enforcement of the ICRA where tribal 
constitutions required that the Secretary of the Interior approve new 
ordinances so that the Department of the Interior might enforce the 
ICRA.287
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has rendered some of the more 
expansive opinions regarding the existence of federal court habeas 
jurisdiction under the ICRA. In one such case, the court found 
“banishment” from the reservation to be the equivalent of a restraint on 
liberty sufficient to invoke the habeas relief available under the ICRA.288 
In a subsequent case, however, the court declined to find the legal 
equivalent of banishment in the seizure and destruction of tribal 
members’ homes, allegedly with the specific intent to punish them for 
exercising various protected rights.289 Other courts have recognized that 
when a tribal official acts beyond his lawful authority, the official may 
 280. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Mission Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1390 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
 281. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2004). 
 282. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2004). 
 283. Id. § 1302(7) (2000). 
 284. Id. §§ 1311-1312, 1321-1326. 
 285. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 286. Id. at 65. For an analysis of tribal court implementation of the ICRA, see Robert J. 
McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 
465 (1998). 
 287. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66 n.22. 
 288. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 289. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004). Noting “the presence of twenty or 
thirty Indian women engaged in prayer in the courtroom and adjoining hallway when this appeal was 
argued,” the court nevertheless suggested “Congress should consider giving this Court power to act.” 
Id. at 92-93. 
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be sued.290
The IBIA has held that in cases where the BIA has authority to 
review a tribal action, it has the authority and the responsibility to review 
the tribal action for violations of the ICRA.291 However, the IBIA has 
also held that ICRA is not an independent grant of authority and does not 
authorize BIA to scrutinize tribal actions not otherwise properly within 
its jurisdiction.292
The Supreme Court has also recognized far-reaching limitations on 
tribal jurisdiction.293 Beginning in the late 1970s, the Court has 
increasingly found inherent limitations on tribal sovereignty, including 
the lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,294 freedom from state 
taxation of on-reservation sales to non-Indians,295 ability to prohibit 
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation fee lands,296 and to 
zone reservation fee lands.297 The Court has inferred congressional intent 
to diminish a reservation,298 to permit state taxation of Indian-owned 
reservation allotments held in fee,299 to authorize state taxation of 
commerce with Indian tribes,300 and to restrict the ability of tribes to tax 
the activities of nonmembers on fee simple land within reservation 
boundaries,301 or to try non-member Indians.302
More recently, the Court has found tribal courts lack jurisdiction to 
 290. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project, 276 F.3d 1150, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002). 
 291. E.g., Torres v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 34 IBIA 173 (1999); Naylor v. Sacramento 
Area Dir., 23 IBIA 76 n.3 (1992); Greendeer v. Minneapolis Area Dir., 22 IBIA 91 (1992). 
 292. E.g., Welmas v. Sacramento Area Dir., 24 IBIA 264, 272 (1993). 
 293. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1996); David H. Getches, Beyond 
Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream 
Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001). 
 294. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). Many commentators have 
called for a statutory fix to Oliphant. One of the more persuasive notes that Native Americans are 
victimized at alarming rates by non-Indian criminal perpetrators, thus Oliphant has adversely 
affected public safety in Indian country by preventing tribes from protecting their members from 
these acts. See Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions 
During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 173 (2000).
 295. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980). 
 296. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
 297. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989). 
 298. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994). 
 299. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992); see also, 
Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US 103 (1998) (state 
permitted to tax formerly allotted lands reacquired in fee simple by tribe). 
 300. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). 
 301. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651-53 (2001). 
 302. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). After Congress essentially overturned that ruling, 
see 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000), the Court upheld the right of Congress to recognize such “inherent” 
tribal jurisdiction. See also United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004). 
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hear a case involving a highway accident on a right-of-way through tribal 
trust lands303 or to hear a civil claim against state officers who enter tribal 
land to execute a search warrant against a tribal member suspected of 
having violated state law outside the reservation.304 The Court has also 
found that Alaska tribes lack jurisdiction over Indian lands.305 
Additionally, the Court has ruled that states retain jurisdiction to enter 
reservations to investigate and prosecute off-reservation violations.306
Congress, acting to curb what it deemed to be abusive practices by 
state courts, gave tribal courts presumptive jurisdiction over many child 
custody matters in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.307 The Indian 
Child Welfare Act provides that Indian tribes may reassume jurisdiction 
over child custody proceedings on those reservations over which states 
obtained jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280.308 BIA regulations set 
out procedures for tribes to petition to reassume jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings.309
Although the U.S. Constitution requires states to give full faith and 
credit to the judgments of the courts of other states, it does not mention 
tribes.310 Nevertheless, some states extend full faith and credit to 
judgments of tribal courts,311 whereas other state and federal courts have 
recognized tribal judgments as a matter of comity.312
 
B.  Courts of Indian Offenses 
 
The BIA is normally precluded from imposing federal standards on 
tribal court administration and conduct.313 Each Tribe controls its own 
judicial system, although intertribal court systems are not uncommon.314 
 303. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 440-43 (1997). 
 304. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 305. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 118 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1998). 
 306. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353. 
 307. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000). 
 308. 25 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). The Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, Pub.L. No. 83-280, 
gave several states extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian Country and allowed other 
states to acquire it at their option. 
 309. 25 C.F.R. § 13.11 (2004). 
 310. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1. 
 311. E.g., In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 64955 P.2d 1334 (1976). 
 312. See, e.g., Wipert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 201 Mont. 299, 654 P.2d 512 (1982); AT&T Corp. v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe 295 F.3d 899, 903 (9th cir. 2002). 
 313. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(d), (e)(1)(E) (2000). 
 314. The National American Indian Court Judges Association (“NAICJA”), established in 
1969, is a national voluntary association of tribal court judges. The Association is primarily devoted 
to the support of American Indian and Alaska Native justice systems through education, information 
sharing and advocacy. See http://www.naicja.org. The National Tribal Justice Resource Center, a 
project of the NAICJA, is dedicated to tribal justice systems, personnel and tribal law. The Resource 
Center is the central national clearinghouse of information for Native American and Alaska Native 
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However, where tribes have not established tribal courts, the BIA has 
established “Courts of Indian Offenses” on certain Indian reservations 
under the authority vested in the Secretary of the Interior by the Snyder 
Act, which authorizes appropriations for “Indian judges,” and pursuant to 
more generalized authority.315
These BIA funded courts operate pursuant to regulations of 25 
C.F.R. Part 11 and are commonly called “C.F.R. Courts” (for the Code of 
Federal Regulations). C.F.R. Courts are considered both agencies of the 
Federal government and tribal courts.316 Due to the unique history of the 
tribes located in the former “Indian Territory,” many of the C.F.R. 
Courts are located within the boundaries of present day Oklahoma.317
C.F.R. Courts enforce federal regulations concerning criminal318 and 
civil causes of action,319 domestic relations,320 probate,321 children,322 
juvenile offenders,323 and minors in need of care324 as well as any tribal 
ordinances that have been approved by the Department.325 Criminal 
jurisdiction is limited to tribal members326 and civil jurisdiction is limited 
to suits wherein the defendant is Indian unless the parties stipulate to the 
court’s jurisdiction.327 The statute of limitations for criminal actions is 
five years328 and three years for civil actions.329 Unless authorized by the 
tribal government, no C.F.R. Court may exercise jurisdiction over tribal 
election disputes, internal tribal government disputes, or suits against the 
tribe.330 A decision of the BIA on who is a tribal official is binding on a 
C.F.R. Court.331
Each C.F.R. Court has a trial and appellate division.332 Appeals are 
tribal courts, providing both technical assistance and resources for the development and 
enhancement of tribal justice system personnel. See http://www.ntjrc.org. 
 315. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000). 
 316. See Tillet v. Hodel, 730 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Okla. 1990), aff’d 931 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
 317. 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2004). 
 318. § 11.100(d). 
 319. § 11.100(e). 
 320. § 11.100(f). 
 321. § 11.100(g). 
 322. § 11.100(i). 
 323. § 11.100(j). 
 324. § 11.100(k). 
 325. § 11.101. 
 326. § 11.102(a). 
 327. § 11.103(a). 
 328. § 11.102(b). 
 329. § 11.103(b). 
 330. § 11.104(b). 
 331. § 11.104(c). 
 332. § 11.200. 
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heard by a panel of three magistrates and are not subject to further appeal 
within the Department.333 Magistrates are appointed by the Department 
and confirmed by the tribe and they serve four-year terms but may be 
removed by the Department for cause.334 Court records are considered to 
be records of the Department and are subject to the Privacy Act and the 
Freedom of Information Act.335 The Department also appoints a 
prosecutor for each court.336 Practice is permitted by attorneys and lay 
counsel.337
Criminal laws338 and procedures339 are detailed in the regulations. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to counsel at their own expense.340 
Sentences may not exceed six months imprisonment and a $500 fine.341 
The civil law to be applied includes federal statutes or regulations, tribal 
ordinances or customs, or in the absence of the foregoing, the law of the 
State in which the dispute arises.342 There are detailed federal regulations 
concerning domestic relations,343 probate of non-trust assets,344 appellate 
proceedings,345 children’s court,346 juvenile offenders,347 and minors in 
need of care.348 The IBIA has no jurisdiction to review decisions made 
by tribal officials, tribal governing bodies, or tribal courts including 
C.F.R. Courts.349
The BIA operates twenty-two Courts of Indian Offenses. Tribes 
operate others under contract/compact agreements with performance 
monitoring subject to negotiation with each tribe.350 Within the BIA’s 
 333. § 11.200(h). 
 334. § 11.200(b). 
 335. § 11.206. 
 336. § 11.204. 
 337. § 11.205. 
 338. § 11.205(d). 
 339. § 11.205(c). 
 340. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000), which essentially 
extended most of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments, did not include the right to have counsel 
appointed for an indigent defendant. Id. § 1302(6). 
 341. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 was amended to permit sentences up to one year and 
$5,000 fine, but the C.F.R. Court regulations do not reflect this change. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2004); 
25 C.F.R. § 11.315(a) (2004). 
 342. 25 C.F.R. § 11.500 (2004). 
 343. § 11.600-611. 
 344. § 11.700-713. 
 345. § 11.800-806. 
 346. § 11.900-912. 
 347. § 11.1000-1014. 
 348. § 11.1100-1115. 
 349. See, e.g., Pounds v. Court of Indian Offenses, Miami, Oklahoma, 31 IBIA 308, recon. 
denied, 32 IBIA 60, 32 IBIA 89 (1998). In any event, the IBIA generally defers to tribal forums in 
resolving intra-tribal disputes, citing cases such as Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 
(1987) and Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 350. Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), at 336, White House OMB (2004) 
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Tribal Priority Allocation (“TPA”) program, tribal governments 
determine annual allocations among thirty-five programs including tribal 
court operations. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2003, TPA funds total $772 
million, of which $26 million is available for tribal courts351The White 
House Office of Management & Budget (“OMB”) has criticized the BIA 
because the tribal courts program lacks long-term goals and annual 
performance measures and because tribal courts are not required to report 
on staffing, caseloads, time for adjudication, appeals to non-tribal courts, 
case dispositions, or other performance indicators. According to the 
OMB, the BIA has conducted no credible independent evaluations and 
none are planned.352
The BIA has no current inventory of tribal courts, but estimates 
about 275 general, special (i.e. traffic, juvenile, family) and appellate 
courts serve about 40 tribes. Most tribes have adopted modern and 
customary codes that are usually based on federal and state statutes. It is 
estimated that about 42% of tribal court cases concern criminal matters 
with potential jail time.353
 
C.  Law Enforcement 
 
The BIA is responsible for overall policy development and 
implementation of the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act,354 for its 
own law enforcement programs and for law enforcement activities 
contracted to tribes.355 The Office of Law Enforcement Services 
(“OLES”) is a semi-autonomous agency within the BIA that carries out 
these responsibilities.356 In addition to its own officers commissioned to 
enforce applicable federal criminal statutes, the OLES may issue law 
enforcement commissions to other federal, state, tribal and local law 
enforcement officers.357 With the permission of the tribe, OLES officers 
may enforce tribal law as well.358
It is common for the BIA and tribes to have difficulty getting local or 
State law enforcement to respond to crimes on the reservations. For 
example, it is difficult to get local law enforcement to respond to 
[hereinafter OMB PART]; see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pma/interior/pdf. 
 351. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 337. 
 352. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 336-41. 
 353. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 336. Other caseloads included traffic (26%), juvenile 
(15%), family (7%), housing/land use (3%), and commercial (3%). Id. 
 354. Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2909 (2000). 
 355. 25 C.F.R. § 12.1 (2004). 
 356. § 12.2. 
 357. § 12.21. 
 358. § 12.22. 
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domestic violence calls and illegal disposal activities in Indian 
country.359 Often, tribal law enforcement officers are limited to 
restraining these perpetrators until a county, State, or Federal officer 
arrives. In response to these complex jurisdictional hurdles, BIA has 
adopted a policy of entering into agreements whereby it grants special 
law enforcement commissions to tribal and local law enforcement 
officers.360
The BIA placed a moratorium on the issuance of deputation 
agreements in response to a federal court ruling that prohibited such 
deputized tribal officers from driving police vehicles equipped with 
emergency light bars on California highways that connect the various 
parts of the tribe’s reservation.361 Another tribe successfully challenged 
the moratorium and established its right to contract for the programs 
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,362 
and thereby seek to qualify for the special law enforcement 
commission.363
In 2000, the BIA and tribal agencies employed about 2,300 full time 
law officers and 1,160 support personnel. Other federal agencies 
employed over 88,000 officers and 72,000 support personnel. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) conducts felony (criminal) 
investigations on Indian reservations. State/local agencies employed over 
708,000 officers and 311,000 support personnel. In FY 2002, the BIA 
supported 206 Indian police agencies. Tribes managed 163 (79%) of 
local agencies under Indian self-determination contract or compact 
agreements. The BIA managed 43 (21%) agencies.364 In 2002, DOI’s 
Inspector General conducted a department-wide review of law 
enforcement programs, and cited the BIA as a model for personnel and 
training standards, operations manuals, staffing redeployment, records 
systems, and incident reporting.365
The OLES has recommended that over the next three years an 
additional 1,500 Native American officers be hired to complement the 
approximately 2,700 who presently patrol the reservations. Instead, it 
 359. See, e.g., Nelsy Rodriguez, Tribe on Offensive Against Offal, THE DESERT SUN, July 16, 
2004, at A1. 
 360. Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 FR 6321 (Feb. 10, 2004). This notice 
publishes internal policies on Cross-Deputation Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, 
Memoranda of Agreement, and Special Law Enforcement Commission Deputation Agreements. 
These policies apply to all Cross-Deputation Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, 
Memoranda of Agreement, and Special Law Enforcement Commission Deputation Agreements. 
 361. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 2002 WL 32065673 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 362. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq). 
 363. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. Norton, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
 364. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 95. 
 365. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 97. 
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appears that 759 police positions on reservations will lose their federal 
funding by 2006.366 Interestingly, especially in light of these conditions, 
Indian tribal police departments have been outspoken in their support of 
the concept of civilian oversight, unlike their counterparts in police 
departments throughout the United States.367
BIA regulations set standards for Indian Country detention facilities 
and programs whether operated by the BIA or by tribes that receive 
federal funds. The regulations are promulgated to ensure compliance 
with the Indian Country Law Enforcement Reform Act of 1990368 and 
the Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention Act.369 
Unfortunately, the nation’s reservation jails have repeatedly been found 
to violate the most basic health and safety standards, posing serious risks 
to over 2,000 inmates as well as their guards.370
The 74 detention centers on reservations hold 1,699 adults and 307 
juveniles, according to most recent federal figures from 2002. The BIA 
operates 20 of the prisons and provides funding for 46 others, whereas 
eight facilities are run by tribes. A recent investigation by DOI’s 
Inspector General catalogued hundreds of suicide attempts and escapes at 
the 27 prisons they visited, and several unreported deaths. The report 
states that the BIA’s jails are a “national disgrace with many facilities 
having conditions comparable to those found in third-world countries,” 
adding that “BIA appears to have a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude in regard to 
these horrific conditions at its detention facilities.” OLES officials 
admitted that none of their detention facilities “come close” to meeting 
the BIA’s standards for operation, which derive from nationally 
recognized detention standards.371
 366. See Matt Ross, BIA/Tribal Budget Advisory Council Meeting, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, 
Mar. 16, 2004, at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1079449349&CFID=71543&CFT 
OKEN=49167035. 
 367. Eileen M. Luna, Seeking Justice: Critical Perspectives Of Native People: Law 
Enforcement Oversight in the American Indian Community, 4 GEO. PUB. POLICY REV. 149 (Spring 
1999). 
 368. Pub. L. No. 101-379, 104 Stat. 473 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (2000)). 
 369. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207–148 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (2000)). 
 370. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Federal Investigators Probe Tribal Prison Deaths, USA 
TODAY, May 21, 2004, at 1A; Kevin Johnson, Death of Girl Part of Indian Prisons Inquiry, USA 
TODAY, May 24, 2004, at 3A; see also Michael Jamison, Little has Changed in Decaying Indian 
Jails, MISSOULIAN, Apr. 19, 2004, at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2004/04/19/news/mtregion 
al/znews01.txt; Upgrading Reservation Jails Should be Priority, Great Falls Tribune (opinion), May 
27, 2004, at 6A (“In the shadow of abuses at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it’s 
disheartening to see a national report on abysmal conditions at jails and prisons in Indian Country, 
including in Montana.”). 
 371. Indian Tribal Detention Facilities, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, June 23, 2004. (Testimony of the Honorable Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General for the 
Department of the Interior), available at http://indian.senate.gov/2004hearings/062304hrg/; Indian 
Country Detention Facilities, Assessment No. X-EV-BIA-0114-2003, Apr. 2004, available at 
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In response to concerns raised by the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, David W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs, testified 
that the BIA is already working on corrective actions, including: closing 
unsafe facilities; revising the procedures for reporting and reviewing 
serious incidents; inspecting Indian Country detention centers for 
compliance with national law enforcement, facility, safety and 
environmental standards; initiating capital improvements to correct 
imminently hazardous or mission critical deficiencies; identifying funds 
to address immediate shortfalls in law enforcement staffing and 
operations for BIA-funded facilities; and standardizing detention facility 
inspections. Anderson also testified that the BIA will spend $6.4 million 
on prison operations in 2004, up from $1.4 million in the previous 
year.372
The Indian Tribal Justice Act established an Office of Tribal Justice 
Support within the BIA to further the development, operation and 
enhancement of tribal justice systems and Courts of Indian Offenses.373 
The Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000 
authorizes DOJ to award grants to (1) Indian tribes for 
development/operation of judicial systems, (2) national/regional 
organizations to provide training/technical assistance to tribes, and (3) 
non-profit entities to provide criminal/civil legal assistance to tribes and 
tribal members.374
In 1999, DOJ began awarding Community Oriented Policing 
Services (“COPS”) grants directly to tribal governments to support new 
police officer, criminal investigator, dispatcher, detention officer, and 
other positions. The COPS grants may cover 75% of additional salary, 
training, and equipment expenses for 3 years and are renewable for two 
years.375 The OMB has noted that the BIA and the DOJ have no formal 
coordination on tribal COPS grant applications, awards, and compliance 
oversight. During FYs 1999-2002, a total of 48 BIA and tribal police 
operations received three annual COPS grants. Up to 125 COPS funded 
positions will expire by FY 2005, but BIA has no plans to assume these 
positions in its budget.376
Since the BIA-DOJ Indian law enforcement initiatives, BIA funding 
http://www.oig.doi.gov; Christopher Lee, Indian Jails Need to Improve, Officials Say, WASHINGTON 
POST, June 24, 2004, A23. 
 372. Indian Tribal Detention Facilities, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, June 23, 2004. (Statement of David W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs). 
 373. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000)). 
 374. Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3681 (2000)). 
 375. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 95. 
 376. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 95, 98; see also Dan Eggen, Hiring under COPS 
Appears Set to End, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 29, 2004 at A25. 
   
56 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 19 
 
has increased from $96.3 million in FY 1999 to $159 million in FY 
2003. The BIA’s FY 2004 Budget requested $169 million for police and 
detention facility operations. The DOJ funding has increased from $182 
million in FY 1999 to $209 million in FY 2003. The DOJ’s FY 2004 
Budget requests $214.9 million, including $30 million for COPS and $35 
million for new detention facilities.377 Twenty new detention centers 
funded by DOJ grants have been constructed and staffed by the BIA.378
 
D.  Unequal Justice 
 
In spite of the combined efforts of the BIA and the DOJ, findings by 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights indicate that: 
 
[A]ll three components of law enforcement—policing, justice, and 
corrections—are substandard in Indian Country as compared with the 
rest of the nation. Native Americans are twice as likely as any other 
racial/ethnic group to be the victims of crime. Yet per capita spending 
on law enforcement in Native American communities is roughly 60% 
of the national average. Correctional facilities in Indian Country are 
more overcrowded than even the most crowded state and federal 
prisons.379
 
Native American women are 50% more likely to be victimized than 
the next highest group (African American men). Indian Country crimes 
are twice as likely to be violent than are those committed elsewhere. 
Native Americans in rural areas are more than twice as likely to be 
victims of crime than are rural whites, even though most violent crimes 
against Native Americans occur in urban areas. Native Americans are 
more likely than other groups “to experience violence at the hands of 
someone of a different race.”380
Although there are disproportionately few law enforcement officers 
in Indian Country, Native Americans are incarcerated at a rate 38% 
higher than the national per capita rate. Federal prisons hold 50 percent 
more Native American youth than they did in 1994.381
Several observers have remarked on the inequities suffered by both 
Native American victims and offenders through the application of federal 
laws in Indian country. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Indians 
 377. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 95, 98. 
 378. Indian Tribal Detention Facilities, supra note 371. 
 379. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at xi. 
 380. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 67-68. 
 381. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 69. 
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may be likely to receive longer sentences imposed by federal courts as 
compared to non-Indian offenders who would be sentenced under 
generally more lenient state laws.382 On the other hand, the Federal 
Guidelines do not currently recognize the sentences of tribal courts in 
weighing the past criminal conduct of a defendant in the federal 
sentencing regime.383 One advocate has proposed changes in the law to 
allow civil suits for prospective injunctive relief against Indian law 
enforcement officials who fail to enforce protective orders from other 
states or tribes.384
 
VI.  INDIAN LAND AND WATER 
 
The BIA is responsible for the administration and management of 
55.7 million acres of land held in trust by the United States for American 
Indians, Indian tribes, and Alaska Natives.385 Developing forestlands, 
leasing assets on these lands, directing agricultural programs, protecting 
water and land rights, developing and maintaining infrastructure and 
economic development are all part of the agency’s responsibility.386 
Records of Indian land holdings are not normally recorded, as are fee 
holdings, with county officials. Rather, the BIA Land Title and Records 
Offices record and maintain custody of records that affect title to Indian 
lands and examine title and provide title status reports.387
 
A.  Acquisition of Indian Lands 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of federal policy with respect 
to Indian lands is that of acquiring lands for tribes. The primary authority 
for taking land into trust for Indians or tribes is the following provision 
of the IRA: 
 
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, 
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any 
 382. See, e.g., Gregory D. Smith, Comment: Disparate Impact of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country: Why Congress Should Run the Erie Railroad into the 
Major Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 484 (Summer, 2004). 
 383. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403 
(Spring 2004). 
 384. Sandra J. Schmieder, The Failure of the Violence Against Women Act’s Full Faith and 
Credit Provision in Indian Country: An Argument for Amendment, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 765 (2003). 
But see Sumayyah Waheed, Comment, Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws, 
Imperfect Solution, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 287 (2004).
 385. http://www.doi.gov/bureaus.html. 
 386. Id. 
 387. 25 C.F.R. pt. 150 (2000). 
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interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or 
without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted 
allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose 
of providing land for Indians.388
 
In addition to this general land acquisition authority, Congress has 
adopted numerous statutes mandating acquisition of land in trust for 
particular tribes.389 The Secretary of the Interior may proclaim that lands 
acquired in trust for a tribe become part of that tribe’s reservation.390 
Federal law also permits the use of funds derived from the sale or 
condemnation of Indian trust or restricted lands for the purchase of 
replacement land to be held in trust.391
Several federal statutes provide for the acquisition of surplus or 
donated property. The DOI may accept donations of property for the 
advancement of Indians.392 The General Service Administration (“GSA”) 
may transfer excess federal land within an Indian reservation to the DOI 
to be held in trust for that tribe.393 Tribes may acquire surplus federal 
property from federal agencies, specifically including the BIA, IHS and 
GSA, for the performance of a contract function under the ISDEAA.394 
Tribes may also acquire excess military property under the Base 
Realignment and Closure Act (“BRAC”).395
Federal courts have frequently been asked to find that 25 U.S.C. § 
465 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that argument but the decision was 
vacated by the United States Supreme Court.396 On remand from the 
Circuit, the district court upheld the constitutionality of Section 465.397 
 388. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000). The Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000), 
extends this authority to tribes that did not adopt the IRA. 
 389. E.g., Coquille Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 715-715(g) (2004); Menominee Restoration 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 903d(c) (2004); Ponca Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 983b(c) (2004). 
 390. Act of June 18, 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 467 (2004). 
 391. Id. § 409(a). 
 392. Id. § 451. 
 393. 40 U.S.C. § 483(a)(1) (2000). 
 394. 25 U.S.C. § 450j(f) (2004). 
 395. Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2628, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2000). It has been suggested that 
BIA should streamline its procedures for accepting such property into trust for tribes, which are 
claimed to be redundant. See Geoffrey D. Strommer and Craig A. Jacobson, Indian Tribes and the 
Base Realignment and Closure Act: Recommendations for Future Trust Land Acquisitions, 75 N.D. 
L. REV. 509 (1999). The BIA is unlikely to do so due to heightened concerns about the 
environmental liabilities often associated with surplus military bases. 
 396. South Dakota v. United States Dept. of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. 
granted and judgment vacated, Dept. of Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996), mandate 
recalled, opinion vacated, 106 F.3d 247 (1996). 
 397. South Dakota v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D.S.D. 2004). 
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Other courts have reached the same conclusion.398
The argument has been soundly rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals,399 which determined that “Congress properly delegated to the 
Secretary of the Interior authority to make (trust) acquisitions, and the 
Secretary then granted a delegation of general authority to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.”400 Indeed, the court expressed some 
exasperation at such challenges to the validity of the trust process, stating 
the “many arguments about the invalidity of the trust process, in this 
instance and in general, must finally be put to rest.”401
BIA land acquisition policy states: 
 
Land not held in trust or restricted status may only be acquired for an 
individual Indian or a tribe in trust status when such acquisition is 
authorized by an act of Congress. No acquisition of land in trust status, 
including a transfer of land already held in trust or restricted status, 
shall be valid unless the acquisition is approved by the Secretary: 
(a) Subject to the provisions contained in the acts of Congress 
which authorize land acquisitions, land may be acquired for a tribe 
in trust status: 
(1) When the property is located within the exterior 
boundaries of the tribe’s reservation or adjacent402 thereto, or 
within a tribal consolidation area; or 
(2) When the tribe already owns an interest in the land; or 
(3) When the Secretary determines that the acquisition of the 
land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, 
economic development, or Indian housing. 
(b) Subject to the provisions contained in the acts of Congress 
which authorize land acquisitions or holding land in trust or 
restricted status, land may be acquired for an individual Indian in 
trust status: 
(1) When the land is located within the exterior boundaries of 
 398. E.g., Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 399. United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 
1108 (2000). 
 400. Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1137. 
 401. See id; see also McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1997); Confederated 
Tribes of Siletz v. United States, 110 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 402. The term “adjacent” is not defined in law or regulation. In administrative appeals from 
decisions taking land into trust for tribes, the IBIA has deferred to the Secretary to define the term. 
See, e.g, Edwards v. Portland Area Dir., 29 IBIA 12, 16 (1995); Cross v. Acting Portland Area Dir., 
23 IBIA 149 (1993) (proposed acquisition was located about one-half mile from the reservation); 
McCloud v. Acting Portland Area Dir., 23 IBIA 203, 204 (1993) (proposed acquisition was located 
within a twenty-mile radius of the reservation); Maahs v. Acting Portland Area Dir., 22 IBIA 294 
(1992) (proposed acquisition was separated by a thirty-foot-wide road from the reservation). 
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an Indian reservation, or adjacent thereto; or 
(2) When the land is already in trust or restricted status.403
 
A proposed land acquisition is examined under different criteria 
depending on whether the land is located contiguous to or within an 
Indian reservation404 or outside of and noncontiguous to a reservation.405 
“Indian reservation” includes that area of land constituting the former 
reservation of an Oklahoma tribe.406
The decision to acquire land into trust for a tribe is one within the 
discretion of the Secretary after due consideration of the factors set forth 
in the regulations.407 After the agency has considered the applicable 
factors, the proper standard for reviewing an agency’s discretionary 
decision is to determine whether the agency acted in a manner which is 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
 403. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (2004). 
 404. 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 provides that: 
Upon receipt of a written request to have lands taken in trust, the Secretary will notify the 
state and local governments having regulatory jurisdiction over the land to be acquired, 
unless the acquisition is mandated by legislation. The notice will inform the state or local 
government that each will be given 30 days in which to provide written comments as to the 
acquisition’s potential impacts on regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes and special 
assessments. If the state or local government responds within a 30 day period, a copy of the 
comments will be provided to the applicant, who will be given a reasonable time in which 
to reply and/or request that the Secretary issue a decision. The Secretary will consider the 
following criteria in evaluating requests for the acquisition of land in trust status when the 
land is located within or contiguous to an Indian reservation, and the acquisition is not 
mandated: 
(a) The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition and any limitations contained in 
such authority; 
(b) The need of the individual Indian or the tribe for additional land; 
(c) The purposes for which the land will be used; 
(d) If the land is to be acquired for an individual Indian, the amount of trust or restricted 
land already owned by or for that individual and the degree to which he needs assistance in 
handling his affairs; 
(e) If the land to be acquired is in unrestricted fee status, the impact on the State and its 
political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land from the tax rolls; 
(f) Jurisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise; and 
(g) If the land to be acquired is in fee status, whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs is 
equipped to discharge the additional responsibilities resulting from the acquisition of the 
land in trust status. 
(h) The extent to which the applicant has provided information that allows the Secretary to 
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act. 
 405. 25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2004). Section 151.11 criteria includes the factors enumerated under 
Section 151.10 as well as the location of the land in relation to state borders and reservation 
boundaries, the anticipated economic benefits to the tribe if the land is for business use, and state and 
local government concerns as to the acquisition’s potential impacts on regulatory jurisdiction and 
property taxes. 
 406. § 151.2(f). 
 407. McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429, 1433-35 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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accordance with law.408
The IBIA has described its standard of review and the burden of 
proof in trust acquisition cases as follows: 
 
[D]ecisions as to whether or not to take land into trust are discretionary. 
The Board does not substitute its judgment for BIA’s in decisions 
based upon an exercise of discretion. Rather, the Board reviews such 
decisions “to determine whether BIA gave proper consideration to all 
legal prerequisites to the exercise of its discretionary authority, 
including any limitations on its discretion established in regulations.”409
 
Most appeals from decisions to take land into trust come from local 
governments that fear a loss of jurisdiction over the land, a loss of tax 
revenue,410 or that the land may be put to an objectionable use such as 
gaming. Mere speculation that a tribe might at some future time attempt 
to use trust land for gaming purposes does not, however, require the BIA 
to consider potential gaming in deciding whether to acquire the property 
in trust.411
The BIA must consider the loss of taxes actually assessed and paid 
on the property412 as well as comply with applicable environmental laws, 
such as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).413 Such 
review is not required for acquisitions that are made mandatory under a 
relevant statute, however, since the Secretary’s decision is then 
ministerial rather than discretionary.414
Appeals from non-governmental parties are usually accompanied by 
appeals filed by governmental entities. Therefore, the IBIA normally 
does not address the standing of the non-governmental appellants.415 
 408. Id.; see also United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1134 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 409. City of Lincoln City, Oregon v. Portland Area Dir., 33 IBIA 102, 104 (1999), aff’d, City 
of Lincoln City v. United States Dep’t of Interior, Civil No. 99-330-AS (D. Ore. Apr. 17, 2001). 
 410. The states have no power to tax Indian trust lands, whether held by the tribe or by an 
allotee. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). 
 411. See, e.g., Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. E. Area Dir., 35 IBIA 93, 103 (2000); 
Lake Montezuma Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Phoenix Area Dir., 34 IBIA 235, 238 (2000); Town of 
Ignacio, Colorado v. Albuquerque Area Dir., 34 IBIA 37, 41 (1999). 
 412. See, e.g., Rio Arriba, New Mexico, Board of County Comm’ns v. Acting Southwest 
Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 14 (2001). 
 413. See, e.g., John Santana and Virginia Buck v. Sacramento Area Dir., 33 IBIA 135, 143 
(1999). 
 414. See Sac and Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) (review under 
National Historic Preservation Act not required where the Secretary has no discretion whether to 
take land into trust). 
 415. See Okla. Petroleum Marketers Ass’n v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 35 IBIA 285 
(2000); Lake Montezuma Prop. Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Phoenix Area Dir., 34 IBIA 235 (2000); May 
v. Acting Phoenix Area Dir., 33 IBIA 125 (1999). 
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However, the IBIA has held that a citizens’ group lacked standing to 
challenge an acquisition of land into trust by a tribe.416 Although state 
law allows individuals to bring suit in the public interest without 
requiring them to meet ordinary standing requirements, the Board 
declined to recognize an appeal made in the capacity of a “private 
attorney general.”417 The IBIA cannot order the BIA to take land into 
trust, where the acquisition involves the exercise of discretion.418 The 
IBIA lacks the authority to revoke a completed trust acquisition even 
upon a finding that the transaction did not meet statutory or regulatory 
requirements.419 The Secretary may withdraw approval of the trust 
acquisition at any time prior to acceptance of the deed actually 
conveying the property to the United States.420
 
B.  Selling or Leasing Indian Lands 
 
Just as federal consent is needed to take land into trust, federal law 
prohibits the transfer of individual and tribal trust or restricted property 
without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.421 The Non-
Intercourse Act invalidates any conveyance of an interest in tribal lands 
made without the approval of the United States.422 A party seeking to 
challenge U.S. title to Indian land pursuant to an unauthorized transfer 
faces an insurmountable barrier. Congress established the Quiet Title Act 
of 1972 as the exclusive means to adjudicate a disputed title to real 
property in which the United States claims an interest.423 The Quiet Title 
 416. Friends of East Willits Valley v. Acting Pac. Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 213 (2002). 
 417. Id., citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992). 
 418. See, e.g., Yerington Paiute Tribe v. Acting W. Reg’l Dir., 36 IBIA 261, 264 (2001). 
 419. Prieto v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Big Lagoon Park Co. 
v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 32 IBIA 309, 323 (1998). 
 420. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 31 IBIA 238 (1997). 
 421. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 348, 464 (2000). 
 422. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000). It is unclear to what extent the Nonintercourse Act applies to 
tribal fee lands. The Supreme Court applied § 177 to land that the Pueblo Indian tribes of New 
Mexico held in fee simple under both Spanish and Mexican law before the United States gained 
control over New Mexico. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440-444 (1926); see also 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 44-48 (1913). Several courts, relying on Candelaria and 
Sandoval, have found § 177 applicable to lands that other Indian tribes have purchased in fee simple. 
See United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938); Alonzo v. United 
States, 249 F.2d 189, 196 (10th Cir. 1957); Tonkawa Tribe of Okla. v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039, 1045 
(5th Cir. 1996). Other courts have held that lands approved for alienation by the federal government 
and then reacquired by a tribe did not then become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse 
Act. See, e.g., Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 553 n.18 (1st Cir. 1997). The United States 
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether the Nonintercourse Act applied to 
land that was rendered alienable by Congress and later reacquired by an Indian tribe. See Cass 
County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US 103, 115 note 5 (1998). 
 423. 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2000). 
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Act displaces APA review of administrative decisions affecting title to 
land in which the United States claims an interest based on the land’s 
status as trust or restricted Indian land.424 This Act expressly reserves 
sovereign immunity in disputes involving property held in trust for 
Indian tribes.425 Preservation of immunity under the Indian lands 
exception to the Act applies as long as the government has a “colorable 
claim” regarding its title as trustee to the land at issue.426
Indian trust lands may be sold with the consent of both the owner 
and the Secretary.427 The Secretary may approve an application to sell 
Indian land if, after careful consideration of the circumstances, the 
transaction appears clearly to be justified in light of the long-range best 
interests of the owner.428 An appraisal is to be obtained prior to 
approving a sale.429 However, a sale may only be made by advertised sale 
and not by individually negotiated sale, unless the purchaser pays fair 
market value and the sale is for a public purpose, to the tribe or another 
Indian, or the Secretary determines it is impractical to advertise.430 
Advertised sales are made by sealed bid and the tribe may match the 
highest bid.431 Thus, the Bureau’s regulations normally do not permit a 
negotiated sale with a non-Indian.432 An individual Indian owner of trust 
land may, with BIA approval, execute a mortgage or deed of trust to such 
land. In the event of foreclosure, the Indian owner is treated as if he or 
she has an unrestricted fee simple title to the land and the United States is 
not a necessary party to the action.433
An Indian landowner also may apply to have Indian land removed 
from trust status. However, an application for a fee patent in order to sell 
land free of the above restrictions is subject to additional limitations. The 
Secretary may withhold action on any application which would adversely 
affect the best interests of other Indians or the tribe until they have had a 
reasonable opportunity to acquire the land from the applicant.434 Prior to 
considering such an application, the tribe must be given an opportunity to 
match the purchase price that has been offered for the trust land 
 424. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 143 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 
490 U.S. 920 (1989). 
 425. 28 U.S.C. 2409(a) (2000); United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 843 (1986). 
 426. Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 427. 25 C.F.R § 152.17 (2004). 
 428. § 152.23. 
 429. § 152.24. 
 430. § 152.25. 
 431. § 152.27. 
 432. See also 25 U.S.C. § 2216(a) (2000) (“[N]othing in this section shall be construed to 
apply to or to authorize the sale of trust or restricted lands to a person who is not an Indian.”). 
 433. 25 U.S.C. § 483(a) (2000). 
 434. 25 C.F.R. § 152.23 (2004). 
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involved. If the landowner conveys the trust land to another Indian or 
tribe, the purchaser would be barred for a period of five years from 
seeking removal of restrictions. Thereafter, the Tribe would again have 
the right to match any purchase price.435
Federal law generally limits the leasing of Indian lands for any 
purpose to a maximum term of twenty-five years,436 although there are 
several exceptions to this rule. The maximum lease term has been 
extended to ninety-nine years for leases on the Agua Caliente 
Reservation, the Navajo Reservation, and certain others.437 The Native 
American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 
(“NAHASDA”)438 authorizes leases for housing development and 
residential purposes for a primary term of up to fifty years. The 
maximum primary term for other types of leases remains twenty-five 
years, and non- agricultural leases may provide for a single renewal 
period of up to twenty-five years.439 The American Indian Agricultural 
Resource Management Act of 1993 (“AIARMA”) limits leases of Indian 
rangeland and farmland to ten years, and up to twenty-five years only 
where a “substantial investment” is required.440
Section 105(c) of AIARMA authorizes the owners of a majority of 
the trust interests in a tract to grant an agricultural lease or permit, and 
thus bind the minority owners upon BIA approval.441 In contrast, Section 
219 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 
(“ILCA”)442 authorizes the owners of a “sliding percentage” of the trust 
ownership of a given allotment to grant a “non-agricultural” lease, again 
subject to BIA approval. The “minimum consent” requirement for these 
“non-agricultural” leases is a bare majority for tracts with twenty or more 
Indian owners and 90% for tracts with five owners or less.443 In the case 
of agricultural leases and permits the requisite “majority consent” must 
come from the Indian landowners themselves, but under the ILCA 
Amendments the BIA is allowed to also grant consent on behalf of 
decedents’ estates and owners whose whereabouts are unknown and 
count those interests toward the applicable “minimum consent” 
 435. 25 U.S.C. § 2216 (2000). 
 436. Id. § 415. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. § 4211. 
 439. See id. § 415. 
 440. Pub. L. No. 103-177, 107 Stat. 2017, 25 U.S.C. § 3715 (2004); see also 25 U.S.C. § 415 
(2004). 
 441. 25 U.S.C. § 3715(c)(2)(A) (2004). 
 442. Id. § 2218. 
443.  The American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004 reduced from 100% to 90% the 
proportion of undivided interests needed for lease consent when there are five or fewer owners.  See 
Pub. L. 108-374, Sec. 6(a)(10), to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2218(b)(1)(a). 
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requirement. 
Leases of Indian trust lands are subject to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)444 and other federal land use 
statutes. Leases which have been granted or approved without proper 
NEPA documentation have been voided even after the lessee has acted in 
reliance on the approval.445 A State may not levy a tax directly on Indian 
tribes or their members inside Indian country absent clear congressional 
authorization. If the legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no 
categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax. Additionally, if the 
balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State and federal 
law is not to the contrary, the State may impose its levy.446 A state 
possessory interest tax imposed on the leasehold interest carved from the 
tax exempt federally owned fee is sufficiently indirect and remote as to 
be permissible.447
BIA regulations for leasing and permitting Indian lands for most 
purposes are set forth at 25 C.F.R. Part 162. The leasing regulations are 
broken into general provisions (Subpart A), use-specific provisions 
relating to agricultural leases (Subpart B), residential leases (reserved - 
Subpart C), and business leases (reserved - Subpart D), respectively, with 
the subparts on residential and business leases being reserved for 
publication at a later date. Pending promulgation of rules for Subparts C 
and D within Part 162, residential and business leases are covered by 
Subpart F which incorporates enforcement provisions identical to those 
found in Subpart B. Regulations for forestry are found in 25 C.F.R. Part 
163, grazing permits are found in 25 C.F.R. Part 166, and mineral leasing 
in 25 C.F.R Parts 200-227. 
C.F.R. Part 162 general leasing regulations specify certain types of 
land use agreements that are not covered by the regulations, including 
those covered under separate regulations discussed infra for mineral 
leases,448 grazing permits,449 timber contracts,450 management contracts 
and joint venture agreements,451 and easements.452 Subpart A specifies 
 444. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
 445. See Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Davis v. 
Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 446. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). Under this balancing 
test, the Tenth Circuit has rejected a state fuel tax in favor of the tribe’s interests in raising revenues 
for essential governmental programs where the tribe’s fuel marketing is integral and essential to 
customers’ visits to the Tribe’s casino. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
 447. Palm Springs Spa, Inc v. County of Riverside, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
 448. 25 C.F.R. pts. 211-212, 225 (2004). 
 449. pt. 166. 
 450. pt. 163. 
 451. pt. 84. 
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that only the owner of 100% of the interests in Indian land may take 
possession of the land without a lease453 and provides for treatment of 
unauthorized possession as trespass.454 In addition to the regulations, 
leases may be subject to federal laws of general applicability, tribal laws, 
and if the lease so provides, state laws (not to be confused with 
jurisdiction).455
A common misunderstanding about the role of the Secretary in 
approving a lease or permit is that the BIA is somehow made a party to 
the lease. The Supreme Court has ruled otherwise.456 The BIA exercises 
discretion in deciding whether or not to approve a lease of Indian land. 
However, once a lease has been approved, the parties acquire legal rights 
under it and a BIA decision concerning the lease must thereafter be based 
upon the law and the terms of the lease itself.457 The IBIA has 
consistently held that the BIA is bound by the terms of leases it has 
approved when the leases are not in conflict with governing 
regulations.458 The BIA acts as trustee for the Indian lessor and thus has 
an affirmative duty to enforce his or her rights. As to the rights of the 
other parties vis-à-vis each other, the BIA is no more than an adjudicator 
and acts in this capacity only where necessary to administer the lease.459 
It is an abuse of discretion, however, for the BIA to withhold approval of 
assignments or subleases for the sole purpose of permitting Indian lessors 
to negotiate more favorable lease terms.460
The construction of contracts approved on behalf of Indians by the 
Secretary of the Interior in her fiduciary capacity is a question of federal 
law. The federal statutes and regulations governing the leasing of Indian 
lands constitute a comprehensive regulatory scheme which preempts the 
application of state and local laws.461 Leases disguised as another type of 
agreement nevertheless require BIA approval and without such approval 
they are void, according rights to neither party.462 Acceptance of rentals 
 452. pt. 169. 
 453. 25 C.F.R. § 162.104. 
 454. § 162.106. 
 455. § 162.109. 
 456. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 371 (1968) (“Although the approval of the 
Secretary is required, he is not the lessor.”). 
 457. E.g., Racquet Drive Estates, Inc. v. Deputy Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs 
(Operations), 11 IBIA 184 (1983). 
 458. E.g., Kearny Street Real Estate Co. v. Sacramento Area Dir., 28 IBIA 4 (1995); Am. 
Indian Land Dev. Corp. v. Sacramento Area Dir., 23 IBIA 208 (1993); Abbott v. Billings Area Dir., 
20 IBIA 268 (1991). 
 459. E.g., Candelaria v. Sacramento Area Dir., 27 IBIA 137 (1995). 
 460. See Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 461. Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 462. Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., IBIA 92-211-A (1993); see 
also Bulletproofing, Inc. v. Acting Phoenix Area Dir., 20 IBIA 179 (1991); Smith v. Acting Billings 
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by the lessor subsequent to default on specific provisions of the lease by 
the lessee does not constitute waiver of the items in default, in the 
absence of showing that the lessor voluntarily and intentionally waived 
the requirements under the lease.463
The BIA may collect reasonable fees in connection with work 
performed for individual Indians or tribes to be paid by vendees, lessees, 
or assignees or deducted from the proceeds of sales, leases, or other 
sources of revenue.464
 
C.  Agricultural Lease Regulations 
 
The agricultural lease regulations provide that leases must conform 
to any agricultural resource management plan developed by the tribe 
having jurisdiction over the land.465 Leases may be negotiated directly 
with the landowners subject to BIA approval. The BIA will assist 
potential lessees upon request, including providing the names and 
addresses of the Indian landowners.466 Normally, the BIA will advertise 
Indian land for agricultural leases.467 Approval by a majority of 
ownership interests must be obtained in order to lease fractionated 
land.468 The BIA may consent on behalf of persons who have been 
declared non compos mentis for undetermined heirs, for persons whose 
whereabouts are unknown, for orphaned minors, for those who have 
given the BIA a power of attorney, and for owners who have been unable 
to agree on a lease for three months where the land is not being used by 
any of them.469
The BIA must determine by any appropriate valuation method the 
fair market rental of the land before approval of a lease unless the lease 
may be approved at less than fair market rental.470 A lesser amount may 
be permitted when payment is based on percentage of income or under 
special circumstances where nominal rent is appropriate.471 Before 
Area Dir., 17 IBIA 231 (1989); see also United States v. Emmons, 351 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1966) (an 
unapproved “side agreement” to extend a five-year lease of restricted Indian lands in Palm Springs 
held void for all purposes). 
 463. Administrative Appeal of Sunny Cove Dev. Corp. v. Flora Cruz, 3 IBIA 33 (1974). 
 464. 25 U.S.C. § 413 (2000); see also Welk Park N. v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 29 IBIA 213 (1996) (discussing history of fees statute and corresponding 
regulations in a case involving tribal fees). 
 465. 25 C.F.R. § 162.201 (2004). 
 466. § 162.206. 
 467. § 162.212. 
 468. § 162.207(c). 
 469. § 162.209. 
 470. § 162.211. 
 471. § 162.222. 
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approval, the BIA must review the lease, status of any legal entities, 
bond if required, environmental reports, and compliance with tribal 
law.472 The lease becomes effective upon BIA approval unless by its 
terms it is made effective at some past or future time (not more than one 
year after approval).473 Approval is effective immediately 
notwithstanding appeal.474
There are no standard lease forms.475 Certain provisions are required 
pertaining to enforceability by the United States, trust status of the land, 
and compliance with applicable laws.476 The lease must identify the 
landowners and their respective interests, be executed by those with 
binding authority, and cite regulatory authority for approval.477 The lease 
must include a legal description or other sufficient description and must 
identify any fee interests.478
A lease must provide for payment of fair market rental at the 
beginning of the lease term and at specified times during the lease except 
where the tribe has negotiated the rent for tribal land or where the tenant 
is a member of the landowners’ immediate family, a co-owner in the 
lease tract, or has some other special relationship or circumstances exist 
that the BIA deems sufficient to warrant approval.479 Fair market rental, 
if based on a fixed amount, must be reviewed for possible adjustment at 
least every fifth year.480
Rental payments are due when specified by the lease regardless of 
whether notice is received and may not be paid more than one year in 
advance.481 The lease must specify what interest and penalties may apply 
and notice will not be required unless so provided by the lease.482 The 
lease must specify to whom rent is to be paid.483
The term of an agricultural lease is limited to ten years, unless a 
substantial investment is required, in which case the term may be for up 
to twenty-five years.484 A lease may be amended, assigned, sublet or 
mortgaged if the required landowners’ consents are obtained and the BIA 
 472. § 162.213, .214. 
 473. § 162.215. 
 474. § 162.216. 
 475. § 162.218. 
 476. § 162.219. 
 477. § 162.220. 
 478. § 162.221. 
 479. § 162.222. 
 480. § 162.223. 
 481. § 162.224. 
 482. § 162.225. 
 483. § 162.226. 
 484. § 162.229. 
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finds the amendment to be in the best interests of the landowners.485 A 
lease may designate a representative, including the BIA, to consent to an 
amendment, but such representative may not consent to an amendment 
that would reduce payments to the landowners, terminate or modify the 
term of the lease or the lease area.486
Construction of improvements under an agricultural lease will not 
require consent, approval or amendment of the lease as long as they are 
generally described in the lease.487 The lease must specify who will own 
any improvements at the end of the lease, providing for them to remain 
on the premises in satisfactory condition, or for their timely removal.488
Leases must require lessees to indemnify the United States and 
landowners from any loss or liability resulting from lessee’s use of the 
premises and from any hazardous materials on the premises, regardless 
of fault.489 Unless otherwise specified in a lease the landowners are 
entitled to any payments arising from actions that diminish the value of 
the land or improvements such as insurance proceeds, trespass damages 
or condemnation awards.490
Leases may provide for negotiated remedies in the event of lease 
violations, to be exercised in addition to the BIA’s right of cancellation, 
but must specify how landowners may exercise those remedies. Leases 
may provide for resolution through a court of competent jurisdiction or 
alternative dispute resolution, although the BIA may not be bound by 
such decisions made in such forums.491 A lessee must provide a bond 
unless otherwise specified by the tribe or a majority of landowners.492 
The lease may require the lessee to maintain insurance with the 
landowner and the United States as additional insured parties.493
The BIA may charge administrative fees for each approval of a lease, 
amendment, assignment, sublease or related document.494 The BIA may 
issue rent due notices but the lessee’s obligation to pay is independent of 
receipt of any such notice.495 Upon lessee’s failure to pay rent in a timely 
manner the BIA will send notice of a violation of the lease. Failure to 
cure within the time provided may result in cancellation of the lease or 
 485. § 162.230, 162.242-162.244. 
 486. § 162.230. 
 487. § 162.232. 
 488. § 162.233. 
 489. § 162.238. 
 490. § 162.239. 
 491. § 162.240. 
 492. § 162.234. 
 493. § 162.237. 
 494. § 162.241. 
 495. § 162.247. 
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other remedies available under the lease or applicable law.496 The 
regulations establish a schedule of fees for delinquent rental payments.497 
In the event of a lease violation, the BIA will provide notice, consult 
with the landowners, and determine whether to cancel the lease or pursue 
other remedies, pending appeal rights under 25 C.F.R. Part 2.498
Although the bond provisions of 25 C.F.R. Part 2 will not apply to 
appeals from lease cancellation decisions, the BIA may require the lessee 
to post an appeal bond; if the bond is not posted, the BIA may dismiss 
the appeal.499 A cancellation decision will be stayed if the lessee perfects 
an appeal under Part 2.500 The BIA may take emergency action to protect 
the leased premises from immediate and significant harm.501
 
D.  Residential and Business Lease Regulations 
 
On February 10, 2004, the BIA published its Proposed Rule for 
Residential and Business Leases. This Rule would replace Subpart F 
with the new Subparts C, Residential Leases, and D, Business Leases.502 
Subpart F currently provides general leasing regulations for all non-
agricultural leasing but does not differentiate between business and 
residential leases. Although the Proposed Rule treats these two types of 
leases separately many of the provisions are common to both business 
and residential leases. Subpart A of the General Provisions is modified to 
define several new terms. The definition of “Immediate Family,” for 
example, is expanded to include “when some other special relationship 
exists between the lessor and the lessee or special circumstances exists 
(sic) that in the opinion of the Secretary warrant the approval of the 
residential lease . . . .”503
The regulations cover ground leases as well as leases of developed 
land. Leases which authorize the construction of single-family homes 
and public housing are covered by the residential lease regulations while 
leases for multi-family developments and for single family residential 
developments for profit are covered under the business regulations.504 
 496. § 162.248. 
 497. § 162.249. 
 498. § 162.252. 
 499. § 162.253. 
 500. § 162.254. 
 501. § 162.255. 
 502. See Vol. 69 Fed. Reg. 6499-6524 (2004) [hereinafter, Proposed Rule for Residential and 
Business Leases]. Some changes in the proposed rules are likely to be made before they are 
published in final form. 
 503. Proposed Rule for Residential and Business Leases, supra note 502, to be codified at 25 
C.F.R. § 162.101. 
 504. § 162.300, .400. 
  
1] BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 71 
 
Leases may be negotiated directly with the landowners subject to BIA 
approval. The BIA will assist upon request including providing the 
names and addresses of the Indian landowners.505
Approval by the required percentage of ownership interests must be 
obtained in order to lease fractionated land.506 If there are five or less 
owners, 100% of the ownership interests must approve; if there are five 
to ten owners, 80% of the interests must approve; if eleven to nineteen 
owners, 60% approval is required; if twenty or more owners exist, over 
50% approval must be obtained. Although the intent of the regulation is 
that the percentage of undivided interests is counted, rather than the 
percentage of owners, the actual wording of the regulation is 
contradictory.507 The BIA may consent on behalf of undetermined heirs, 
whereabouts unknown, legal disability, orphaned minors, power of 
attorney, and those owners who, after notice, are unable to agree on a 
lease for three months and are not using the land.508
The BIA must determine by any appropriate valuation method the 
fair market rental of the land before approval of a lease even if the lease 
is approved at less than fair market rental. The BIA must use an appraisal 
for a business lease, except that a tribe may waive appraisal of tribal land 
for residential or business leases.509 Before approval, the BIA must 
review the lease, status of any legal entities, bond if required, 
environmental reports, and compliance with tribal law.510 The BIA must 
determine in writing that the lease is in the best interests of the 
landowners. The BIA will act on complete lease proposals within thirty 
days for residential and sixty days for business. Denial or inaction is 
subject to appeal under Part 2 of 25 C.F.R.511 The lease becomes 
effective upon BIA approval, unless by its terms it is made effective at 
some past or future time, but not more than one year after approval.512 
Approval is effective immediately notwithstanding appeal.513
There are no standard residential or business lease forms.514 Certain 
provisions are required, however, pertaining to enforceability by the 
United States, trust status of the land, and compliance with applicable 
 505. § 162.302, .402. 
 506. § 162.303, .403. 
 507. § 162.304, .404. This likely will be corrected in the final regulations.  Additionally, the 
final regulations presumably will reflect a reduction to 90% in the consent required for a lease when 
there are five or fewer owners, as provided by the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004. 
 508. Id. 
 509. § 162.307, .407. 
 510. § 162.308, .408. 
 511. § 162.309, .409. 
 512. § 162.310, .410. 
 513. § 162.311, .411. 
 514. § 162.313, .413. 
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laws.515 The lease must identify the landowners and their respective 
interests, be executed by those with binding authority, and cite regulatory 
authority for approval. Signatures on a business lease, in addition, may 
be required to be notarized or witnessed by two individuals.516 The lease 
must include a legal description or other sufficient description, and must 
identify any fee interests.517
A residential lease must provide for payment of fair market rental at 
the beginning of the lease and at specified times during the lease except 
where the tribe has negotiated the rent for tribal land, or where the tenant 
is a member of the landowners’ immediate family, a co-owner in the 
lease tract, or some other special relationship or circumstances exist that 
the BIA deems sufficient to warrant approval.518 A business lease must 
provide for initial payment of fair market rental, based on a fixed 
amount, a percentage of income, or a combination of both, except where 
the tribe has negotiated the rent for tribal land or where the tenant is a 
member of the landowners’ immediate family, a co-owner in the lease 
tract or a participant in a joint venture with the landowners. The lease 
may provide for reduced rent in pre-development and construction 
periods. Non-consenting minority owners must be paid fair market 
rental. Fair market rental, if based on a fixed amount, must be reviewed 
for possible adjustment at least every fifth year.519
Residential lease rent adjustments are required only as provided in 
the lease.520 Business lease rental adjustments required by the BIA must 
be specified in the lease.521 Rental payments are due when specified by 
the lease, regardless of whether notice is received, and may not be paid 
more than one year in advance.522 The lease must specify what interest 
and penalties may apply and notice will not be required unless so 
provided by the lease.523 The lease must specify to whom rent is to be 
paid.524
The term of a residential lease is limited to fifty years, including 
renewals, unless otherwise provided by statute. The term of a business 
 515. § 162.314, .414. 
 516. § 162.315, .415. 
 517. § 162.316, .416. 
 518. § 162.317. 
 519. § 162.417. 
 520. § 162.318. 
 521. § 162.418. It has sometimes been BIA practice to peg periodic rental adjustments to a 
percentage of the assessed value of the land. Investors generally prefer a standard inflationary index, 
with a maximum and minimum percentage increase, so that they can more accurately forecast 
business expenses. 
 522. § 162.319, .419. 
 523. § 162.320, .420. 
 524. § 162.321, .421. 
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lease is limited to twenty-five years, plus a twenty-five year renewal, 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Leases of land on certain 
reservations, including the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, are 
authorized for up to ninety-nine years.525
A lease may be amended if the required landowners’ consents are 
obtained and the BIA finds the amendment to be in the best interests of 
the landowners.526 A business lease may designate a representative, 
including the BIA, to consent to an amendment but such representative 
may not consent to an amendment that would reduce payments to the 
landowners, terminate or modify the term of the lease or the lease area.527 
Leases may be assigned without the consent of the landowners if 
specified in the lease and the assignee agrees to assume the lessee’s 
obligations. Whereas assignment of a business lease requires BIA 
approval a residential lease may be assigned without BIA approval if the 
assignee is a leasehold mortgagee that agrees any tenant will be a tribal 
member, tribal housing authority, or the tribe. If none of these wish to 
lease the property the lease may be transferred to another Indian, 
consistent with tribal law; if none is available the lease may be 
transferred to a non-Indian consistent with tribal law.528
A lease may provide for subleasing without the consent of the 
landowners when the lease is part of a residential or commercial 
development for which the BIA has approved a general plan and 
sublease form. The lease may provide that BIA approval of a sublease is 
not required. If a residential lease was approved at less than fair market 
rent and the sublessee is not a co-owner or member of the landowners’ 
immediate family the sublease must require fair market rent.529 Leases 
may be mortgaged without the consent of the landowners if specified in 
the lease and approved by the BIA.530 The BIA will take action on a 
business lease amendment, assignment, sublease or mortgage within 
sixty days of receipt.531
Construction of improvements under a residential lease will not 
require consent, approval or amendment of the lease as long as they are 
generally described in the lease. Similarly, a business lease must describe 
any improvements to be constructed and must also provide a construction 
schedule approved by tribal officials.532 The lease must specify who will 
 525. § 162.324, .424. 
 526. § 162.325, .326. 
 527. § 162.425, .426. 
 528. § 162.327, .427. 
 529. § 162.328, .428. 
 530. § 162.329, .430. 
 531. § 162.434. 
 532. § 162.333, .436. 
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own any improvements at the end of the lease, providing for them to 
remain on the premises in satisfactory condition, or for their timely 
removal. A business lease may provide for reimbursement of the residual 
value of the improvements.533
Leases must require lessees to indemnify the United States and 
landowners from any loss or liability resulting from lessee’s use of the 
premises and from any hazardous materials on the premises regardless of 
fault. Under a business lease there is no such indemnity with respect to 
hazardous materials if the liability arises from the gross negligence or 
willful misconduct of the landowner.534 Unless otherwise specified in a 
residential lease, the landowners are entitled to any payments arising 
from actions that diminish the value of the land or improvements such as 
insurance proceeds, trespass damages or condemnation awards. Business 
leases must specify the distribution of such payments.535
Leases may provide for negotiated remedies in the event of lease 
violations, to be exercised in addition to the BIA’s right of cancellation, 
but must specify how landowners may exercise those remedies. Leases 
may provide for resolution through a court of competent jurisdiction or 
alternative dispute resolution although the BIA may not be bound by the 
decisions made in such forums.536 The business lease regulation explains 
that BIA may not be bound by such decisions, for example, where such a 
resolution would diminish the BIA’s trust responsibilities or violate 
federal law.537 A lessee must provide a bond unless otherwise specified 
in the lease and if it’s determined by the BIA to be in the best interest of 
the landowner.538 The lease may require the lessee to maintain insurance 
with the landowner and the United States as additional insured parties.539
The BIA may charge administrative fees for each approval of a lease, 
amendment, assignment, sublease or related document.540 The BIA may 
issue rent due notices but the lessee’s obligation to pay is independent of 
receipt of any such notice.541 Upon lessee’s failure to pay rent in a timely 
manner the BIA will send notice of a violation of the lease. Failure to 
cure within the time provided may result in cancellation of the lease or 
other remedies available under the lease or applicable law.542 The 
 533. § 162.334, .437. 
 534. § 162.335, .438. 
 535. § 162.336, .439. 
 536. § 162.337, .440. 
 537. § 162.440. 
 538. § 162.338, .441. 
 539. § 162.341, .444. 
 540. § 162.342, .445. 
 541. § 162.343, .446. 
 542. § 162.344, .447. 
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regulations establish a schedule of fees for delinquent rental payments.543 
In the event of a lease violation, the BIA will provide notice, consult 
with the landowners, and determine whether to cancel the lease or pursue 
other remedies pending appeal rights under Part 2.544
Although the bond provisions of Part 2 will not apply to appeals 
from lease cancellation decisions the BIA may require the lessee to post 
an appeal bond. If the bond is not posted, the BIA may dismiss the 
appeal.545 A cancellation decision will be stayed if the lessee perfects an 
appeal under Part 2.546 The BIA may take emergency action to protect 
the leased premises from immediate and significant harm.547 If the lease 
provides an option for early termination it must specify the manner and 
time in which it may be exercised. A lease may be mutually terminated 
by lessee and the applicable percentage of landowners required for 
approval, subject to BIA approval.548
If a residential lessee fails to diligently develop or abandons the 
leased premises the lessee and its sureties continue to be responsible for 
their obligations under the lease. The residential lease may specify a time 
after which the leased premises must be developed or a period of non-use 
after which the premises will be considered abandoned. There are no 
such rules for business leases other than the general statement that 
abandonment of the premises does not relieve the lessee and its sureties 
of obligations under the lease.549
 
E.  Grazing Permits 
 
Regulations for Grazing Permits on Indian Lands are found in 
separate subparts for management planning, trespass, and agriculture 
education.550 Most disputes regarding grazing permits have to do with the 
rental rate. In reviewing a grazing rental rate adjustment or rental value 
determination the IBIA does not substitute its judgment for that of the 
BIA. Instead, it reviews the BIA’s decision to determine whether it is 
reasonable; that is, whether it is supported by law and by substantial 
evidence. The burden is on the appellant to show that the BIA’s action is 
unreasonable. The BIA may set a rental rate at the start of a new grazing 
term where the rate is supported by substantial evidence, however, 
 543. § 162.345, .448. 
 544. § 162.348, .451. 
 545. § 162.349, .452. 
 546. § 162.350, .452. 
 547. § 162.351, .453. 
 548. § 162.353, .454. 
 549. § 162.354, .457. 
 550. 25 C.F.R. pt. 166 (2004). 
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grazing permits with terms of five years or less are not subject to an 
increase in the grazing rental rate even where the permit provides 
otherwise.551
Trespass is another issue that arises with regularity on Indian grazing 
lands. The BIA has jurisdiction to enforce trespass regulations for any 
unauthorized use or occupation of Indian lands.552 A tribe may also 
assume direct responsibility for enforcement of federal regulations found 
at 25 C.F.R. Part 166 Subpart I – Trespass, which provides for 
concurrent tribal jurisdiction.553 The BIA may respond to a trespass on 
Indian agricultural lands by impounding livestock or other property 
involved in the trespass and assessing damages and penalties.554 The BIA 
determinations of trespass are not subject to administrative appeal within 
the agency.555
 
F.  Indian Forest Lands 
 
General forestry regulations are promulgated pursuant to the 
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act.556 The Act directs 
the BIA to take part in management of Indian forests either directly or 
through contracts with tribes557 and permits the BIA to deduct the cost of 
its management activities from the proceeds of forest product sales.558 
The Act also directs the BIA to adopt trespass regulations with tribes 
having concurrent enforcement authority559 and to institute a program of 
financial support for tribal forestry programs.560
Indian forests cover over 17 million acres on 275 reservations in 26 
states with a commercial timber volume of approximately 42 billion 
board feet with an annual allowable harvest of 779 million board feet.561 
The OMB has recommended a reduction in funds for the BIA’s forestry 
program because BIA has not met its harvest goal for the past several 
years.562 The criticism of the BIA seems unwarranted, for as OMB 
acknowledges, Indian forests often are valued by the tribes for 
ceremonial or cultural purposes rather than as a source of revenue and 
 551. Fort Berthold Land and Livestock Ass’n v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 35 IBIA 266 (2000). 
 552. 25 C.F.R. § 166.800 (2004). 
 553. § 166.802. 
 554. § 166.806. 
 555. § 166.805. 
 556. Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104 Stat. 4532, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120. 
 557. 25 U.S.C. § 3104 (2004). 
 558. § 3105. 
 559. § 3106. 
 560. § 3110. 
 561. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 88. 
 562. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 89, 91. 
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public forests experienced a similar harvest decline in the 1990s as 
ecological concerns gained ground on timber production goals.563
 
G.  Restricted Lands Held by Members of the Five Civilized Tribes 
 
There are laws peculiar to sale and lease of lands of members of the 
Five Civilized Tribes. Section 3 of the Act of April 12, 1926 (1926 
Act)564 provides that the plaintiff, defendant, or intervener to a suit 
involving restricted lands, including quiet title to restricted lands, can 
bind the government and all parties by serving notice on the Eastern 
Oklahoma Regional Director for the BIA. Most commonly, such cases 
involve actions to quiet title to lands formerly or currently held in 
restricted status by Five Tribes allottees or their heirs. Other types of 
cases affected include partition actions, mortgage foreclosures, 
condemnation actions, and actions to abate nuisances. The Tulsa Field 
Solicitor may elect to remove the case to the United States District Court 
for the district within which the subject property is located. Any time 
restricted Indian property in a partition action goes to forced sale, the 
Department may exercise a right of preferential purchase.565 After 
partition, the property remains restricted in the hands of a co-tenant of at 
least one-half Indian blood who elected to take the property. It loses its 
restricted status if sold by forced sale. 
Under Section 1 of the 1947 Act,566 state courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction concerning alienation of property interests inherited from 
Indian allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes by Indians of a half-blood or 
more.567 This process typically involves petitions filed in state court for 
the approval of deeds or oil and gas leases previously executed by 
competent adult Indian landowners.568 The Tulsa Field Solicitor appears 
in these proceedings, on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, to protect 
the interests of the Indian petitioners.569 In addition, the Tulsa Field 
 563. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 90, 92. 
 564. 44 Stat. 239. 
 565. 25 U.S.C. § 503 (2004); 25 C.F.R. § 16.5 (2004).
 566. Act of August 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 733 (1974). 
 567. See generally, Tim Vollman and Sharon Blackwell, Fatally Flawed: State Court 
Approval of Conveyances by Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes–Time for Legislative Reform, 25 
TULSA L.J. 1 (1989). 
 568. Id. Vollman and Blackwell, both former Associate Solicitors for Indian Affairs, argue for 
long overdue reform of a statutory scheme that is cumbersome, expensive, confusing, and–since the 
process requires the attorney for the grantee or lessee to file the petition for approval on behalf of the 
Indian landowner–fraught with ethical problems. 
 569. A federal court found a government trial attorney negligent in failing to properly 
represent an Indian landowner in one such state court proceeding for approval of an oil lease and 
awarded the Indian substantial monetary damages. The Court also found the entire state court 
approval process to be “fatally flawed” stating that “[t]here is no justification for the Department of 
   
78 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 19 
 
Solicitor has discretionary authority under Section 4 of the 1947 Act to 
appear and represent any restricted member of the Five Civilized Tribes 
in the courts of the State of Oklahoma in any other matter in which the 
restricted Indian may have an interest.570
 
H.  Alaska Native Landholding 
 
Congress created a unique system of landholding for Alaska Natives 
that was completely unlike anything that had ever been a part of federal 
Indian policy.571 Not being a military threat to an expanding nation, 
Alaska Natives initially escaped the various policies that had whittled 
away at Indian landholdings in the mainland. The earliest statement of 
federal policy toward Alaska Natives was contained in the 1867 Treaty 
of Cession from Russia which proclaimed that “the uncivilized tribes will 
be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from 
time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.”572 The 
Alaska Organic Act of 1884 provided that “the Indians or other persons 
in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands 
actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms 
under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for 
future legislation by Congress.”573
Alaska Natives became eligible for allotments in 1906574 and for 
townsite plots in 1926.575 The Supreme Court held in 1955 that Alaska 
Natives retained aboriginal rights to lands subject to extinguishment by 
the federal government without compensation.576 The Alaska Statehood 
the Interior to permit this kind of procedural masquerade wherein the government’s trial attorneys 
know first-hand that the private attorneys filing these petitions are bought and paid for by the 
Indian’s adversary, i.e. the private attorneys’ fiduciary client.” Walker v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 
258, 262-63 (E.D. Okla. 1987). Although the Office of the Solicitor added certain procedural 
safeguards in the aftermath of Walker, Congress has not seen fit to change the statutory scheme. A 
comprehensive reform measure backed by the Cherokee Nation sailed through the House in 2002, 
however, Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma blocked its passage at the request of the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission and oil and gas industry. Five Nations Citizens Land Reform Act, H.R. 
2880, 107th Congress -1st Session; Indian land bill aground, Inhofe says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, 
October 18, 2002, available at http://olive.newsok.com/archive/Skins/ArchiveSearch/navigator.asp? 
skin=ArchiveSearch&BP=OK; see also, Land Reform Act, at http://www.chadsmith.com/land.htm. 
 570. See also 25 C.F.R. § 16.3 (2004). 
 571. Federal Indian policy as applied to Alaska Natives has been subject to much criticism. 
See, e.g., Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Twenty Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Self 
Determination or Destruction of the Heritage, Culture, and Way of Life of Alaska’s Native 
Americans? 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 305 (1997). 
 572. 15 Stat. 539, 542 (1867). 
 573. 23 Stat. 24, 26 (1884). 
 574. 34 Stat. 197 (1906). 
 575. 44 Stat. 629 (1926). 
 576. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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Act disclaimed state title to lands held by natives but also allowed the 
state to select large tracts from the vacant public lands.577 Finally, in 
1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)578 
extinguished Alaskan aboriginal title and created a unique system of 
Native landholding. 
ANCSA authorized Native groups to select large parcels of public 
land in or near Native villages and individual Natives to claim homesites 
of up to 160 acres.579 The Act provided for establishment of regional 
corporations throughout the State in which individual Natives would 
receive corporate stock.580 Native villages within each region formed 
village corporations581 which acquired title to the surface of lands 
selected within each respective region582 whereas the regional 
corporations acquired the mineral rights.583 The Native corporations 
received their land in fee although later amendments have provided some 
protections against involuntary alienation.584
A 1980 statute, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
(“ANILCA”), attempted inter alia to protect subsistence hunting and 
fishing uses of Alaska Natives.585 ANILCA also granted many of the 
land claims that had remained pending under the Allotment Act of 
1906.586 Legislative approval of a Native allotment application pursuant 
to ANILCA precludes any inquiry into whether the Native’s use and 
occupancy of the land was sufficient to entitle the Native to approval of 
the allotment.587
The BLM has determined that preference rights to Native allotments 
took precedence over subsequent state right-of-way claims.588 In an 
Appeal from a decision of the BLM’s Alaska State Office declaring a 
right-of-way null and void in part, the IBLA held that the failure of the 
State of Alaska to appeal a decision finding a native allotment to be 
legislatively approved by the State prohibits a subsequent challenge to 
 577. 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
 578. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2004). 
 579. § 1613. 
 580. § 1606. 
 581. § 1607. 
 582. § 1611. 
 583. § 1606. 
 584. § 1636. 
 585. § 3101. 
 586. § 1643(a) (1994). 
 587. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 153 IBLA 309 (2000) (rejecting a regional corporation 
selection application for a cemetery site/historical place to the extent it includes land within a 
legislatively approved Native allotment application). 
 588. Alaska v. Babbitt, 75 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1995); Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert Allotment), 38 
F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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any of the predicate facts determined by BLM in its initial decision.589 
However, a highway right-of-way grant for land which was withdrawn 
and the withdrawal then converted to an easement reserved for highway 
purposes is a valid existing right to which a native allotment is subject 
where the use and occupancy began after the land was withdrawn.590
 
I.  Navajo and Hopi Relocation 
 
In the 1934 Navajo Reservation Act, Congress sought to consolidate 
and enlarge the Navajo Reservation by appropriating all vacant, 
unreserved, and unappropriated lands within certain boundaries.591 
Included in the land set aside was the Hopi Reservation established by 
Executive Order in 1882. Subsequent litigation between the tribes led to 
a ruling that they were joint owners of approximately 1.8 million acres of 
land since known as the Joint Use Area.592
The Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974593 led to further 
litigation and eventual partition of the area.594 It also created the Navajo 
and Hopi Indian Relocation Commission595 which assumed from the BIA 
all responsibility to assist in the relocation of Indian households and their 
livestock from lands partitioned to the tribe of which they are not 
members.596 DOI regulations govern the manner in which the 
Commission carries out the relocation provisions of the law.597 
Relocation has long been a highly controversial and heart-wrenching 
issue for the tribes involved as well as for policy-makers and other 
observers.598
 
J.  Easements, Rights-of-Way, and Indian Roads 
 
The 1887 General Allotment Act explicitly reserved the power of 
 589. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 154 IBLA 57 (2000). 
 590. Id. 
 591. Ch. 521, 48 Stat. 960 (1934). 
 592. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff’d 373 U.S. 758 (1963). 
 593. The Act of December 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712, as amended by Pub. 
L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929, Pub. L. No. 100-666, 102 Stat. 3929, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 640(d). 
 594. See, e.g., Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 595. 25 U.S.C. § 640(d)(11) (2004). 
 596. § 640(d)(13). Most of those to be relocated are Navajo living on the Hopi Partitioned 
Land. At this time, there are approximately 146 households that remain to be relocated, of which 13 
are full-time residents on the Hopi Partitioned Land. A total of 3,370 families have been relocated 
from the Hopi Partitioned Land. House Rpt.108-542, Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2005. 
 597. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 700 (2004). 
 598. See, e.g., Hollis A Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government’s Relocation of 
Navajo Indians under P.L. 93-531 and P.L. 96-305, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (1985). 
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Congress to grant rights-of-way through Indian lands for railroads and 
highways, for other public uses, and to condemn such lands.599 Congress 
exercised this power in a series of enactments over the following several 
decades. A statute adopted in 1899 authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to grant rights-of-way over Indian lands, except in Oklahoma, for 
railroads, telegraph and telephone lines.600 The authority was extended to 
the granting of rights-of-way for highways in 1901.601 Another 1901 
statute authorized rights-of-way for telephone and telegraph lines in 
general602 and yet another 1901 law granted to states the power to 
condemn the trust lands of individual Indians for public purposes in 
federal court.603 Ten years later, Congress authorized Interior to grant 
fifty-year rights-of-way over Indian lands for electric power and 
communication lines and poles.604 The Federal Power Act authorizes the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to grant rights-of-
way for hydroelectric dams and transmission lines but permits Interior to 
place conditions on such licenses.605
In 1948, Congress enacted a series of general statutes to govern all of 
the rights-of-way on Indian lands except for hydroelectric projects that 
remained under FERC jurisdiction.606 Under these statutes, tribal consent 
is required for a right-of-way across tribal lands.607 Indians must be justly 
compensated for grants of rights-of-way.608 The BIA has promulgated 
regulations to implement the array of statutes governing grants of rights-
of-way.609
Rights-of-way granted under the earlier statutes are unaffected by the 
1948 enactments.610 A 1904 law limited the terms of pipeline rights-of-
way granted under that statute to a term of twenty years with the 
possibility of renewal for another twenty years.611 The 1948 enactment 
contains no term limitations.612 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 599. 25 U.S.C. § 341 (2004). 
 600. § 312. 
 601. § 311. In U.S. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943), this statute served 
as sufficient authority for the addition of electric power lines within such highway right-of-way. 
 602. 25 U.S.C. § 319 (2004). 
 603. § 357; see also Town of Okemah v. United States, 140 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1944). 
 604. 43 U.S.C. § 961 (2004). 
 605. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2004). See Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission 
Indians, 104 S.Ct. 2105 (1984). 
 606. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (2004). 
 607. § 324. The statute refers only to tribes organized under the IRA, however, BIA has 
extended the requirement to all tribes. See 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2004). 
 608. 25 U.S.C. § 325 (2004). 
 609. 25 C.F.R. pt. 169 (2004). 
 610. 25 U.S.C. § 326 (2004). 
 611. The Act of March 11, 1904, ch. 505, 33 Stat. 65, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 321. 
 612. The Act of February 5, 1948, ch. 45, 62 Stat. 17, 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28. Federal 
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rejected a challenge to BIA approval of a rights-of-way under the latter 
statute rather than limiting it to twenty years in accordance with the 1904 
Act. In a case which concerned a challenge by the Blackfeet Tribe to five 
pipeline rights-of-way approved between 1961 and 1969, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the two statutes co-existed and that 
BIA had properly approved the rights-of-way for fifty year terms under 
the 1948 Act in accordance with consent given by the Tribe.613
Where a public road had been opened within the Crow Reservation 
pursuant to approval given by the DOI in 1934, the IBIA found that a 
telephone company had a right to place a buried telephone cable in the 
road right-of-way in accordance with Montana law without obtaining the 
approval of any DOI official or the consent of the owners of trust land 
crossed by the right-of-way.614 This ruling was in keeping with prior 
decisions of federal courts interpreting rights of way granted under 
different statutory authority.615
The Supreme Court has held that tribes do not retain jurisdiction over 
non-Indian use of public roads maintained pursuant to a state right-of-
way.616 BIA roads, on the other hand, are considered tribal roads and thus 
tribes retain jurisdiction.617 The BIA constructs such roads on 
reservations “to provide an adequate system of road facilities serving 
Indian lands.”618 A BIA road is considered an “Indian reservation 
road”619 even where a road serves both Indian and non-Indian land620 and 
even though BIA roads are generally open to public use.621 An “Indian 
reservation road” serving Indian land and held in trust for a tribe is a 
“tribal road.”622
The BIA has published a final rule establishing new policies and 
regulations, however, limit the terms of pipeline rights-of-way to fifty years with the possibility of 
renewal for another fifty years. 25 C.F.R. § 161.19 (2004). 
 613. Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 828 (1988). 
 614. Colleen Simpson v. Rocky Mountain Reg’l Dir., 37 IBIA 182 (2002). 
 615. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206, 209-210 (1943); United States v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 434 F. Supp. 626, 626 (D. Mont. 1977). 
 616. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442, 456 (1997). 
 617. McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 618. 25 C.F.R. § 170.3 (2004). BIA also operates a small Indian Highway Safety Grant 
Program. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 181 (2004). 
 619. 25 C.F.R. § 170.1 (2004). 
 620. § 170.7. 
 621. § 170.8. 
 622. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (noting in the context of 
federal preemption that the Court saw “no basis, and respondents point to none, for distinguishing 
between roads maintained by the Tribe and roads maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”). The 
Ninth Circuit also equated a BIA road with a tribal road in Allstate v. Stump, 191 F.3d 1071, 1072 
(9th Cir. 1999) (describing an accident on Route 9, a BIA road, as occurring “on a tribal road in the 
Rocky Boy Reservation.”). 
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procedures governing the Indian Reservation Roads (IRR) Program. The 
rule expands transportation activities available to tribes and tribal 
organizations and provides guidance for planning, designing, 
constructing, and maintaining transportation facilities. It also establishes 
a funding distribution methodology called the Tribal Transportation 
Allocation Methodology.623
 
K.  Indian Irrigation Projects 
 
Regulations governing the operation and maintenance of various 
Indian Irrigation Projects624 are found in 25 C.F.R. Part 171. The 
regulations vest a great deal of responsibility and discretion in the 
“Officer in Charge” (normally the Agency Superintendent or Project 
Engineer)625 for setting rates,626 establishing the irrigation season,627 
determining whether to provide domestic and stock water,628 establishing 
delivery points,629 distribution and apportionment of water,630 recording 
irrigation water deliveries,631 management of surface drainage,632 
construction and maintenance of facilities,633 preparation of annual 
project crops and statistical reports,634 carriage agreements and water 
rights applications,635 recording assessments and payments,636 and 
enforcing health and sanitation standards.637 Irrigation water normally 
will not be delivered until the Indian landowner or lessee has paid or 
made satisfactory arrangements for payment of annual operations and 
maintenance assessments.638 Disputes are subject to the Part 2 appeals 
procedures.639
Individual regulations are set forth respectively designating Pueblo 
Indian lands benefited by irrigation and drainage works of the Middle 
 623. See “Indian Reservation Roads Program” (RIN: 1076-AE17), 69 Fed. Reg. 43090 (July 
19, 2004). 
 624. E.g. 25 U.S.C. § 385 (2004). 
 625. 25 C.F.R. § 171.1 (2004). 
 626. § 171.1(e). 
 627. § 171.2. 
 628. § 171.3. 
 629. § 171.5. 
 630. § 171.6. 
 631. § 171.7. 
 632. § 171.8. 
 633. § 171.9. 
 634. § 171.13. 
 635. § 171.14. 
 636. § 171.20. 
 637. § 171.21. 
 638. § 171.17, .19. 
 639. § 171.23. 
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Rio Grande Conservancy District, New Mexico;640 governing 
concessions, permits and leases on lands withdrawn or acquired in 
connection with the San Carlos, Fort Hall, Flathead and Duck Valley or 
Western Shoshone irrigation projects;641 and for the use and distribution 
of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Development Trust Fund and Lease 
Fund.642 The Indian Dams Safety Act of 1994 requires the BIA to ensure 
the long term maintenance and safety of some fifty-three dams on Indian 
lands that provide flood control and water for irrigation, municipal, 
industrial, domestic, livestock, recreation, and for fish and wildlife 
habitats.643
 
L.  Indian Water Rights 
 
The BIA regulations do not address the subject of Indian water rights 
nor are they defined by statute. The BIA performs a limited role in 
assisting tribes to litigate or more often seek to settle their water rights 
claims.644 In some cases, the BIA has been given a role in assisting tribes 
to implement a water rights settlement.645
State courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate federally-reserved water 
rights under a 1952 law known as the McCarran Amendment.646 This 
jurisdiction extends to adjudication of rights held by the United States as 
trustee for Indian water rights although subject to federal substantive 
law.647
The source of Indian water rights is found in the 1908 Supreme 
Court decision of Winters v. United States648 which held that the creation 
of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana under a treaty entered 
into in 1888 by necessity implied the reservation of sufficient water 
rights to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.649 The Court revisited this 
 640. 25 C.F.R. pt. 172; 45 Stat. 312. 
 641. pt. 173. 
 642. pt. 183; San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 
4748. 
 643. Pub. L. No. 103-302, 108 Stat. 1560, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3804. 
 644. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 89.41 (2004). This regulation provides for the discretionary grant of 
funds to pay tribal counsel in limited circumstances. Ordinarily, the DOJ represents the tribes as 
trustee, however, tribes often feel this representation is inadequate. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 
460 U.S. 605, 613-15 (1983). 
 645. See, e.g., Fort hall Indian Water Rights Settlement, Pub. L. No. 101-602, 104 Stat. 3059 
(1990). 
 646. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2004). 
 647. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Arizona 
v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
 648. 207 U.S. 564, 576. 
 649. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Legal History: The Unsettling of the West: How Indians Got 
The Best Water Rights, reviewing Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Doctrine in its Social 
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holding in 1963 when it ruled in the case of Arizona v. California that the 
creation of reservations for tribes along the Colorado River similarly 
implied a reservation of water sufficient to irrigate all of the “practicably 
irrigable acreage” on the reservations. 650
Despite the method of measuring these so-called “Winters” rights, 
Indian tribes are free to use their water for other than agricultural 
purposes651 including maintenance of fish habitat.652 Allotment of tribal 
lands resulted in the transfer of tribal water rights to the allottees.653 A 
non-Indian who succeeds to the allotment also acquires water rights 
although their nature is changed in some respects.654 Indian water rights 
may be leased to non-Indians along with a lease of Indian lands.655
The Arizona Supreme Court has concluded that federal reserved 
rights apply to both surface and subsurface sources of water, and that 
federal reserved rights enjoy greater protection from groundwater 
pumping than do state water rights.656 The Wyoming Supreme Court had 
earlier declined to apply Winters rights to groundwater.657 It is likely that 
the Supreme Court will ultimately decide this question.658
 
M.  Federal Landlord 
 
Perhaps more than anything else, the BIA is regularly criticized with 
respect to its management of Indian lands. States are often upset because 
Indian lands are not within their tax base and regulatory jurisdiction. 
Tribes and individual beneficial owners sometimes complain that the 
BIA approval they require in order to develop their lands seems to be 
arbitrarily withheld or inordinately delayed. Third parties who wish to 
lease Indian lands many times are frustrated by what appear to be arcane 
rules and bureaucratic procedures (although they often escape even more 
burdensome state regulation). 
Reform of BIA’s leasing regulations, now underway, could help to 
and Legal Context, 1880s-1930s, By John Shurts, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1473 (2001). 
 650. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
 651. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1979). 
 652. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-11 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1252 (1984); But see In re. Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992). 
 653. See United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). 
 654. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1092 (1981), appeal after remand, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1010 (1986). 
 655. See Skeem v. United States, 273 Fed. 93 (9th Cir. 1921). 
 656. In re Gen. Adjudication of the Gila River Sys., 195 Ariz. 411, 422, 989 P.2d 750 (1999). 
 657. In re Gen. Adjudication of Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988). 
 658. See generally, Debbie Shosteck, Beyond Reserved Rights: Tribal Control over 
Groundwater Resources in a Cold Winters Climate, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 325 (2003). 
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resolve some of these problems. Despite their exhaustive detail, the 
regulations currently do little to limit the discretion of BIA officials to 
withhold approval for various types of land use. Whereas BIA officials 
must protect against the improvident conveyance of property interests, if 
their only incentive is to avoid such acts, the natural tendency is to be 
conservative in the extreme. As a result, Indian lands may go unused and 
the owners receive no benefit. Amendments to the leasing regulations 
that would require the BIA to act within specified timelines may be 
helpful in this regard. 
The BIA also appears to lack the resources to effectively monitor and 
enforce compliance with its land use regulations and leases. Especially in 
complex leases, where rents may be based on a percentage of income 
(with an alternative minimum), the BIA and the landowners must 
provide for regular audits to ensure that trespass by non-Indians, 
particularly on agricultural lands, also continues to be a major problem. 
 
VII.  INDIAN ENERGY AND MINERALS 
 
A.  Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
 
The primary authorization for leasing of Indian minerals is the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) of 1938.659 The IMLA provides that 
“unallotted lands within any Indian reservation” or otherwise under 
federal jurisdiction “may, with the approval of the Secretary . . . be 
leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other 
authorized spokesmen for such Indians.”660 The Act aims to provide 
Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue and to foster tribal self-
determination by giving Indians a greater say in the use and disposition 
of the resources on their lands. 
Unlike federal statutes and regulations that invest the BIA with 
overall responsibility for management of certain Indian resources, such 
as those pertaining to timber management that were at issue in Mitchell 
II,661 the IMLA and its implementing regulations merely requires Federal 
approval of the lease negotiated between the parties. Thus, even where 
the Secretary failed to obtain the highest possible royalty rate for the 
tribe in a coal mining lease with a third party, the Supreme Court held in 
United States v. Navajo Nation that the United States was not liable in 
 659. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)-396(g). In addition, all leases of coal on Indian lands must comply as 
well with the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1215 and regulations promulgated at 30 C.F.R. pt. 750 (2004). 
 660. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2004). 
 661. Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II). 
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damages to the tribe.662
 
B.  IMLA regulations 
 
The DOI’s IMLA regulations at 25 CFR Part 200 govern leases and 
permits for the development of Indian tribal oil and gas, geothermal, and 
solid mineral resources. Tribal mineral resources are governed by 
regulations at Part 211 whereas Part 212 regulations govern individual 
Indian minerals. There are separate regulations, in addition, for leasing 
and development of energy and minerals for specific tribes, including 
members of the Five Tribes of Oklahoma,663 the Osage Nation,664 and the 
Wind River Reservation.665 Some of these regulations are long out-of-
date, such as those concerning lead and zinc mining operations and 
leases at the Quapaw Agency.666
The BLM is responsible for resource evaluation, approval of drilling 
permits, mining and reclamation, production plans, mineral appraisals, 
inspection and enforcement, and production verification.667 The OSM is 
the regulatory agency for surface coal mining and reclamation operations 
on Indian lands.668 Within the OSM, the Minerals Management Service 
(“MMS”) is responsible for reporting, accounting, and auditing 
functions.669
BIA regulations recognize that Indian mineral owners may lease 
their land for mining purposes only with the approval of the Secretary.670 
Mineral leases must first be offered for bidding at an advertised lease 
sale although the Secretary may grant tribal mineral owners permission 
to negotiate leases for minerals other than oil and gas.671 DOI may also 
grant geological or geophysical exploration permits with no preference 
 662. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 663. 25 C.F.R. pt. 213 (2004). 
 664. pts. 214, 226. 
 665. pt. 227. 
 666. pt. 215. Ironically, these outdated regulations are now at the heart of federal court 
litigation in which children residing in the vicinity of the Quapaw Indian Reservation in northeastern 
Oklahoma have sued for damages to their health allegedly caused by toxic wastes left over from 
mining on Quapaw lands. See Wally Kennedy, Two More Tar Creek Suits Filed, JOPLIN GLOBE, July 
20, 2004, at http://www.joplinglobe.com/story.php?story_id=122253; Omer Gillham, Tar Creek 
youths named plaintiffs, TULSA WORLD, July 7, 2004, at A1. The BIA and several mining companies 
have also been identified as potentially responsible for helping to clean up the forty square mile Tar 
Creek Superfund Site. See generally, EPA, Interior, Army, to Work Together in Removing Health 
Risks at Tar Creek, Oklahoma at http://www.epa.gov/region6/6ra/ 6ra_tar_creek.htm. 
 667. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 212.4 (2004). 
 668. §§ 211.5, 212.5. 
 669. §§ 211.6, 212.6. 
 670. §§ 211.20, 212.20. 
 671. Id. 
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rights to development and with all data to be shared with DOI and the 
Indian mineral owner.672 Lessees must post a bond and a statewide or 
nationwide bond may suffice if approved by the Secretary.673 A lessee 
may acquire more than one lease but no single lease may exceed 2,560 
acres for coal and 640 acres for oil and gas and all other minerals.674 
Nondiscriminatory state gross production and excise taxes on petroleum 
production may be imposed on the lessee of mineral rights in restricted 
Indian lands.675
Leases are for a primary term of ten years and normally continue as 
long thereafter as the minerals specified in the lease are produced in 
paying quantities.676 When an oil and gas lease provides for a primary 
term and “as much longer thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in 
paying quantities” the lease expires by operation of law when production 
ceases and not because of any action taken by the BIA.677
The BIA is not required to follow lease cancellation procedures 
when giving notice that a lease has expired by operation of law.678 Where 
a lease had expired by operation of law for non-production, the Board 
held it could not have been validated by lessee’s subsequent payment of 
annual rent to Minerals Management Service. The IBIA expressed some 
discomfort, however, noting: 
 
[I]t is not clear from the record in this case how the three Interior 
bureaus involved in Indian oil and gas leasing (i.e., BIA, MMS, and the 
Bureau of Land Management) communicate with each other 
concerning cases like this. It seems possible that MMS was not aware, 
when it sent Appellant a bill in September 1999, that BIA was shortly 
to determine that the lease had expired.679
 
A long period of non-production caused by a mechanical breakdown 
or accident might excuse non-production had Appellant shown that he 
had made repairs and resumed production within a reasonable time.680 
The burden is on the Appellant to show that his period of non-production 
 672. §§ 211.56, 212.56. 
 673. §§ 211.24, 212.24. 
 674. §§ 211.25, 212.25. 
 675. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
 676. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.27, 212.27 (2004). 
 677. E.g., Oxley Petroleum v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 29 IBIA 169, 170 (1996). 
 678. E.g., Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp. v. Acting Albuquerque Area Dir., 21 IBIA 88, 
94-95 (1991), aff’d Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp. v. Lujan, No. CIV-92-210 SC-LFG 
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 1993), and cases cited therein. 
 679. Dyck v. Acting E. Okla. Reg’l Dir., 35 IBIA 250, 4 n.2 (2000). 
 680. See, e.g., P & M Drilling, Inc. v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 33 IBIA 208 (1999), and 
cases cited therein. 
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was excusable.681
The Secretary may approve well spacing and unitization and 
communitization agreements in the interests of promoting conservation 
and efficient utilization of minerals.682 Provisions of tribal law not 
inconsistent with federal statutes may supercede DOI’s regulations for 
tribal leases.683 DOI regulations provide minimum royalty rates and 
rentals, which may be altered by agreement.684 The lessee must exercise 
diligence in prevention of waste685 and a lease may be suspended,686 
surrendered,687 assigned,688 or cancelled.689 The DOI may also impose 
penalties for violations of the lease or the regulations690 which like other 
DOI decisions may be appealed pursuant to 25 CFR Part 2.691
The DOI has considerable discretion under the IMLA and DOI 
regulations regarding the computation of royalty owed on natural gas 
produced from Indian oil and gas leases.692 The six-year statute of 
limitations for the commencement by the United States of civil actions 
for money damages693 does not limit administrative action within the 
DOI such as MMS orders to recalculate and pay additional royalty due 
under an Indian lease.694
Part 216 contains regulations for protection and conservation of non-
mineral resources during exploration and production of mineral resources 
other than oil and gas.695 In connection with an application for a permit 
or lease the BIA conducts a technical examination of the prospective 
effects of mining on the environment and formulates requirements for 
protection of non-mineral resources as part of the permit or lease.696 
 681. E.g., Oxley Petroleum, 29 IBIA at 171. 
 682. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.28, 212.28 (2004). 
 683. § 211.29. 
 684. §§ 211.41-43, 212.41-43. 
 685. §§ 211.47, 212.47. 
 686. §§ 211.44, 212.44. 
 687. §§ 211.51, 212.51. 
 688. §§ 211.53, 212.53. 
 689. §§ 211.54, 212.54. 
 690. §§ 211.55, 212.55. 
 691. §§ 211.58, 212.58. 
 692. Supron Energy Corp., 46 IBLA 181, 187 (1980); But see Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron 
Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536, 549-51 (D. N.M. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986) (holding that 25 C.F.R. § 
211.13(a) required valuation of wet gas produced from an Indian lease on the greater of the value of 
the gas at the wellhead or the aggregate value of the residue gas remaining after processing 
regardless of whether the wet gas had been sold before or after being processed into its constituent 
components). 
 693. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1994). 
 694. Union Tex. Petroleum Energy Corp., 153 IBLA 170 (2000). 
 695. 25 C.F.R. § 216.2. 
 696. § 216.4. 
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Before operations may commence the United States Geological Survey 
(“USGS”) must approve the exploration plan697 and mining plan.698 The 
operator must post a reclamation bond699 and submit annual operations 
reports.700 The mining operations are subject to inspection and 
suspension or cancellation of the permit or lease for noncompliance.701 
BIA decisions are subject to appeal pursuant to 25 CFR Part 2 and USGS 
decisions may be appealed pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Parts 211 and 231.702
 
C.  Indian Mineral Development Act 
 
Tribes play an increasingly leading role with respect to Indian 
minerals and national energy policies.703 Congress has recognized the 
greater role desired by tribes in managing their own resources. The 
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (“IMDA”)704 authorizes 
agreements for the development of Indian owned minerals whereby the 
mineral owners have greater control over the mineral leasing. The IMDA 
permits any tribe, subject to BIA approval, to enter into an agreement for 
the development of minerals in which the tribe owns an interest.705 Such 
agreements may also include individually owned mineral interests.706 
Where the BIA has approved a minerals agreement the United States is 
not liable for any losses sustained by Indian mineral owners under such 
agreement although the federal trust responsibility remains.707 BIA 
regulations authorized by the IMDA are found at 25 CFR Part 225.708
 
D.  Conflicts of Interest 
 
To some, the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in assisting 
Peabody Coal to negotiate a lower royalty rate with the Navajo Nation 
may merely confirm the historic inability of the DOI to honor its trust 
 697. § 216.6. 
 698. § 216.7. 
 699. § 216.8. 
 700. § 216.9. 
 701. § 216.10. 
 702. § 216.11. 
 703. Founded in 1975, the Council of Energy Resource Tribes (“CERT”) is a particularly 
active tribal alliance that helps its member Tribes to develop their management capabilities and use 
their energy resources for building self-governing economies. Information about CERT can be 
located at http://www.certredearth.com. 
 704. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2004). 
 705. § 2102(a). 
 706. § 2102(b). 
 707. § 2103(e). 
 708. § 2107. 
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obligations to Indians when striking bargains with powerful mining 
interests.709 Yet objections to such perceived conflicts are increasingly 
being voiced by tribes and within the DOI itself. The NCAI, for example, 
lobbied vociferously against the federal court nomination of a former 
Solicitor it felt had favored mining and grazing industries over the 
interests of tribes.710
Interior’s Inspector General, reporting recently on “a series of cases 
in which we have observed an institutional failure to consider the 
appearance of conflicts of interest by Interior Department employees and 
officials,” nevertheless spoke expectantly about “changes [in] the ethical 
culture in the Department.”711
 
VIII.  INDIAN PROBATE 
 
A.  Indian Wills and Probate 
 
The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the probate of Indian 
trust property712 and the review as to form and approval of Indian 
wills.713 The Secretary’s probate decisions are “final and conclusive” and 
reviewable only for constitutional compliance.714 The Secretary’s 
approval or disapproval of an Indian will is subject to judicial review for 
abuse of discretion.715 The review as to form is conducted by the Office 
of the Solicitor to determine whether or not there are any obvious 
problems on the face of the will that may render it subject to attack 
during probate.716 Approval of the will, subject to appeal, is the 
responsibility of the Administrative Law Judge, Office of Hearings and 
Appeals.717 Claims against the estate are permitted by BIA regulations.718
 709. See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust 
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 
327 (1995). 
 710. See www.ncai.org/news (February 6, 2004, Broadcast 04-010) (“The NCAI’s 
unprecedented opposition to a judicial nominee received interest by the [Senate Indian Affairs] 
Committee members since the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals hears a very high number of Indian 
law cases.”); see also Henry Weinstein, Groups Fight Nominee for 9th Circuit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2004, at A1 (citing opposition to William G. Myers III from “nearly 100 environmental, tribal, civil 
rights, labor and women’s organizations” including the NCAI). 
 711. Rick Weiss, Report Critical of Interior Official, Inspector General Calls Deputy 
Secretary’s Dealings Troubling but Not Illegal, WASHINGTON POST, March 17, 2004, at A23. 
 712. 25 U.S.C. § 372 (2004). 
 713. Id. 
 714. Kicking Woman v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 715. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970). 
 716. 43 C.F.R. § 4.260(b) (2004). 
 717. § 4.202. 
 718. § 4.250, .252. 
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The substantive law applied to the inheritance of trust property 
normally is that of the state where the property is located,719 subject to 
federal law described infra, and to tribal law with regard to the 
determination of the legitimacy of heirs720 and validity of adoptions.721 
Current law provides that interests in trust land may be devised only to 
another Indian or to the tribe with jurisdiction over the land.722 An 
attempted devise to a non-Indian conveys only a life estate.723 The 
remainder descends to the decedent’s Indian spouse or Indian heirs of the 
first or second degree pursuant to the applicable laws of succession or if 
there are no such heirs then to collateral heirs who own interests in the 
land.724 If there are no such heirs, the remainder interest descends to the 
tribe725 subject to the right of any Indian co-owner of the land to 
purchase the decedent’s interest at fair market value.726 Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, a testator who does not have an eligible Indian heir may 
devise his interest to any non-Indian lineal or collateral heir of the first or 
second degree727 subject to the right of the tribe to purchase such interest 
at fair market value.728
Rules of intestate succession provide that an interest in trust land 
may pass only to a decedent’s spouse or heirs of the first or second 
degree.729 A non-Indian heir may acquire only a life estate.730 The 
remainder from the life estate descends to the decedent’s collateral 
Indian heirs of the first or second degree who own interests in the land.731 
If there are no such heirs, the remainder interest descends to the tribe,732 
subject to the right of any Indian co-owner of the land to purchase the 
decedent’s interest at fair market value.733
Under the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, Indian 
landowners will soon have greater flexibility to pass on their property to 
lineal descendants, tribes will gain the ability to acquire small 
fractionated interests from individual Indians, a uniform probate code 
 719. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2004). 
 720. § 371. 
 721. § 372(a). 
 722. § 2206(a)(1). 
 723. § 2206(a)(2). 
 724. § 2206(a)(3). 
 725. § 2206(a)(4). 
 726. § 2206(a)(5). 
 727. § 2206(a)(6)(A). 
 728. §§ 2206(a)(6)(B), 2205(c). 
 729. § 2206(b)(1). 
 730. § 2206(b)(2). 
 731. § 2206(b)(3). 
 732. § 2206(b)(4). 
 733. § 2206(b)(5). 
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will apply in Indian Country, and there will be increased emphasis on 
estate planning and the development of wills.734 The Secretary is given 
180 days to publish notice of the new law, with most of its provisions 
becoming applicable one year thereafter.735
Subject to any applicable tribal probate code, the Probate Reform 
Act permits the owner of a trust interest in land to devise such interest to 
any lineal descendant; any co-owner of an undivided trust interest in the 
same parcel of land; the Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the interest in 
land; or any Indian. A trust interest in land may also be devised as a life 
estate to any person, with the remainder being devised as stated above, or 
as a fee interest. Trust personalty may be devised to any person or 
entity.736
Trust property that is not disposed of by a valid will descends 
according to an applicable tribal probate code. In the absence thereof, a 
surviving spouse receives a life estate in the trust lands. Where there is 
no surviving spouse, or there is a remainder interest, the estate or 
remainder passes to lineal descendants, parents or siblings. If there are no 
such eligible heirs, then the estate passes to the Indian tribe with 
jurisdiction over the lands, except that an Indian co-owner may purchase 
an interest that would otherwise pass to the tribe.737
Procedurally, when an Indian who owns trust property dies the BIA 
prepares information on the person’s trust estate and family history. The 
BIA does not have jurisdiction concerning non-trust property that must 
be probated in tribal or state court. An ALJ holds a probate hearing and 
issues a decision distributing the trust estate. All trust moneys of the 
deceased on hand or accrued at the time of death may be used for the 
payment of claims.738 An interested party who disagrees with the 
decision must seek a rehearing before the ALJ before appealing to the 
IBIA.739
In order to increase the efficiency of the probate process the 
Department has recently adopted new regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 15. 
The Agency Superintendent or Attorney Decision-Makers rather than an 
OHA ALJ may now make initial probate decisions. If the estate is worth 
less than $5,000, does not include land, and is not covered by a will, it is 
handled by the Agency Superintendent pursuant to 43 C.F.R. Part 4, 
 734. P.L. 108-374, 118 Stat. 1773 (to be codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 
464, 2201). 
 735. P.L. 108-374, § 8, 118 Stat. 1809. 
 736. P.L. 108-374, §§ 3, 6(a)(2), (4), (e), 118 Stat. 1774, 1797, 1800, 1805. 
 737. Id. 
 738. 43 C.F.R. § 4.252 (2004). 
 739. § 4.21, .320. 
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Subpart D.740
In most other cases the estate will be referred to an Attorney 
Decision-Maker741 who may issue a decision or refer it on to OHA after 
consideration of the following factors. The probate can be referred to 
OHA if the will disinherits children, is likely to be contested, is complex 
or ambiguous, is of questionable validity, or the dead person’s capacity 
to make a will is questionable. The probate can also be referred to OHA 
if there is a contest against a creditor claim or a claim made by a family 
member. Lastly, the probate can be referred to OHA if there are 
substantial questions about family relationships, there is a conflict in 
prior probates, there are evidence problems, the adoption of an heir is 
questionable, there is a need to establish a presumption of death, there 
are minor heirs whose rights might be jeopardized, or any interested 
person is represented by an attorney. 742
The DOI does not have jurisdiction concerning probate, leasing or 
sale of the restricted property of members of the Five Civilized Tribes 
(Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, Choctaw, and Seminole). The Act of 
April 26, 1906,743 as amended by the Act of May 27, 1908 (“1908 
Act”),744 requires state court approval of wills of full blood citizens of the 
Five Tribes, if the will disinherits a spouse, parent or child. The Act of 
June 14, 1918 (“1918 Act”)745 provides that a determination of the heirs 
of a deceased allottee leaving restricted heirs, made by the Oklahoma 
probate court “having jurisdiction to settle the estate of said deceased and 
conducted in the manner provided by the laws” of the state “shall be 
conclusive of said question.” The Act of August 4, 1947 (“1947 Act”)746 
provides that the Oklahoma state courts shall have “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over all proceedings to administer estates or to probate wills 
of deceased Indians of the Five Tribes and “of all actions to determine 
heirs arising under section 1 of the Act of June 14, 1918 . . . .”747 Trial 
Attorneys from the Office of the Tulsa Field Solicitor appear in these 
proceedings representing the Secretary of the Interior to protect the 
restricted Indian interests.748
If the estate of a deceased Five Tribes citizen contains no restricted 
land, but consists of a restricted interest in funds not exceeding $500 on 
 740. 25 C.F.R. § 15.206 (2004). 
 741. § 15.301. 
 742. § 15.205. 
 743. § 23, 34 Stat. 137 (1906). 
 744. 35 Stat. 312 (1908). 
 745. § 1, 40 Stat. 606, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 375 (2004)). 
 746. § 3(a), 61 Stat. 731 (1947). 
 747. See also 25 C.F.R. pt. 16 (2004). 
 748. See Vollman & Blackwell, supra, note 567. 
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deposit to the credit of the decedent, a special administrative procedure 
may be used under certain circumstances so that the funds may be 
distributed from the decedent’s estate.749 The Oklahoma state courts have 
no probate jurisdiction over property held in trust by the United States on 
behalf of individual Indians. Some citizens of the Five Tribes are the 
beneficial owners of this type of Indian trust property having acquired 
the property pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936750 
and/or the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.751 When trust property is 
part of the estate of a deceased Five Tribes citizen it is subject to probate 
pursuant to 43 CFR Part 4.752
Special provisions govern approval of wills executed by members of 
the Osage Nation. An attorney from the Office of the Tulsa Field 
Solicitor holds a will hearing and issues a recommended decision to the 
Superintendent of the Osage Agency. The Superintendent’s decision 
approving or disapproving the will may be appealed to the IBIA.753
Federal law prohibits the devise of trust or restricted property 
without the approval of the Secretary.754 The DOI has long held that trust 
property cannot be made the subject of an overlying private trust, 
whether inter vivos or testamentary, because doing so would conflict 
with the federal trusteeship.755 DOI regulations on life estates and future 
interests provide that “State procedural laws concerning the appointment 
and duties of private trustees shall not apply.”756 Additionally, the DOI 
will not recognize the appointment of an executor as to trust property.757 
In both testate and intestate trust estates, the BIA performs functions that 
an administrator or executor might otherwise, such as managing the 
estate pending distribution. 
Because the BIA is an interested party in a dispute concerning an 
estate inventory the IBIA has established a procedure under which 
alleged errors in the BIA’s estate inventory are to be considered during a 
probate proceeding. The procedure requires that the Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) notify the BIA when such a dispute arises and invite 
participation by the BIA. As a part of the order concluding the probate 
proceedings the ALJ is to issue a recommended decision concerning the 
disputed inventory following which any interested party (including the 
 749. 25 C.F.R. § 16.8 (2004). 
 750. 25 U.S.C. § 501 (2004). 
 751. Id. § 465. 
 752. 25 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2004). 
 753. Id. pt. 17. 
 754. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 464 (2004). 
 755. See, e.g., Estate of Arthur, 70 I.D. 24 (1963) (citing 36 Opin. Atty. Gen. 98, 100 (1929)). 
 756. 25 C.F.R. § 179.3 (2004). 
 757. See, e.g., Estate of Soulier, 2 IBIA 188, 81 I.D. 95 (1974). 
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BIA) may file objections with the Board.758 The IBIA does not have 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a probate case unless rehearing has 
first been sought from the ALJ.759
The Department’s regulation concerning renunciation of interests 
provides that “the property so renounced passes as if the person 
renouncing the interest has predeceased the decedent.”760 The regulation 
does not permit an heir to renounce an interest in trust or restricted 
property in favor of a particular person or persons.761 The IBIA has held 
that certain disclaimants, who clearly misunderstood the consequences of 
their disclaimers, must be given an opportunity to withdraw those 
disclaimers.762
 
B.  Probate Reform 
 
The descent and distribution of Indian allotments over generations 
has led to a remarkable splintering of ownership interests to the point that 
hundreds or even thousands of individuals may own undivided interests 
in a single parcel.763 The BIA’s attempts to manage Indian trust lands and 
account for the rights of each of the owners is largely what has led to the 
trust fund mismanagement discussed under Part XVII of this article. 
Meanwhile, productive use of the land is more and more difficult as the 
number of owners who must be consulted increases, the cost of 
administration of the land continues to escalate, and the benefits received 
by individual owners declines.764
There are approximately four million owner interests in the ten 
 758. Estate of Douglas Leonard Ducheneaux, 13 IBIA 169, 177-78 (1985). 
 759. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.320 (2004) (“A party in interest shall have a right to appeal to the 
Board of Indian Appeals from an order of an administrative law judge on a petition for rehearing, a 
petition for reopening, or regarding tribal purchase of interests in a deceased Indian’s trust estate, 
and also from a summary distribution order made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or an 
administrative law judge pursuant to § 4.271.”); Estate of Wilford Louie “Hops”: Broncho, 36 IBIA 
4 (2001); Estate of Thomas Nicholas Black Elk, 34 IBIA 212 (2000), and cases cited therein. 
 760. 43 C.F.R. § 4.208 (2004). 
 761. Estate of Gus Four Eyes, 20 IBIA 22 (1991). 
 762. Estate of Donna Gottschalk, 30 IBIA 82 (1996). Another holding in Gottschalk was later 
clarified to state that, as to trust property in Alaska, where a disclaimant is a descendant of the 
decedent and where that disclaimant has descendants the disclaimant’s interest passes to the 
disclaimant’s descendants. Estate of Clifford Barney Tulee, Sr., 37 IBIA 235 (2002). 
 763. Much has been written about the problem of “fractionization.” See, e.g., Jessica A. 
Shoemaker, Comment: Like Snow In The Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and The Indian 
Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 729 (2003); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: 
Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1616 (2001) 
(“As early as 1892, Indian Agents were reporting problems of fractionated heirship.”); Katheleen R. 
Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA 
L. REV. 595, 598 (1999); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1995). 
 764. See 25 U.S.C. § 2201(9) (2004) (congressional finding). 
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million acres of individually owned trust lands and ownership could 
expand to eleven million interests by the year 2030. There are parcels of 
land with ownership interests that are less than 0.000002 percent of the 
whole interest. According to the BIA, it costs an average of $1,400 to 
probate a decedent’s estate. As of December 31, 2002 there were 1,522 
open estate accounts where the funds derived only from per capita or 
judgment payments (and not income from land interests) with a 
combined total value of $7,194. This averages out to under $5 per 
account.765 The total number cases awaiting probate at the BIA is 
estimated to be nearing 9,000 with some of these estates dating back to 
the 1940s.766 Indeed, an Indian landowners group testified to Congress 
that “[t]he 1996 Cobell suit could as easily been filed in 1913 when the 
department had a probate backlog of 40,000 cases involving estate assets 
worth $60 million dollars.”767
Congress has made a couple of attempts to address this 
“fractionation” problem only to be rebuffed both times by the Supreme 
Court. A 1983 law provided that an undivided interest representing less 
than 2% of an allotted tract and yielding less than $100 annual income 
could not pass by intestacy or devise but instead escheated to the tribe.768 
The Court held the provision to be an unconstitutional taking of property 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.769 While that case was pending 
before the Court, Congress – perhaps seeing the writing on the wall – 
amended the law to require the income of less than $100 annually to 
persist over five years, to permit devise and descent of fractional interests 
to other holders of fractional interests in the same land, and to permit the 
tribe to adopt alternative remedies with BIA approval.770 This law was 
also held unconstitutional.771
 765. Testimony of Wayne Nordwall, Director, W. Region Bureau Of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 550, The American Indian 
Probate Reform Act of 2003, 108th Cong. May 7, 2003; see http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/05070 
3hrg/nordwall.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing 
List). 
 766. Testimony of Cris E. Stainbrook, President of the Indian Land Tenure Foundation: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, Regarding S. 550, The American Indian 
Probate Reform Act of 2003, 108th Cong. May 7, 2003; see http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/05070 
3hrg/stainbrook.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing 
List). 
 767. Testimony of Austin Nunez, Chairman of the Indian Land Working Group: Hearing 
Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 550, The American Indian Probate Reform Act 
of 2003, 108th Cong. Oct. 15, 2003; see http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/101503hrg/nunez.PDF 
(Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing List). 
 768. Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983). 
 769. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
 770. Pub. L. No. 98-608, 98 Stat. 3172. Additional minor amendments were made in 1990. 
Pub. L. No. 101-644, 14 Stat. 4666. 
 771. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
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The attempt to force the uncompensated escheat of fractional 
interests was repealed in its entirety in 2000.772 Meanwhile, there is no 
lessening of interest in obtaining probate reform.773
The American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004 continues a 
program authorized under the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 2000774 
for federal acquisition of fractional ownership interests in Indian trust 
lands, to prevent further fractionation and attempt to consolidate land for 
tribal development. The BIA has been conducting the pilot program in 
the Midwest Region. The 2003 budget for Indian land consolidation 
through the acquisition of fractionated ownership interests was about $8 
million. The BIA believes the pilot project has demonstrated that large 
numbers of owners are willing to sell fractionated ownership interests 
and that a purchase program can be administered at a reasonable cost. 
When the projects started there were approximately 87,000 interests on 
three target reservations. By May of 2003, BIA had purchased over 
40,000 interests on those reservations. However, because of the runaway 
growth of fractionation there was the same number of outstanding 
interests as when the project began.775 It has been conservatively 
estimated that it would cost approximately $1.25 billion to buy every 
fractionated ownership interest that existed in Indian Country.776
An OMB review of the purchase program criticized the BIA for 
carrying substantial fund balances early in the program due to lack of 
full-time staff available for processing pending applications from an 
 772. Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1995. 
 773. Tribal groups have played a central role in working for legislative reforms, including the 
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004. See, e.g., Testimony of Austin Nunez, Chairman of the 
Indian Land Working Group: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 550, The 
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2003, 108th Cong. Oct. 15, 2003; see 
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/101503hrg/nunez.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing List). Regarding the important role played by legal services 
programs see S. 550, the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2003 and other amendments to the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, October 15, 
2003 (Testimony of Lisa C. Oshiro, Directing Attorney California Indian Legal Services). See 
http://indian.senate.gov (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing 
List). The Indian Land Tenure Foundation is another nonprofit organization that has worked for 
resolution of the land fractionation issue. See www.indianlandtenure.org. 
 774. Pub. L. No. 106-462, Title I, Sec. 213; see also P.L. 108-374, § 6. 
 775. Testimony of Wayne Nordwall, Director, W. Region Bureau Of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 550, The American Indian 
Probate Reform Act of 2003, 108th Cong. May 7, 2003; see http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/05070 
3hrg/nordwall.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing 
List). 
 776. Testimony of Cris E. Stainbrook, President of the Indian Land Tenure Foundation: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, Regarding S. 550, The American Indian 
Probate Reform Act of 2003, 108th Cong. May 7, 2003; see http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/05070 
3hrg/stainbrook.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing 
List). 
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unanticipated number of willing sellers.777 However, cumulative 
obligations were dramatically increased in 2002 as Midwest agency staff 
was expanded.778 The OMB and other reviews have made a number of 
recommendations to improve BIA program management and 
accountability, such as: expanding the land acquisition and consolidation 
program to other regions and reservations; reducing unobligated fund 
balances; concentrating acquisitions on owners with active IIM accounts 
in order to close IIM accounts and thus avoid future probate cases.779
Despite its projected costs, the administration has sought to expand 
the program. As of December 31, 2003 the DOI had purchased 68,938 
individual interests equal to approximately 42,075 acres. The DOI is in 
the process of attempting to expand the program nationwide and plans to 
enter into agreements with “[t]ribes or tribal or private entities” to carry 
out aspects of the land acquisition program. The administration’s 2005 
budget request included an unprecedented $75 million for this program780 
an amount cut in the House appropriations bill from $28 million to $42 
million.781
The Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma support revision of the 
uniquely unfair system of probate regarding their members’ restricted 
property interests asking that it be amended along the lines of probate 
procedures applicable elsewhere in Indian country.782
 
IX.  FISH AND WILDLIFE 
 
A.  Reserved Rights 
 
The establishment of a reservation by treaty, statute or agreement 
includes an implied right of Indians to hunt and fish on that reservation 
free of state regulation.783 Congress retains the power to regulate such 
hunting and fishing.784 Pursuant to several federal statutes, BIA regulates 
Indian fishing in Alaska for the Annette Islands Reserve and the Karluck 
 777. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 344. 
 778. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 347. 
 779. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 342-47. 
 780. Statement of Ross O. Swimmer, Special Tr. for American Indians, and David W. 
Anderson, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, on the Trust Initiatives for the 21st Century, March 10, 2004. 
 781. H.R. 108-542, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill 
(2005). 
 782. See Five Nations Citizens Land Reform Act, supra, note 569. 
 783. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). A tribe may also reserve by 
treaty the right to hunt or fish off-reservation. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
 784. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (upholding Eagle Protection Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 668(a) (2004)). 
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Indian Reservation;785 commercial fishing on the Red Lake Indian 
Reservation;786 use of Columbia River treaty fishing access sites787 and 
in-lieu fishing sites;788 and off-reservation treaty fishing.789
 
B.  Tribal Management 
 
Tribes play the leading role in management of their own fish and 
wildlife resources. They have formed a number of inter-tribal 
organizations to assist in the administration of fish and wildlife 
programs. The Native American Fish & Wildlife Society (“NAFWS”) 
describes itself as “a national tribal organization incorporated in 1983 to 
develop a national communications network for the exchange of 
information and management techniques related to self-determined tribal 
fish and wildlife management.”790 According to the Northwest Indian 
Fisheries Commission (“NWIFC”), it “is a tribal organization established 
in 1974 to assist tribes in conducting orderly and biologically sound 
fisheries.”791 The Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission “is 
an agency of eleven Ojibwe nations in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan with off reservation treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather in 
treaty-ceded lands.”792
Joining these groups in testifying before the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee in one hearing in 2003 were leaders of several individual 
tribes plus representatives of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission, Upper Columbia United Tribes, Southwest Tribal Fisheries 
Commission, and other inter-tribal groups. Senator Inouye acknowledged 
the proliferation of tribal expertise stating that: 
 
Although it is widely recognized that tribal governments and inter-
tribal fish and wildlife management organizations have been amongst 
the most effective stewards of natural resources, both on tribal lands 
and off, today it is more than ever clear that in many areas of Indian 
country, tribal governments are on the cutting edge of new 
technological advances that are assuring enhanced protections for fish 
and wildlife and plant resources.793
 785. 25 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2004). 
 786. pt. 242. 
 787. pt. 247. 
 788. pt. 248. 
 789. pt. 249. 
 790. See http://www.nafws.org. 
 791. http://www.nwifc.wa.gov. 
 792. http://www.glifwc.org. 
 793. The Status of Tribal Fish and Wildlife Management Programs, Oversight Hearing Before 
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C.  Tribal Consultation 
 
Outside of regulatory measures and technical assistance, the BIA 
often helps tribes to enforce various rights by obtaining the cooperation 
of other federal agencies. Pursuant to Executive and Secretarial Orders794 
tribes must be consulted by federal agencies when the agencies propose 
to take actions that may adversely affect tribal resources. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service of the DOI, in particular, is required to consult with 
tribes prior to designating reservation lands as critical habitat under the 
Endangered Species Act.795 Because such designations may create 
additional regulatory burdens on tribal governments and may potentially 
undermine tribal conservation efforts the Secretarial Order requires tribal 
consultation “at the earliest indication that the need for federal 
conservation restrictions is being considered for any species” and 
“cooperative identification of appropriate management measures to 
address concerns for such species and their habitats.”796 Similarly, the 
Executive Order requires Federal agencies to extend to tribes increased 
opportunities for waiver of statutory or regulatory requirements.797
 
D.  A Question of Priorities 
 
Numerous federal statutes and policies have adopted tribal 
consultation requirements in recent years,798 however, it is unclear 
whether they accord any substantive rights. Indeed, some critics suggest 
that such measures may actually undermine the federal trust 
responsibility by implying that it amounts to no more than a procedural 
right of access to decision-making.799
Notwithstanding a professed deference to tribes, Interior’s land, 
minerals, water, fish and wildlife agencies have frequently been accused 
of sacrificing tribal interests in favor of competing agency priorities. The 
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, June 3, 2003, at http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/060303hr 
g/Inouye.PDF, (Vice Chairman Inouye’s Opening Statement). 
 794. Exec. Order No. 13175 (Consultation and Coordination with Indian Governments) and 
Secretarial Order No. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust Responsibilities, and 
Endangered Species Act). 
 795. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2004). 
 796. Secretarial Order No. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust 
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act). 
 797. Exec. Order No. 13175 (Consultation and Coordination with Indian Governments). 
 798. See Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation With Indian Tribes: The Foundation Of 
Enlightened Policy Decisions, Or Another Badge Of Shame? 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, n.3 
(1999/2000). 
 799. Id.; see also Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility 
Toward the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton 
Administration’s Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 749 (1995). 
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals castigated the DOI for failing to provide 
irrigation water to Indian farmers while providing it for non-Indians 
indicating that this behavior “borders on the shocking.”800
More recently, Interior was heartily criticized by Indian tribes for 
diverting Klamath River water to non-Indian farmers that reportedly 
killed some 68,000 salmon in the process.801 A National Marine Fisheries 
Service (“NMFS”) biologist invoked whistleblower protection status 
after claiming that the Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) suppressed an 
NMFS report in order to support the DOI’s decision to restore water to 
the farmers.802
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty of balancing 
such competing priorities within a single agency. 
 
[I]t may well be that Congress was requiring the Secretary of the 
Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to 
him both the responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and 
the commencement of reclamation projects in areas adjacent to 
reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this, and it is simply 
unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not perform its 
obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has 
obliged it to represent other interests as well.803
 
Some have suggested the Court reasoned that “a lesser standard 
necessarily applies to the Indian trust duty when the Secretary has to 
serve competing legitimate public interests.”804 Tribal advocates continue 
to argue that such competing interests should be harmonized with the 
Indian trust obligation.805
 
 800. Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 
(1970); see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (overturning 
a water allocation made by the Secretary as an “accommodation,” without adequate attention to the 
trust responsibility). 
 801. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, California Report Supports Critics of Water Diversion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at A12. The final report of the California Department of Fish and Game found 
that the fishkill in the Klamath Basin was worse than originally thought, concluding that as many as 
68,000 chinook salmon died in September 2002. The report may be seen at 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/html/krfishkill-2004pdf. 
 802. Steve Hymon, Federal Biologist Invokes Whistleblower Act; He says administration 
pressure led to river levels too low to protect salmon. A U.S. official says decision relied on “best 
available science,” L.A. TIMES, Oct 29, 2002, at B7. 
 803. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 127 (1983). 
 804. DAVID H. GETCHES et al., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 342-43 (4th 
ed., West 1998). 
 805. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Symposium: The Indian Trust Doctrine After The 2002-2003 
Supreme Court Term: The Conflict Between The “Public Trust” And The “Indian Trust” Doctrines: 
Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (Winter 2003). 
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X.  INDIAN GAMING 
 
A.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
 
Observers have noted that “[l]egalized gambling is the fastest-
growing industry in the United States (perhaps the world) . . . and Indian 
casinos are the fastest growing segment of this industry.”806 According to 
federal government statistics, “Indian gaming generated $12.7 billion in 
2001 and accounted for about a quarter of the gaming market in the 
United States. As recently as 1997, annual gambling revenues were $7.4 
billion, only slightly more than half of the 2001 revenues.”807
Perhaps anticipating the explosive growth in Indian gaming, 
Congress established a comprehensive regulatory scheme in 1998.808 The 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)809 created within the DOI a 
National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”)810 with broad regulatory 
powers.811
The Chairman of the Gaming Commission is authorized to issue 
orders to close gaming activities for substantial violations of the Act812 
and to levy and collect civil fines.813 The Chairman also has approval 
authority for gaming management contracts.814 Detailed NIGC 
regulations cover, inter alia, approval of Class II and Class III tribal 
ordinances, management contracts, background investigations of persons 
having a management interest or management responsibility, internal 
control standards, monitoring and enforcement, and appeals before the 
Commission.815
The IGRA authorizes Indian gaming only on “Indian lands,”816 
defined to include reservation lands and lands held in trust by the United 
States, as well as “any lands title to which is . . . held by any Indian tribe 
or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation 
 806. Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law and Economics of Native American 
Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REV. 263 (1999) (citations omitted). 
 807. Sandra J. Ashton, The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for Sovereignty: The Role of the 
National Indian Gaming Commission in the Regulation of Tribal Gaming, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 545 
(Spring 2003) (citing Tribal Gaming Revenues at http://www.nigc.gov (Jan. 27, 2003)). 
 808. A 1987 decision of the Supreme Court provided an impetus, holding that the State of 
California was without authority to regulate Indian gaming. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 809. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2004). 
 810. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2004). 
 811. § 2706. 
 812. § 2705(a)(1). 
 813. § 2705(a)(2). 
 814. § 2711. 
 815. See generally 25 C.F.R. pts. 501-599 (2004). 
 816. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(a), (d)(1) (2004). 
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and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”817 The 
IGRA forbids gaming on lands away from the tribe’s reservation and 
placed in trust after 1988, with some exceptions.818
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes with different 
regulations for each. Class I gaming consists of “social games for prizes 
of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming connected with 
tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”819 Class I gaming is “within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes” and is not regulated by the 
Act.820
Class II gaming consists of bingo and similar games.821 Class II 
gaming is within the jurisdiction of tribes but is also subject to regulation 
by the NIGC.822 Tribes may engage in Class II gaming within a state that 
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or 
entity, but it must first have a tribal ordinance approved by the NIGC.823
Class III gaming is defined as all other forms of gaming including 
typical casino games such as slot machines and banked card games.824 In 
order to conduct Class III gaming, a tribe must have a tribal ordinance 
approved by the NIGC and be located within a state that permits such 
gaming for any purpose. Additionally, it must enter into a compact with 
the State that may allocate civil and criminal jurisdiction with respect to 
such gaming.825
The IGRA authorizes a tribe to bring an action in federal court 
against a state that refuses to negotiate in good faith for a state-tribal 
compact.826 The Supreme Court invalidated that provision, however, 
holding that Congress lacked the power to abrogate state Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under either the Indian or the Interstate 
Commerce Clause.827 Ironically, the loss of this remedy opens the door 
for a tribe that is unable to negotiate with a state to ask the Secretary of 
the Interior to prescribe regulations governing Class III gaming on the 
 817. § 2703(4). 
 818. § 2719. 
 819. § 2703(6). 
 820. § 2710(a)(1). 
 821. § 2703(7). 
 822. § 2710(a)(2). 
 823. § 2710(b)(1). 
 824. § 2703(8). 
 825. § 2710(d)(1). 
 826. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(1). The Act also waives tribal sovereign immunity to suit by another 
tribe or state seeking to enjoin Class III gaming carried on in violation of a tribal-state compact. 
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(2). 
 827. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Whereas Seminole dealt with federal 
court jurisdiction, a subsequent case established that Congress also lacked power to waive a state’s 
sovereign immunity to suit in state courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
  
1] BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 105 
 
tribe’s lands.828 Another alternative successfully employed by tribes in 
some states has been to go around recalcitrant governors and directly to 
the voters.829
The BIA’s role under the IGRA is quite limited. BIA must approve 
any tribal plan for allocation of revenue if the tribe plans to make per 
capita payments to its members from net gaming revenues.830 Tribes 
must first provide for tribal government services, economic and 
community development, general tribal welfare, charitable donations and 
any requirements for aid to local governments, before they file with the 
BIA for a revenue allocation plan.831 BIA also promulgates rules for the 
conduct of Class III Indian gaming when a State and a tribe are unable to 
voluntarily agree to a compact and the state has asserted its immunity 
from suit brought by a tribe under the provisions of the IGRA.832
 
B.  The Impact of Indian Gaming 
 
Congress established the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (“NGISC”) in 1996 to conduct a comprehensive legal and 
factual study of the social and economic implications of gambling in the 
United States, including impacts on tribal governments.833 The 
Commission’s report, which was released in 1999, lauds the tremendous 
social and economic benefits that have resulted from tribal gaming.834 
The report notes that gaming has created a substantial number of jobs in 
depressed communities and that gaming revenues have been used to 
support tribal governmental services such as tribal courts, utilities, law 
enforcement, social welfare programs, as well as tribal language, history 
and cultural programs. In fact, the report states that there “was no 
evidence presented to the commission suggesting any viable approach to 
economic development across the broad spectrum of Indian country, in 
the absence of gambling.”835
 828. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (2004); 25 C.F.R. § 291.3 (2004). 
 829. See, e.g., Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Hull, 190 Ariz. 97, 945 P.2d 818 
(1997). An amendment to the California Constitution to permit tribal casinos withstood challenges 
that it violated IGRA or the Equal Protection Clause. Flynt v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm’n, 104 
Cal. App. 4th 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr.2d 167 (2002), cert. denied, 124 SCT 398 (2003); Artichoke Joe’s 
Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 U.S. Lexis 5595 
(2004). 
 830. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 290 (2004). 
 831. Id. § 290.12. This is a requirement of the statute. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(3) (2004). 
 832. See generally 25 C.F.R. pt. 291 (2004). 
 833. Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat. 1482 (1996). 
 834. Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Report of the Nat’l Gambling Impact Study 
Comm’n (1999). 
 835. Id. at 6-7. 
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According to the National Indian Gaming Association (“NIGA”), a 
gambling industry group, tribal gaming produced revenue in 2002 of 
$14.5 billion (21% of total gaming industry) and created 400,000 jobs 
(75% filled by non-Indian employees). The NIGA says less than half of 
federally recognized Indian Tribes engage in Class II or Class III gaming 
with no tribal gaming at all in twenty-two states.836 Not all tribes benefit 
equally from gaming as some tribes choose not to undertake gaming 
operations,837 whereas others are not so geographically situated as to 
make gaming profitable. According to NIGC records, “for the fiscal year 
ending in 2000, 62% of all tribal gaming revenues were generated by 
only 12% of the gaming operations.”838
An FBI-led working group of federal agencies has formed to protect 
tribal casinos from theft, embezzlement, fraud, organized crime and 
corrupting influences. The “Indian Gaming Working Group” was formed 
in 2003 in response to the growth of Indian gaming from approximately 
100 tribes in a $100 million-a-year industry to 220 tribes and 359 
separate sites generating $15 billion annually (a figure that is expected to 
exceed $16 billion in 2004). The figure exceeds the combined gaming 
revenues of Las Vegas and Atlantic City, according to the Indian Gaming 
Working Group.839
In spite of the financial success enjoyed by some tribes, critics say 
gambling money has been bad for tribal members in other ways. In 
California, several tribes have engaged in intra-tribal membership 
disputes with some members attempting to strip others of their 
membership.840 The Pechanga Tribe, for example, has disenrolled over 
10% of its 1,200 members in a phenomenon that observers say 
eventually could affect thousands of tribal members. Indian Casinos in 
California bring in $4 billion a year with profits going toward health, 
social, education, and housing programs but also to member per capita 
payments–in the case of Pechanga amounting to more than $120,000 a 
year.841
Large amounts of gaming funds also have profound effects on the 
politics of the nation, as demonstrated most shockingly by a recent 
 836. See http://www.indiangaming.org. 
 837. See, e.g., Hopis Don’t Roll the Dice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 29, 2004, at 8.
 838. Ashton, supra note 807, p. 546. 
 839. See Jerry Reynolds, FBI Watchdog Group Galvanizes to Protect Tribal Casinos, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, July 2, 2004, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/?1088772523. 
 840. For more on how Indian gaming may influence tribal membership requirements, see, e.g., 
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at The Bingo Palace, 29 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 97, 117-18 (1997). 
 841. See Danna Harman, Gambling on Tribal Ancestry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 
2004, at Features-15. 
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influence peddling scandal in which a powerful Republican lobbyist and 
his associate reportedly took several tribes for $66 million in fees, while 
secretly supporting their gaming opponents and meddling in intra-tribal 
politics.842 The Senate Indian Affairs Committee, the FBI and a task 
force of five federal agencies are all investigating the scheme, which 
includes campaign contributions the tribes were told to make to members 
of Congress.843 The Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee 
expressed outrage that the two men “regularly referred to their clients 
using contemptuous, even racist, language.”844
Even prior to the lobbyists’ scandal, some observers had come to 
perceive gaming tribes as having an undue influence on political 
campaigns and political deal making.845 Such influence may be one 
reason that public opinion seems to be turning against any further 
expansion of tribal gaming.846 According to one cynical columnist, 
“[s]ince 1998, casino tribes have spent $175 million on California 
elections. No other interest group has come close. Republican and 
Democratic lawmakers alike receive contributions from the tribes. They 
don’t directly praise slot machines. Rather, they speak of the sanctity of 
Indian sovereignty.”847
As state governments increasingly look to tribal gaming revenues to 
shore up state budgets, the political and financial influence wielded by 
tribes seems likely to grow. For example, California Governor Arnold 
Schwartzenegger promised in his gubernatorial campaign to solve the 
State’s financial problems in part by renegotiation of tribal gaming 
compacts to require tribes to pay their “fair share.” California and other 
 842. See Susan Schmidt, Insiders Worked Both Sides of Gaming Issue, WASHINGTON POST, 
Sept. 26, 2004, at A1. 
 843. See, e.g., Thomas Edsall, Probe to Include GOP Donations, WASHINGTON POST, May 
18, 2004, at A17; see also Susan Schmidt, Ex-Lobbyist is Focus of Widening Investigations, 
WASHINGTON POST, July 16, 2004, at A17. 
 844. In re Tribal Lobbying Matters, et al., Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, Statement of Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman - Committee on Indian Affairs, 
September 29, 2004 (http://indian.senate.gov/2004hrgs). Lobbyist Jack Abrahamoff and Public 
Relations Consultant Michael Scanlon allegedly referred to their tribal employers in internal e-mail 
messages as “morons,” “idiots,” “troglodytes,” “monkeys” and by other derogatory names. See, e.g., 
Michael Janofsky, Senate Opens Hearings on Lobbyists for Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at 
A26; Susan Schmidt, Ex-Lobbyist is Assailed at Hearing, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A4; 
Doug Abrahms, Outsiders Involved in Tribal Vote, DESERT SUN, Oct. 2, 2004, at A1. 
 845. See, e.g., Commentary, The Monitor’s View, “Loopy Campaign-Finance Hole,” 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, March 4, 2002, at Editorial-10 (“When the Senate votes soon on a 
campaign-finance bill, it should also close a loophole that now allows native American-owned 
casinos to dole out as much money to candidates as they wish.”); see also, Native Americans Wield 
New Political Clout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 27, 1999, at USA-3. 
 846. See, e.g., No More Casinos, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at B10; 2 Bad Bets on 
Gambling, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26, 2004, at E4. 
 847. Dan Morain, California on Path to Become Nation’s Gambling Capital, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2004, at A1. 
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states have been criticized for such over-reliance on tribal gaming, 
especially slot machines, which have been called the “crack cocaine of 
gambling.”848
 
XI.  TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
A.  Regulating Commerce with the Indians 
 
Beginning in 1790, Congress enacted a number of statutes to regulate 
non-Indian trade with Indians.849 Among other things, the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts limited trade with reservation Indians to those persons 
licensed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.850 BIA regulations under 
these statutes provide for acquiring a license, describe conditions under 
which a license may be revoked or an unlicensed trader may be 
excluded, and specify the limited circumstances under which a BIA 
employee may contract or trade with Indians.851
The BIA has been criticized for lax enforcement of the statutes, 
especially in remote areas served by isolated trading posts.852 On the 
other hand, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee has noted that, at least 
with respect to BIA employees, the laws have become archaic. 
“Although these statutes served an admirable purpose when enacted in 
the 1800s, they are now relics of a very different era. The important 
public purposes served by the original Trading with Indians Act are now 
adequately protected by the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees 
of the Executive Branch.”853
Businesses operated by non-tribal members on the Navajo, Hopi and 
Zuni Reservations are subject to detailed regulations that require 
licenses, consent to the jurisdiction of the tribes, and compliance with 
certain consumer protection standards.854 The “Alaska Resupply 
Operation” provides consolidated purchasing, freight handling and 
distribution, and transportation to and from Alaska in support of the 
BIA’s mission and responsibilities.855 BIA may provide power and water 
utilities or sell other goods and services to non-Federal users in Indian 
 848. Lemons in a Row, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at A18; see also Bill Virgin, Gambling 
Craze Not a Good Bet for States, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 2004, at C1. 
 849. Ch. 133, 1 Stat. 137. 
 850. 25 U.S.C. §§ 261, 262, 264 (2004). 
 851. 25 C.F.R. pt. 140 (2004). 
 852. See, e.g., Mario Gonzalez, Regulation of Indian Traders: A Historical Perspective, Vol. 5 
No. 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313 (1978); see also Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
 853. SENATE RPT. NO. 104-349 (July 24, 1996). 
 854. 25 C.F.R. pt. 141 (2004). 
 855. pt. 142. 
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country where the goods and services are not otherwise available or it is 
in the best interests of the Indians.856
 
B.  BIA Loans 
 
In the Indian Financing Act of 1974, Congress sought to provide 
Indians access to loan funds for economic development to raise the 
standard of living in Indian communities to the equivalent of “that 
enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.”857 The Act 
authorized BIA to adopt regulations to carry the programs authorized by 
Congress into effect.858 The regulations provide for loans from an Indian 
Revolving Loan Fund to “relending organizations” and tribes for a 
variety of economic development ventures.859 BIA may also guarantee or 
insure any loans made by commercial financial institutions.860 The BIA’s 
Indian Business Development Program makes grants of equity capital to 
establish and expand profit-making Indian-owned economic enterprises 
on or near reservations.861
To maintain the guaranty certificate in full force and effect a lender 
must follow BIA’s procedures after a borrower defaults on a loan 
guaranteed by the BIA.862 BIA is not required to show specific prejudice 
resulting from the lender’s failure to follow the procedures.863 Any 
amounts disbursed for purposes other than those provided in the loan 
agreement must be excluded in computing the amount for which the 
lender may be reimbursed in the event of a loss on a loan. There is no 
liability on the part of the United States to reimburse a lender on a 
guaranteed loan for that amount of the guaranteed loss caused by the 
lender’s willful or negligent action that permitted a fraud, forgery or 
misrepresentation. Even in a case where the BIA has been imprudent a 
lender is not relieved of its responsibilities under the regulations.864
 
 856. pt. 143. 
 857. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2004). 
 858. § 1469. 
 859. 25 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2004). 
 860. pt 103. 
 861. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1524 (2004); 25 C.F.R. pt. 286 (2004). 
 862. 25 C.F.R. § 103.36(a) (2004). 
 863. Marquette Bank, N.A. v. Acting Dir., Office of Econ. Dev., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 
IBIA 161 (2000). 
 864. First Nat’l Bank of Pawhuska v. Dir., Office of Econ. Dev., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 
IBIA 63 (2000); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Acting Anadarko Area Dir., 22 IBIA 104, 115 (1992); 
United Nat’l Bank v. Acting E. Area Dir., 30 IBIA 272 (1997), aff’d.; United Nat’l Bank v. United 
States Dep’t of the Interior, Civ. No. 97-1912 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29 1998) (The BIA “may assert the 
defense of negligence to void a guaranty.”). 
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C.  Department of Commerce 
 
The Native American Business Development, Trade, Promotion and 
Tourism Act of 2000865 established an Office of Native American 
Business Development within the Department of Commerce.866 The 
Secretary of Commerce has the task of coordinating the federal programs 
relating to Indian economic development including programs of the 
DOI.867 The Act also creates a Native American export and trade 
promotion program868 and tourism program.869
The GAO has analyzed all grants made to Indian tribes from 1993-
2002 by the Economic Development Administration (“EDA”) within the 
Commerce Department. Whereas 143 tribes and tribal organizations 
received $112 million in EDA grants, this represented a small portion of 
EDA’s awards to all organizations. The GAO found that tribes have used 
the EDA grants to create businesses, build roads and other infrastructure, 
and create economic development plans, but concluded the grants had 
limited success in generating jobs, income, and private sector 
investment.870
 
D.  Revenue Bonds 
 
Notwithstanding these BIA programs, Indian tribal governments, like 
state and local governments, must find revenue to pay for capital 
improvement projects. These projects may be those traditionally 
considered to be the exclusive province of government, such as schools, 
roads, sewer and water systems, health and housing facilities, parks, and 
government administration buildings. They may also be partly 
commercial, such as a convention center or a sports arena. Governments 
often use “revenue bonds” to borrow money to finance these activities in 
anticipation of repayment with future tax revenues or through earnings 
made possible by the projects themselves. 
Although the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982871 
permits tribes to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds, tribal bond proceeds 
may be used only for “essential government functions.” These are 
 865. Pub. L. No. 106-464, 114 Stat. 2012; 25 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4307 (2004). 
 866. 25 U.S.C. § 4303(a)(1) (2004). 
 867. § 4303(b). 
 868. § 4304. 
 869. § 4305. 
 870. Indian Economic Development: Relationship to EDA Grants and Self-determination 
Contracting Is Mixed, GAO-04-847, Sept. 8, 2004, at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04847high
.pdf. 
 871. 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2004). 
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generally considered to be such things as government office buildings, 
schools, streets and sewers. State and local governments, on the other 
hand, may finance a range of projects such as convention centers, golf 
courses, and gaming facilities; they may also serve as conduits, in effect 
loaning the proceeds of the bonds to eligible third parties, such as 
nonprofit corporations and tribes. Lacking the statutory flexibility of 
other governments, tribes view conduit financing as an interim solution 
and are asking Congress to pass the Tribal Tax Exempt Bond Fairness 
Act that would repeal the “essential government function” test for on-
reservation financings.872 Meanwhile, some tribes are seeking local 
government conduit financing of projects including casinos with the 
local government receiving hefty fees.873
 
E.  Tribal Contracts 
 
The Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act 
of 2000874 requires BIA’s approval of contracts that could “encumber” 
tribal land for a period of seven or more years. The statute requires 
disapproval if the contract: (1) violates federal law, or (2) does not 
contain either a remedies provision or a disclosure or waiver of the 
tribe’s sovereign immunity. The amendment also expressly preserves the 
“management contract” approval requirements of the National Indian 
Gaming Commission and any contract approval requirements found in 
tribal law while eliminating any federal approval requirements for tribal 
attorney contracts. BIA regulations specify several types of contracts and 
agreements that do not require Secretarial approval under the Act 
including those governed under other applicable law or regulations, such 
as leases of tribal lands.875
 
F.  IRA Corporations 
 
Some tribes have taken advantage of a provision of the IRA that 
allows tribes to form tribal corporations.876 Section 17 of the IRA states: 
 
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to 
purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, 
 872. H.R. 1421, S. 1526. 
 873. See, e.g., Steve Moore, Tribe Gets an Ally on Bonds, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, July 27, 2004, 
at B01 (“Banning will soon issue $145 million in tax-exempt bonds to help the Morongo Band of 
Mission Indians finance a new casino resort. In return, the city gets $1 million as a fee.”). 
 874. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2004). 
 875. 25 C.F.R. pt. 84 (2004). 
 876. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2004). 
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operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, 
including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in 
exchange therefore interests in corporate property, and such powers as 
may be incidental to the conduct of the corporate business, not 
inconsistent with the law; but no authority shall be granted to sell, 
mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding twenty-five years any trust or 
restricted lands included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter so 
issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of 
Congress.877
 
The Act provides that a charter may convey to the incorporated tribe 
the power to acquire, manage, and dispose of property. Federal 
regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 162 do not apply to leases of land made 
under a corporate charter except to the extent that the authorizing statutes 
require Secretarial enforcement of the leases.878
 
G.  Employment and Labor Laws 
 
Tribes still face unique issues in pursuing economic development 
including the determination of what law applies to tribal business 
ventures. Tribes are excluded from coverage under certain federal 
employment and labor laws.879 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
excludes Indian tribes from the definition of employers who may not 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.880 Tribes are excluded from the definition of “employer” under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act that prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of disability.881 However, most federal labor statues are silent as to 
their applicability to Indian tribes.882 Where the statute itself is silent, 
courts have reached different results in attempting to discern 
congressional intent regarding application to Indian tribes.883
 877. Id. 
 878. 25 C.F.R. § 162.103(a)(4) (2004). 
 879. See generally, Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to 
Native American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 
(Fall 1994); William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and 
Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365 (Summer 1995). 
 880. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (2004). 
 881. Id. §§ 12101-12213. 
 882. See, e.g., Occupation Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2004); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2004); Employment Retirement Security 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2004); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2004); 
Family Medical Leave Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2604 (2004); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (2004). 
 883. For decisions declining to apply such statutes to tribes, see, for example, Reich v. Great 
Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993) (FLSA); EEOC v. Fond du Lac 
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In what may foreshadow more widespread application of federal 
labor laws to tribes, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
recently ruled that tribal governments and their enterprises might be 
subject to the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).884 Previously, the 
Board held the NLRA does not apply to tribes.885 In light of the 
expansion of tribal economic development, fueled by the gaming 
industry, the NLRB now will look at the specific tribal enterprise to 
determine jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. The factors the NLRB 
considers include the nature of the enterprise, whether it is commercial or 
governmental, and whether the business employs or caters to non-
Indians.886
 
H.  Unequal Development 
 
The Supreme Court has noted that tribes have increasingly 
diversified their reservation economies in recent years, citing the growth 
of “modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises,” including “ski resorts, 
gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.”887 However, the 
relatively few pockets of prosperity, often fueled by gaming revenues, 
belie the grinding poverty and unemployment that continues to 
characterize most of Indian country. As noted by the U.S. Civil Rights 
commission, 
 
On some reservations, unemployment levels have reached 85%. 
According to the 2000 census, the average unemployment on 
reservations is 13.6% more than twice the national rate. Likewise, 
31.2% of reservation inhabitants live in poverty and the national 
poverty rate for Native Americans is 24.5% percent. In contrast, the 
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 
F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989) (ADEA); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 
1982) (OSHA). For decisions applying such statutes to tribes, see, for example, Donovan v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (OSHA); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 
929 (7th Cir. 1989) (ERISA); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 
939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991) (ERISA); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 
1996) (OSHA). 
 884. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (2004); see San Manuel Indian 
Bingo and Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138 (2004); Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp., 341 NLRB No. 
139 (May 28, 2004). 
 885. Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503, 93 LRRM 1296 (1976). 
 886. San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino; Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corporation, 341 
NLRB No. 139 (2004). 
 887. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757–58 (1998); see also U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS (Veronica E. Velarde Tiller, ed. 1995); Richard J. 
Ansson Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal 
Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441 (2002). 
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national poverty rate in the United States between 1999 and 2001 was 
11.6%.888
 
XII.  INDIAN HERITAGE PRESERVATION 
 
A.  Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
 
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act (“ARPA”)889 states the 
policy of the United States is to protect archaeological resources and 
sites that are on public and Indian lands. The Act prohibits unauthorized 
excavation of such archaeological resources890 and authorizes federal 
land management agencies to grant permits to excavate or remove such 
resources.891 A few reported decisions have interpreted the key criminal 
and civil penalty provisions under ARPA, as well as the application of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to criminal violations under the Act.892
BIA regulations set forth procedures for obtaining a permit to 
excavate or remove such resources from lands owned or managed by the 
BIA.893 Consent of the Indian landowner and the tribe having jurisdiction 
over the lands, if any, is required.894 More extensive DOI regulations 
implementing ARPA provisions are found in Title 43 of the C.F.R.895 
These regulations are promulgated jointly by Interior, the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Defense, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.896 Subpart 
B contains supplemental DOI regulations including permitting 
procedures for Indian lands897 and civil penalty hearings procedures.898
 
B.  Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(“NAGPRA”)899 establishes three mechanisms to ensure the protection of 
Indian cultural property. First, it creates procedures through which 
culturally affiliated Indian tribes can recover human remains and 
 888. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 101. 
 889. 16 U.S.C. § 470(aa)-(mm) (2004). 
 890. Id. § 470(ee). 
 891. Id. § 470(cc). 
 892. See Roberto Iraola, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act - Twenty Five Years 
Later, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 221 (2004). 
 893. 25 C.F.R. pt. 262 (2004). 
 894. 25 C.F.R. § 262.5(c)(1) (2004). 
 895. 43 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2003). 
 896. 43 C.F.R. § 7.2 (2003). 
 897. Id. § 7.35. 
 898. Id. § 7.37. 
 899. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2004). 
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funerary objects from federally funded museums.900 Secondly, NAGPRA 
criminalizes the trafficking of Indian human remains and cultural 
items.901 Finally, it sets forth notification and consultation procedures for 
intentional or inadvertent excavation of Native American human remains 
and cultural objects on tribal and federal lands.902
Part 10 of 43 C.F.R. contains regulations to carry out provisions of 
the Act.903 The regulations describe the process for determining the rights 
of lineal descendants and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian 
organizations to certain Native American human remains, funerary 
objects sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony with which they 
are affiliated.904 On April 3, 2003, the BIA published final rules under 
NAGPRA for assessing civil penalties on museums that fail to comply 
with applicable provisions of the Act.905 Museums that fail to properly 
repatriate, sell or otherwise transfer human remains, funerary objects, 
sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony in violation of NAGPRA, 
face civil fines including penalties of $1,000 a day for continuing 
violations of the Act.906
Critics contend that loopholes in NAGPRA leave many Indian burial 
grounds unprotected. One significant obstacle is that in litigation under 
NAGPRA there is a threshold requirement of establishing a significant 
connection between the remains and the plaintiffs. In the recent 
“Kennewick Man” case the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff tribes failed 
to establish any relationship between the ancient remains and presently 
existing American Indians.907 The court reasoned that because the tribe is 
not federally recognized and the disturbance took place on private lands, 
the Gabrieleno Indians in Southern California were unable to stop the 
wholesale removal of hundreds of burials during the construction of a 
luxury resort.908 Nothing in NAGPRA prevents even the placement of 
strategically located gaming sites atop or adjacent to burial grounds.909
 900. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2004). 
 901. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2004). 
 902. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)-(d) (2004). 
 903. 43 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2004). 
 904. Id. § 10.1. 
 905. 68 Fed. Reg. 64,16354 (April 3, 2003) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
 906. 68 Fed. Reg. 64,16360 (April 3, 2003) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 10.12). 
 907. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 908. See Sara Lin, State Decries Removal of Remains, L.A. TIMES, March 21, 2004, at B3. 
 909. See, e.g., Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, sub. 
nom. Wyandotte Nation v. Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri, et al., 534 U.S. 1078 (2002) (regarding an 
attempt by Wyandotte Nation to build casino on or adjacent to burial ground in Kansas City). The 
Poarch Creek Band of Creek Indians recently built a bingo hall in Alabama on the site of the last 
territorial capitol of the Muscogee Creek Indians who were removed to Oklahoma in the 1830s. 
Despite the presence of hundreds of burials, the tribe is now negotiating for the construction of a 
casino on the site. See, e.g., Garry Mitchell, Sacred Sites Spark Discussion, POST & COURIER, May 
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C.  American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (“AIRFA”)910 states 
that the policy of the United States is to protect and preserve for 
American Indians their inherent right to believe, express, and exercise 
their traditional religions, their ability to access ancient religious sites, 
their use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship 
through ceremonials and traditional rites. However, AIRFA confers no 
judicially enforceable private right of action.911 In litigation over a Forest 
Service road, the Supreme Court held that the government was free to 
develop its property regardless of interference with religious practices, so 
long as it did not coerce individuals into violating their religious beliefs 
or punish religious activity by denying them rights available to others.912 
Against a similar claim, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Forest Service’s 
approval of a uranium mine near the Grand Canyon.913
In a case involving religious use of peyote, the Supreme Court held 
that if the object of a generally applicable law is not to prohibit or burden 
religion, its incidental effect upon religion cannot give rise to a free 
exercise claim.914 Congress reacted to the decision by enacting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,915 which prohibits government from 
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it can show 
that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the 
least restrictive means of doing so. The Supreme Court subsequently 
held the Act unconstitutional as applied to the states ruling that Congress 
lacked the power to expand the constitutional right of free expression by 
statute.916
 
 
 
15, 2004, available at http://www.charleston.net/stories/051504/wor_15sacred.shtml; see also 
Gambling on Hickory Ground, NATIVE AM. CALLING, Sept. 10, 2002, available at 
http://nativeamericacalling.org/nac_past20022.shtml. 
 910. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2004). 
 911. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). 
 912. Id. 
 913. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1484-86 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff’d, 943 
F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959 (1992). 
 914. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). 
 915. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb) (2004). 
 916. The Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), held that Congress 
lacked authority to enact such a law through the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
thus making RFRA inapplicable to actions against the states. After City of Boerne, however, the 
Tenth Circuit held that RFRA created an extra-constitutional statutory claim against the federal 
government, justified through its Article I, section 8 “necessary and proper” powers. Kikumura v. 
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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D.  Indian Arts and Crafts 
 
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990917 prohibits 
misrepresentation in marketing of Indian arts and crafts products within 
the United States. The law makes it illegal to offer or display for sale or 
sell any art or craft product in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian 
produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or 
Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization that is resident within 
the United States. For a first time violation of the Act, an individual can 
face civil or criminal penalties up to a $250,000 fine or a five-year prison 
term or both.918 If a business violates the Act it can face civil penalties or 
can be prosecuted and fined up to $1,000,000.919 The Act also creates a 
civil cause of action for misrepresentation of goods as being Indian 
produced, authorizing injunctive or equitable relief, and punitive 
damages.920 The action may be instituted by an Indian, Indian tribe, or 
Indian arts and crafts organization, or by the Attorney General on behalf 
of such persons.921 Any amount recovered is payable to such party.922
The law established an “Indian Arts and Crafts Board” within the 
Department of the Interior.923 The Board is charged with promoting the 
economic welfare of Indians and Indian tribes through the development 
of Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of markets for such 
products.924 The Board may refer complaints of violations of the Act to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and subsequently to recommend to 
the Attorney General that criminal proceedings be instituted.925 BIA 
regulations define the nature and Indian origin of products protected 
under the Act.926
Although there has been relatively little litigation under the Arts and 
Crafts Act it has been tremendously controversial among many Indians 
and non-Indians alike. One critic argues that the statute is an ineffective 
attempt to foster cultural survival because it fails to acknowledge the 
historical development of both Indian tribes and Indian arts and crafts, 
and fails to appreciate the ways that contemporary Indian identity is 
 917. Pub. L. No. 101 Stat. 644 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 and 25 U.S.C. § 305). 
 918. 18 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(1) (2004). 
 919. Id. 
 920. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2004). 
 921. § 305e(c)(1). 
 922. § 305e(c)(2). 
 923. § 305. 
 924. § 305a. 
 925. § 305d. 
 926. 25 C.F.R. pt. 309 (2004). 
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constructed.927
 
XIII.  HUMAN AND HEALTH SERVICES 
 
A.  Social Services 
 
Congress has tasked BIA with responsibility “for the benefit, care, 
and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States.”928 The 
Snyder Act of 1921 authorizes the BIA to “direct, supervise, and expend 
such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the 
benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States” 
for purposes including “[g]eneral support and civilization,” “relief of 
distress and conservation of health[,]” and assistance with property, 
employment, and “administration of Indian affairs.”929 Although phrased 
in terms of expending “such moneys as Congress may from time to time 
appropriate,” the statute broadly delegates responsibility for matters 
including general assistance, education, health, economic development, 
administration of Indian property, public facilities, law enforcement, and 
transportation.930 The statute is liberally construed for the benefit of 
Indians.931
In recent years, Congress has curbed the use of appropriated funds 
for general assistance where equivalent state programs are available,932 
where benefit levels are in excess of state levels933or where tribes have 
restricted eligibility or benefit levels in order to use savings for other 
tribal priorities.934 BIA regulations govern the provision to eligible 
Indians of financial assistance and social services including adult care 
assistance, burial assistance, child assistance, disaster assistance, 
emergency assistance, general assistance, services to children, elderly 
and families, and work experience.935 Such programs are secondary to 
other sources of Federal, state or local assistance, and are subject to 
 927. See William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Note: Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (2001). Hapiuk recommends the criminal 
and civil provisions of the IACA be repealed and replaced by a certification trademark program. 
 928. Act of November 2, 1921, Pub. L. No. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 13 (2004)). 
 929. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2004). 
 930. Id. 
 931. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
 932. 25 U.S.C. § 13(d) (2004). 
 933. § 13(d)(1). 
 934. § 13(d)(3). The author has argued elsewhere that it is unfair to take from the poorest of 
the poor under the guise of savings to subsidize other priorities. Tribal Welfare Reform: The Miner’s 
Canary, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 554 (Apr. 1998). 
 935. 25 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2004). 
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annual Congressional appropriations.936 Tribes operating assistance 
programs under BIA contracts may establish different eligibility criteria 
or benefit levels.937 A tribe may use savings from a redesign of its 
program to fund other tribal priorities.938 BIA decisions to decrease or 
terminate financial assistance may be appealed pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2 
(2005).939 An applicant or recipient may appeal decisions from tribally 
administered programs only through the process set forth in the relevant 
BIA contract or if none exists, “through the appropriate tribal forum.”940
President Clinton’s “welfare reform” made sweeping changes to the 
nation’s welfare system substituting a program called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) in place of the old Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) program.941 TANF was 
intended “to increase the flexibility of States” in operating welfare 
programs by shifting administration of welfare benefits almost entirely 
from the federal government to the states.942 TANF ensures that the state 
will provide aid to tribal members who are not part of a tribal assistance 
program. For a state to be eligible for TANF funds the state must certify 
that it “will provide each member of an Indian tribe, who is domiciled in 
the State and is not eligible for assistance under a tribal family assistance 
plan . . . with equitable access to assistance under the State program 
funded under this part attributable to funds provided by the Federal 
Government.”943
In addition, TANF authorizes Indian tribes to apply for welfare 
funds.944 TANF’s provision for “direct funding and administration by 
Indian tribes” directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) to “pay to each Indian tribe that has an approved tribal family 
assistance plan a tribal family assistance grant for the fiscal year.”945 
TANF mandates that “each Indian tribe to which a grant is made . . . 
shall use the grant for the purpose of operating a program to make work 
activities available to such population and such service area or areas as 
the tribe specifies.”946 Finally, TANF gives Indian tribes somewhat more 
flexibility than states in applying for block grants. The Secretary of 
 936. 25 C.F.R. § 20.102. 
 937. § 20.202. 
 938. § 20.207. 
 939. § 20.700-705. 
 940. § 20.705. 
 941. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
104 Pub. L. No 193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
 942. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2004). 
 943. § 602(a)(5). 
 944. § 612. 
 945. § 612(a)(1)(A). 
 946. § 612(a)(2)(C). 
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Labor, for instance, is permitted to waive or modify a set of limitations 
normally imposed on states,947 “to the extent necessary to enable the 
Indian tribe to operate a more efficient or effective program.”948 TANF is 
not a contractible program under the self-determination provisions of the 
ISDEAA.949
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978950 tasks the BIA with helping 
to notify tribes and Indian families of foster care and adoption 
proceedings, providing assistance, and maintaining records on Indian 
child adoptions.951 The BIA is also responsible for making grants to tribal 
governments for establishment and operation of child and family services 
programs952 as well as similar grants to off-reservation Indian 
organizations.953 The BIA also operates programs to assist Indians to 
obtain permanent employment954 and vocational training programs.955 
Congress has authorized tribes to consolidate such BIA assistance 
together with employment and training assistance provided by other 
federal agencies in order to create a single comprehensive program under 
tribal administration and control.956
 
B.  Health Care 
 
Although the Snyder Act provided basic authorization for Indian 
health care957 the BIA was ill equipped to carry out the mandate. 
Responsibility for Indian health care was transferred in 1955 from the 
BIA to the Public Health Service (“PHS”), which at the time was a 
 947. See id. § 603(a)(5)(C). 
 948. Id. § 612(a)(3)(C)(ii). 
 949. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv’s., 325 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 950. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1901). The Act 
seeks to protect the best interests of Indian children by establishing federal standards to minimize the 
removal of Indian children from their families in state court proceedings. The author has written 
elsewhere to argue that state courts have largely ignored the federal law, and that the BIA has not 
fulfilled its responsibilities to pursue state compliance with the Act. The Indian Child Welfare Act: 
In the Best Interests of the Child and Tribe, 27/8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 864 (Dec. 1993). The 
National Indian Child Welfare Association (NICWA represents tribal governments and urban Indian 
social service programs, working on behalf of Indian children and families). See www.nicwa.org.
 951. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1951 (2004); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(b) (BIA receipt of notice); § 
23.11(f) (BIA to provide notice); § 23.11(g)(help identify family or tribe); § 23.13 (payment for 
appointed counsel); § 23.81 (assistance in identifying witnesses); § 23.82 (assistance in identifying 
language interpreters); § 23.81 (assistance in identifying biological parents after termination of 
adoption) (2004). 
 952. 25 C.F.R. § 23.21-23.23 (2004). 
 953. § 23.31-23.35. Grant applicants may appeal decisions of the BIA under 25 C.F.R., § 2 
(2004). § 23.61-23.63. 
 954. Id. pt. 26. 
 955. Id. pt. 27. 
 956. Pub. L. No. 102-477, 106 Stat. 2302 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3401). 
 957. Ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2004)). 
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division of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) 
and is now part of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”). The Indian Health Service (“IHS”) within the PHS is directly 
responsible for Indian health care.958
Congress reaffirmed Federal responsibility for Indian health care 
with the passage of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (“IHCIA”) 
of 1976959 and its 1992 amendments.960 The IHCIA permits the Secretary 
of the Interior “to expend funds . . . for the purposes of eliminating the 
deficiencies in health status and resources of all Indian tribes.”961 
Specifically, it authorizes the Secretary’s expenditure of funds for, 
among other things, “meeting the health needs of Indians” and 
“augmenting the ability of the [Indian Health] Service to meet . . . health 
service responsibilities . . . with respect to those Indian tribes with the 
highest levels of health status and resource deficiencies.”962 Unlike 
TANF, the IHCIA is notable for “Congress’ recognition of federal 
responsibility for Indian health care.”963 Tribal advocates have taken a 
strong and persistent role in helping to fashion federal Indian health 
policy. A leading voice for tribes is the National Indian Health Board 
(“NIHB”), a non-profit organization established in 1972, that represents 
Tribal Governments operating their own health care delivery systems 
through contracting and compacting, as well as those receiving health 
care directly from the Indian Health Service (“HIS”).964
The IHS is the primary source of medical care for most American 
Indians and Alaska Natives. Care is provided through a network of forty-
nine hospitals and over five hundred outpatient clinics and smaller 
facilities located primarily in the Southwest, Oklahoma, the Northern 
Plains, and Alaska. The IHS also purchases medical care for Indian 
people from non–IHS hospitals and health providers and funds thirty-
four urban Indian health organizations. In addition to providing medical 
treatment, the IHS carries out substantial prevention and wellness 
activities including diabetes prevention and disease management, 
sanitation construction to provide water and waste disposal for Indian 
communities, injury prevention, mental health services, and 
 958. See Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native 
Americans: Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 215 (1997); 
see also, Report on Indian Health: Task Force Six 33 AM. INDIAN POL’Y REV. COMM’N (1976); 
Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How To Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy, and Framework 
of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 381 (1995-96). 
 959. Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400. 
 960. Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, 106 Stat. 4526. 
 961. 25 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(1) (2004). 
 962. Id. § 1621(a)(3)-(4). 
 963. McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
 964. See http://www.nihb.org.
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alcohol/substance abuse treatment and prevention.965
The House of Representatives approved a FY 2005 IHS budget of $3 
billion that was $66 million above the White House request.966 After a 
delay of two years, apparently due to concerns over potential costs, the 
Administration recently lent its support to reauthorization of the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act.967
The IHS has not completely escaped the type of criticism otherwise 
reserved for the BIA. At a 1989 Hearing on “Mismanagement of Indian 
Health Service,” the Indian Affairs Committee even compared the 
agency unfavorably to the BIA.968 Yet, despite the Committee’s 
characterization of the IHS, Congress’ own Office of Technology 
Assessment (“OTA”) recognized with diplomatic understatement, that 
there was plenty of blame to go around. “Given the scarce resources 
available to IHS to achieve its mission,” a researcher testified, “OTA 
cannot conclude that the inadequacies in the IHS system can be held 
entirely responsible for the continuing poor health of Indian [sic].”969
 
C.  Administration for Native Americans 
 
Another HHS agency that plays a leading role in programs designed 
specifically for tribes and individual Indians is the Administration for 
Native Americans (“ANA”). ANA was created in 1974 to promote the 
goal of self-sufficiency for Native Americans by providing social and 
economic development opportunities through financial assistance, 
training, and technical assistance to eligible Tribes and Native American 
organizations. To achieve this mission, ANA provides funding through 
discretionary grants to eligible Tribes and Native organizations on a 
competitive basis. In Fiscal Year 2003, Congress appropriated $45.5 
million for Social and Economic Development Strategies (SEDS) 
Projects, Environmental Regulatory Enhancement Projects, and Native 
Language Preservation and Maintenance Projects.970
Examples of the range of projects which help to promote the 
economic and social development of Native Americans are: creation of 
 965. http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm. 
 966. H.R. REP. NO.108-542, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation 
Bill (2005). 
 967. Hearing on Pending Legislation to Reauthorize the Indian Health Care Improvement Act 
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. - 2nd Sess., (July 21, 2004) (testimony of 
Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/2004hrgs. 
 968. Mismanagement of Indian Health Service: S. Hrg. 101-126 Before the Senate Select 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 8 (1989). 
 969. Id., S. Hrg. 101-126, pt. 8, at 1-18, (Testimony of Denise Dougherty). 
 970. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ana. 
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new jobs and development or expansion of business enterprises and 
social service initiatives; establishment of new Tribal employment 
offices; formulation of environmental ordinances and training in the use 
and control of natural resources; enactment of new codes and 
management improvements to strengthen the governmental functions of 
Tribes and Native American organizations; and establishment of local 
court systems. The Commissioner of the ANA is the Chair of the Intra-
Departmental Council on Native American Affairs (“ICNAA”) within 
HHS and advises the Secretary on Native American issues.971
 
D.  “A Quiet Crisis”972
 
Despite the array of social programs administered by the BIA and 
HHS, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights notes that “nearly a quarter 
of Native Americans—more than twice the national average—continue 
to live in poverty.”973 Native Americans are more than twice as likely as 
the general population to face “hunger and food insecurity” at any given 
time.974
 
Native Americans have a lower life expectancy—nearly six years 
less—and higher disease occurrence than other racial/ethnic groups. 
Roughly 13% of Native American deaths occur among those under the 
age of twenty-five, a rate three times more than that of the total U.S. 
population. Native American youth are more than twice as likely to 
commit suicide, and nearly 70% of all suicidal acts in Indian Country 
involve alcohol. Native Americans are 670% more likely to die from 
alcoholism, 650% more likely to die from tuberculosis, 318% more 
likely to die from diabetes, and 204% more likely to suffer accidental 
death when compared with other groups.975
 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has criticized the inadequacy of 
not only BIA and HHS programs, but also USDA’s Food Distribution 
Program on Indian Reservations (“FDPIR”) that “lost funding when 
accounting for inflation between 1999 and 2003, reducing available food 
 971. Id. 
 972. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46. Noting the relative small size and geographic isolation of 
tribal communities and the growing gap between needs and federal resources the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission terms Indians the “invisible minority” and warns of a “quiet crisis.” Id. at 40. 
 973. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 8. 
 974. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 107. “From 1995 to 1997, 22.2 percent of Native 
American households were food insecure, meaning they did not have enough food to meet even their 
basic needs.” A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 107. 
 975. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 34-35. 
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resources.”976 The Commission noted that the Administration’s 2004 
budget proposed to reduce funding by more than 18.2% from 2003.977
The Commission on Civil Rights notes that most Native Americans 
do not have private health insurance and thus rely exclusively on the IHS 
for health care.978 Yet, according to the Commission’s calculations, the 
IHS operates with only 59% of the amount necessary to stem the crisis in 
Indian health.979 The Commission found that: 
 
[H]ealth facilities are frequently inaccessible and medically obsolete 
and preventive care and specialty services are not readily available . . . 
The federal government spends less per capita on Native American 
health care than on any other group for which it has this responsibility 
including Medicaid recipients, prisoners, veterans, and military 
personnel. Annually, IHS spends 60% less on its beneficiaries than the 
average per person health care expenditure nationwide. 
 . . . . 
 The IHS, although the largest source of federal spending for Native 
Americans, constitutes only 0.5% of the entire HHS budget.980
 
The staff of the Civil Rights Commission has followed up the “Quiet 
Crisis” report by releasing a more detailed draft report on Indian health 
problems and lack of adequate health care.981 “Broken Promises: 
Evaluating the Native American Health Care System” notes that 
 
Native Americans are 770 percent more likely to die from alcoholism, 
650 percent more likely to die from tuberculosis, 420 percent more 
likely to die from diabetes, 280 percent more likely to die from 
accidents, and 52 percent more likely to die from pneumonia or 
influenza than the rest of the United States, including white and 
minority populations.982
 
While criticizing Congress for failing to adequately fund Indian 
health programs, the report also urges IHS to eliminate social, cultural 
and “structural” barriers that may affect delivery of health care. These 
include cultural training; partnerships with tribes; improved investigation 
 976. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 12. 
 977. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 106. 
 978. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 35. 
 979. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 43. 
 980. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 12-13. 
 981. Broken Promises: Evaluating the Native American Health Care System (July 2004) at 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nahealth/nabroken.pdf.
 982. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 8. 
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and handling of bias and discrimination complaints; fully funding tribal 
contract support costs; and changing the contract health services 
(“CHS”) system to allow all Native Americans, regardless of location, to 
receive services.983
 
XIV.  HOUSING 
 
A.  BIA’s Housing Improvement Program 
 
The federal government’s recognition of its responsibility to provide 
adequate Indian housing stretches back for two centuries,984 although the 
promise remains largely unkept.985 Today, the BIA plays a secondary 
role in Indian housing to that of HUD. Indeed, BIA’s “Housing 
Improvement Program” (“HIP”) offers assistance to only “the neediest of 
the needy Indian families who have no other resource for standard 
housing.”986 HIP provides grants for the cost of services to repair, 
renovate, replace, or provide housing. Tribal administration of the HIP 
program is “encouraged to the maximum extent possible.”987 The BIA 
may approve the mortgage of a landowner’s interest in individual 
allotment lands988 and leasehold interests in individual or tribal trust 
property.989
 
B.  HUD & NAHASDA 
 
Like BIA, HUD gives tribal governments a large say in its Indian 
housing programs, having radically deregulated tribal housing in the 
1990s eliminating several separate programs of assistance and replacing 
them with a single block grant program, the Native American Housing 
Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996990 (“NAHASDA”).991
NAHASDA is administered through HUD’s Office of Native 
American Programs (“ONAP”).992 Tribes design their own housing plans 
 983. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 136-39. 
 984. See Virginia Davis, A Discovery of Sorts: Reexamining the Origins of the Federal Indian 
Housing Obligation, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 211 (Spring 2002). 
 985. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 50-63. 
 986. 25 C.F.R. § 256.3(a) (2004). 
 987. § 256.3(c), 256.12. 
 988. 25 U.S.C. § 483(a) (2004). 
 989. 25 C.F.R. § 162.610 (2004). 
 990. Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 4101-4195). 
 991. Native American Housing Assistance and Self- Determination Act of 1996 
(NAHASDA), Pub. L. No. 104- 330, 110 Stat. 4016 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4212); see 
generally, Susan J. Ferrell, Indian Housing: The Fourth Decade, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 445 (1995). 
 992. 25 U.S.C. § 4102 (2004). ONAP hosts a federal inter-agency Native American Web site, 
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and submit them to ONAP, which makes block grants directly to 
tribes.993 Eligible activities include buying, building, or improving homes 
as well as funding services like counseling and crime prevention.994 The 
Act allows grant recipients to apply for loan guarantees backed by the 
full faith and credit of the United States.995 Leasehold terms are permitted 
for up to fifty years to encourage private lending.996
 
C.  Promises Unkept 
 
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission reports that there is a significant 
need for safe and sanitary housing in Indian country. 
 
Roughly 90,000 Indian families are homeless or under-housed; more 
than 30% of reservation households are crowded and 18% are severely 
crowded. Roughly 16% of Native American homes are without 
telephones, while only 6% of non-Native households lack telephone 
service . . . Fewer than 50% of homes on reservations are connected to 
a public sewer system.997
 
Funding for Native American programs at HUD, according to the 
Commission, increased only slightly over the past four years (8.8%), 
significantly less than the agency as a whole (62%).998 The Commission 
notes that the “tribal housing loan guarantee program lost nearly 70% of 
its purchasing power over the last four years . . . .”999 As in other areas of 
importance to tribes, they have banded together to make their collective 
voice heard on housing policy issues. The National American Indian 
Housing Council (“NAIHC”) is a leading advocacy organization that 
provides technical assistance and advocacy for tribal housing 
programs.1000
 
 
 
 
known as “Code Talk,” that is designed specifically to deliver electronic information from 
government agencies and other organizations to Native American communities. See 
http://www.codetalk.fed.us. 
 993. 25 U.S.C. § 4111 (2004). 
 994. Id. § 4132(1)-(6). 
 995. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4191, 4192 (2004). 
 996. Id. § 4211. 
 997. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 50. 
 998. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 54-55. 
 999. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 60. 
 1000. See http://www.naihc.net. 
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IX.  EDUCATION 
 
A.  “A National Tragedy”1001
 
In 1819, Congress authorized the President to institute education 
programs for Indians, including instruction in agriculture as well as 
reading, writing, and arithmetic.1002 Vacant military posts and barracks 
were converted for use as schools.1003 Churches were given control of 
Indians’ treaty rations1004 and granted land patents for purposes of 
operating mission schools,1005 a practice not formally ended until 
1968.1006 Early Indian education policies sought to assimilate Indian 
children and to essentially terminate their Indian culture.1007
Federal policy began a gradual shift after the 1928 Meriam Report 
focused national attention on the grossly inadequate state of federal 
Indian policies, including education.1008 In 1934, through the Johnson-
O’Malley Act, Congress provided for contracts and grants to integrate 
Indian education into state school systems.1009 In 1950, Congress adopted 
legislation popularly known as “Impact Aid,” authorizing federal 
subsidies to state operated public schools for the education of children 
"connected" with federal lands exempt from taxation, including Indian 
reservations.1010 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
established funds for Indian students.1011 Still, at the end of the sixties in 
 1001. See Senate Special Subcommittee on Indian Educ., Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 
Indian Education: A National Tragedy - A National Challenge, S. REP. NO. 91-501 at 21 (1969) 
[hereinafter, A National Tragedy]. 
 1002. Act of March 3, 1819, Pub. L. No. c. 85, 3 Stat. 516 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 271). 
 1003. Act of July 31, 1882, Pub. L. No. c. 363, 22 Stat. 181 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 276). 
 1004. Act of June 21, 1906, Pub. L. No. c. 3504, 34 Stat. 326 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 279). 
 1005. Act of September 21, 1922, Pub. L. No. c. 367, § 3, 42 Stat. 995 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
280). 
 1006. Pub. L. No. 90-280, § 2, 82 Stat. 71 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 278a). 
 1007. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Let No Native American Child Be Left Behind: Re-
Envisioning Native American Education for the Twenty-First Century, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 819, 829-32 
(2001); Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation’s Debt 
to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 944 (1999). 
 1008. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 7. 
 1009. Act of April 16, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-167, 48 Stat. 596 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 452-457). The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to enter into a contract . . . with 
any State . . . for the education, medical attention, agricultural assistance, and social welfare, 
including relief of distress, of Indians in such State.” The federal regulations specify that “education 
contracts under the Johnson-O’Malley Act . . . shall be for the purpose of financially assisting those 
efforts designed to meet the specialized and unique educational needs of eligible Indian students.” 25 
C.F.R. § 273.1(a) (2004). 
   1010.  Pub. L. 81-874, c. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950), codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7701-
7714.  School districts receiving Impact Aid funds for children residing on Indian lands must adopt 
certain "Indian policies and procedures" to ensure equal participation of Indian children in all aspects 
of the instructional program of the district. 20 USC § 7704. 
 1011. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2713 (2004). 
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a Senate report subtitled “A National Tragedy – A National Challenge,” 
Indian education was said to be characterized by a “dismal record of 
absenteeism, dropouts, negative self-image, low achievement, and, 
ultimately, academic failure for many Indian children.”1012
 
B.  The Self-Determination Era 
 
A renewed focus on improving Indian education resulted in a series 
of new laws, including the Indian Education Assistance Act of 19751013 
(authorizing contracts with states for school construction on Indian 
lands); the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
19751014 (permitting tribes to operate federally funded educational 
programs); the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 19881015 (directing 
BIA to make grants to tribes operating BIA-funded schools); Part B of 
Title XI of the Education Amendments of 1978;1016 the National Fund for 
Excellence in American Indian Education (directs BIA to make grants to 
tribes to permit the tribes to provide financial assistance to individual 
Indian students for the costs of attendance at institutions of higher 
education);1017 and the American Indian Education Foundation1018 (a 
federally chartered corporation intended to further educational 
opportunities for American Indians). 
The primary legislation that authorizes federal spending on 
education, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) was 
reauthorized in January of 2002, now known as the “No Child Left 
Behind” Act (“NCLB”) of 2001.1019 NCLB requires states to set twelve-
year goals to ensure that all students meet state academic standards and 
to close achievement gaps between rich and poor and minority and non-
minority students. In addition, the NCLB specifically addresses programs 
for Indian, Native Hawaiian, and Alaska Native Education, in 
amendments known as the Native American Education Improvement Act 
of 20011020 that states: 
 
 1012. A National Tragedy, supra note 1001. 
 1013. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2214 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458-458(e)). 
 1014. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a), (f) (2004). 
 1015. Id. §§ 2501-2511. 
 1016. Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2136 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-382, Title II, § 381, 
108 Stat. 3979 (1994)). 
 1017. 25 U.S.C. § 3301. Originally called the American Indian Education Foundation, it has 
been redesignated as the National Fund for Excellence in American Indian Education. See 108 Pub. 
L. No. 267, 118 Stat. 797 (Jul. 2, 2004). 
 1018. Pub. L. No. 106-568, 114 Stat. 2936 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458(bbb)). 
 1019. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 2007 (20 U.S.C. § 6301). 
 1020. 25 U.S.C. § 2001 (2004). 
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It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government’s 
unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the 
Indian people for the education of Indian children and for the operation 
and financial support of the Bureau of Indian Affairs-funded school 
system to work in full cooperation with tribes toward the goal of 
ensuring that the programs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs-funded 
school system are of the highest quality and provide for the basic 
elementary and secondary educational needs of Indian children, 
including meeting the unique educational and cultural needs of those 
children.1021
 
Although Congress coupled the new reforms in ESEA with historic 
increases in funding and targeting schools with high percentages of low-
income children, Indian leaders charge that the President’s FY05 Budget 
under-funds ESEA by $9.4 billion below the authorized level.1022
On April 30, 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 13336 on 
American Indian and Alaska Native Education, declaring support for 
tribal sovereignty, tribal traditions, languages and cultures; establishing 
an interagency working group to develop a federal interagency plan that 
recommends initiatives, strategies and ideas for actions to promote the 
purposes of the Executive Order; calling for a multi-year study of 
American Indian and Alaska Native education with the purpose of 
improving Native students’ ability to meet the standards of the No Child 
Left Behind Act; calling for a report to the President; and seeking 
enhancement of research capabilities of tribal-level educational 
institutions. The Task Force is to convene a forum on the No Child Left 
Behind Act to identify means to enhance communication, collaboration, 
and cooperative strategies to improve the education of Native students 
attending federal, state, Tribal and other schools.1023
 
C.  BIA’s Office of Indian Education 
 
The Office of Indian Education Programs (“OIEP”) within the BIA 
 1021. Id. § 2000. BIA has promulgated a proposed rule for grants to tribal schools that was 
negotiated in the wake of the No Child Left Behind Act. See 69 F.R. 8752, 8788-8789 (Feb. 25, 
2004). 
 1022. The No Child Left Behind Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
108th Cong. – 2d Sess., Hearing (June 16, 2004) (testimony of Cindy La Marr, President, National 
Indian Education Association). 
 1023. The Executive Order was signed at the persistent urging of the National Indian Education 
Association (NIEA). Founded in 1969, the NIEA is the largest organization in the nation dedicated 
to Indian education advocacy issues and embraces a membership of over 4,000 American Indian, 
Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian educators, tribal leaders, school administrators, teachers, parents 
and students. See http://www.niea.org. 
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is charged with the responsibility for administering BIA’s education 
programs.1024 There are approximately 541,000 elementary and 
secondary-aged Indian students in the United States, about 49,000 of 
whom are enrolled in 185 federal Indian schools, 64 of which are 
operated by the BIA, with the remainder operated by Indian tribes.1025 
The BIA school system includes elementary, secondary, and boarding 
schools located on 63 reservations in 23 states. BIA also provides for the 
education of about 30,000 adult Indian students at 25 BIA-funded 
Tribally controlled community colleges and universities and an 
additional 1,600 Indian adults at two colleges operated by BIA.1026
The majority of funding for the OIEP is provided through the 
Department of the Interior’s annual appropriation. The OIEP receives 
additional funding from the U.S. Department of Education and other 
sources.1027 The OIEP distributes the majority of appropriated funds to 
schools under the Indian School Equalization Program (“ISEP”) that 
provides direct funding for the instruction and residential care of Indian 
children. For budget fiscal year
 
2001/2002, the OIEP spent 
approximately $728 million in funding received from all sources. Of the 
$728 million, $667 million was used by schools and education field 
offices and about $61 million was used by the OIEP Central Office.1028
Current OIEP policy is “to facilitate Indian control of Indian affairs 
in all matters relating to education.”1029 Eligibility for BIA education 
programs is limited to students who are tribal members or at least one-
quarter Indian blood descendant of a tribal member and who reside on or 
near an Indian reservation or meet criteria for attendance at BIA off-
reservation boarding schools.1030 Eligibility may be extended to certain 
other students, for example, dependents of BIA employees.1031
 1024. 25 C.F.R. pt. 33 (2004). 
 1025. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, BIA and DOD Schools: Student Acheivement and Other 
Characteristics Often Differ from Public Schools, at 3 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REP., BIA Schools]. 
 1026. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Office of Indian Education Programs Central Office Management of Administrative Funds, REP. NO. 
C-In-Bia-0007-2003 (March 2004), Appendix 1 at 12-13. Haskell Indian Nations University was 
established in Lawrence, Kansas, in 1884 as the United States Indian Industrial Training School. See 
http://www.haskell.edu. The Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute is a National Indian 
Community College and Land Grant Institute established in Albuquerque in 1971. See 
http://www.sipi.bia.edu. 
 1027. Funding is provided by DOE under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (as 
amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act. 
 1028. See generally, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs Office of Indian Education Programs Central Office Management of Administrative 
Funds, REP. NO. C-In-Bia-0007-2003 (March 2004). 
 1029. 25 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2004). 
 1030. § 2007(f). 
 1031. Id. 
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The OIEP has established minimum academic standards for the basic 
education of Indian children and national criteria for dormitory 
housing.1032 There are stringent standards for employment of education 
personnel.1033 The Indian School Equalization program has rules to 
ensure uniform direct funding of BIA and tribally operated schools.1034 
Other regulations govern educational loans and grants,1035 grants to 
tribally controlled community colleges,1036 maintenance of student 
records in BIA schools,1037 and adult education.1038
Because OIEP employees are in contact with Indian children they are 
subject to statutes that require federal agencies involved with the 
provision of services to children under age eighteen to assure that all 
existing and newly hired employees undergo a criminal background 
check.1039 In addition, OIEP is also subject to the Indian Child Protection 
and Family Violence Protection Act of 19901040 that requires background 
investigations of individuals who are employed or being considered for 
employment in a position that has regular contact with or control over 
Indian children. Individuals are not eligible for appointment if they have 
been found guilty of, or entered a plea of no contest or guilty to, any 
felony offense or any two or more misdemeanor offenses under federal, 
state, or Tribal law involving crimes of violence; sexual assault, 
molestation, exploitation, contact, or prostitution; crimes against persons; 
or offenses committed against children. 
Pursuant to the Act, the BIA has established minimum standards of 
character and suitability for employment not just for school employees 
but for all individuals whose duties and responsibilities allow them 
regular contact with or control over Indian children,1041 and to establish 
the method for distributing funds to support tribally operated programs to 
protect Indian children and reduce the incidence of family violence in 
Indian country.1042 Tribal employers are required to conduct background 
investigations of all prospective employees whose responsibilities allow 
them regular contact with or control over Indian children and to employ 
 1032. 25 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2004). 
 1033. pt. 38. 
 1034. pt. 39. 
 1035. pt. 40. 
 1036. pt. 41. 
 1037. pt. 42. 
 1038. pt. 46. 
 1039. Crime Control Act of 1990, Subchapter V-Child Care Worker Employee Background 
Checks, Pub. L. No. 101-647, Title II, Subtitle E, § 231, 104 Stat. 4808 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 
10341). 
 1040. Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104 Stat. 4544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211). 
 1041. 25 C.F.R. § 63.10-63.24 (2004). 
 1042. Id. § 63.30-63.36. 
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only those individuals who meet standards of character no less stringent 
than those established for BIA employees.1043
 
D.  Failing Grades 
 
The importance of education to tribes cannot be overstated, as 
evidenced by the activities of the NIEA and other advocacy 
organizations. The American Indian Higher Education Consortium 
(“AIHEC”), for example, was founded in 1972 by six tribal colleges and 
has grown to represent thirty-four colleges in the United States and one 
Canadian institution.1044 Another prominent organization, the American 
Indian Science & Engineering Society (“AISES”), promotes educational 
opportunities for Native students in science, engineering, and 
technology.1045
Groups such as these have made great strides in helping to improve 
Indian education, but for some, the changes are too little, too late. Former 
students at church-run schools in South Dakota recently filed a $25 
billion class-action lawsuit against the federal government alleging that 
federally-funded church schools were little more than “labor camps” rife 
with “round-the-clock” physical and sexual abuse that continued into the 
1970s.1046
Decades later, Indian education provided by the BIA continues to be 
markedly inferior to public school education. A 2001 report of the 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) on BIA schools found that 
students’ academic achievement and performance on college admission 
exams and statewide assessment tests were “far below the performance” 
of public school students.1047 The GAO report found that one in five BIA 
students was enrolled in a special education program and that nearly 60% 
had limited English proficiency.1048 Recruiting and retention of qualified 
staff remained an issue as did a nearly $1 billion backlog of repairs and 
construction.1049 The GAO report also emphasized the negative impact of 
social problems, including poverty, unemployment, and substance abuse 
on the academic achievement of Indian students.1050
In the last decade, one in three Native American students failed to 
 1043. Id. § 63.13(b). 
 1044. See http://www.aihec.org. 
 1045. See http://www.aises.org. 
 1046. See Sharon Waxman, Abuse Charges Hit Reservation, Church-Run Schools Cited In 
Wide-Ranging Lawsuit, WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2003, at A01. 
 1047. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 2. 
 1048. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 33. 
 1049. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 12. 
 1050. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 15. 
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graduate from high school. Native American students are far more likely 
than other students to drop out of primary and secondary schools.1051 
Additionally, Individuals working in Indian education are typically 
underpaid in comparison to colleagues in non-Indian schools. Tribal 
college full-time faculty, for example, are paid about half as much on 
average as their counterparts at non-tribal two-year institutions.1052
The amount currently spent per student at BIA schools is equivalent 
to “an amount per student that public schools were spending twenty-
years ago.”1053 The Commission on Civil Rights reports that “funding for 
DOEd’s Office of Indian Education (“OIE”) has remained a relatively 
small portion of the department’s total discretionary budget (ranging 
from 0.2 to 0.3%) between 1998 and 2003.”1054
 
XVI.  SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF GOVERNANCE 
 
A.  Indian Self-Determination 
 
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(“ISDEAA”),1055 directs the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, upon the request of an Indian Tribe, to turn 
over to that Tribe the direct operation of its federal Indian programs.1056 
Once a Tribe requests control of its programs the Secretary and the Tribe 
enter into a “self-determination contract” which the statute specifies must 
incorporate the provisions of a mandatory model contract included in the 
text of the ISDEAA.1057
The ISDEAA requires the Secretary to provide program funding, 
known as “base funding,” to contractors in an amount no less than the 
Secretary would have spent had he retained operation of the program.1058 
In addition to base funding, the Act requires the Secretary to provide 
funding of contract support costs (“CSCs”) although the obligation to 
provide CSCs is expressly subject to the availability of 
appropriations.1059
Federal appeals courts in two circuits have held that federal agencies 
 1051. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 86. 
 1052. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 85-86. 
 1053. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at 23. 
 1054. GAO REP, BIA Schools, supra note 1025, at xi. 
 1055. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450). 
 1056. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1) (2004). 
 1057. Id. § 450l(a), (c). 
 1058. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (2004). 
 1059. Id. § 450j-1(a)(2), j-1(a)(2)(b); see Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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can’t award full CSCs to tribes where Congress has not made sufficient 
funds available.1060 These decisions essentially view self-determination 
agreements not as government procurement contracts, but rather, as 
governmental funding arrangements under which the tribes are 
substituted for a federal agency both in furnishing governmental services 
and in receiving federal funding for that purpose. More recently, 
however, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Cherokee 
Nation was owed full contract support costs for administering such 
programs.1061 Both the Government and the Cherokee Nation have asked 
the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute.1062
There are specific programs administered by the BIA that are not 
subject to contract under the ISDEAA because they are inherently federal 
functions, also called residual functions.1063 The Secretary is precluded 
from contracting for programs that would impair her ability to discharge 
her trust responsibility to any Indian tribe or individuals1064 and the 
Secretary must reserve funds for other tribes who would also be eligible 
for the administration of programs.1065
The Indian Health Service (“HIS”) is another major source of tribal 
self–determination contracts. Such contracts accounted for over half of 
the IHS FY 2004 budget of $3.7 billion and funded tribal operation of 
almost one-third of IHS hospitals and three–quarters of its clinics and 
smaller facilities.1066 Tribes and tribal groups, through contracts and 
compacts with the IHS operate 13 hospitals, 172 health centers, 3 school 
health centers, and 260 health stations (including 176 Alaska Native 
village clinics).1067 The IHS, tribes, and tribal groups also operate 9 
regional youth substance abuse treatment centers and 2,252 units of staff 
quarters.1068
Upon receipt of a contract proposal, the Department must review and 
approve or decline the proposal within ninety-days; failure to act within 
the ninety-day period results in the award of a contract by operation of 
 1060. Cherokee Nation v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2002); Shoshone-Bannock v. 
Thompson, (9th Cir.2001); Navajo Nation v. HHS, 285 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 1061. Thompson v. Cherokee Nation, 334 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2003), certiorari granted by 
Thompson v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 2004 U.S. LEXIS 2028 (U.S. 2004); Cherokee Nation v. 
Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2002), certiorari granted by Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. 
Thompson, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 2027 (U.S. 2004). 
 1062. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2), j-1(a)(2)(b) (2004). 
 1063. Id. § 450f(a)(2)(E). 
 1064. Id. § 450j(g). 
 1065. Id. § 450j(i). 
 1066. http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm. 
 1067. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, H.R. REP. NO. 108-
542 (2005). 
 1068. Id. 
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law.1069 A proposal may be declined only for one of five specific 
reasons.1070 An appeal of the decision complained of must be filed within 
thirty-days.1071 A tribe filing an appeal may also go directly to federal 
court at any point.1072
Generally, funds paid to a tribe and not expended or used for the 
purposes for which paid must be repaid to the Treasury of the United 
States.1073 Tribes are required to submit to the Secretary a single-agency 
audit report for each fiscal year during which it receives or expends 
contract funds.1074 The Department is barred from recovering disallowed 
costs unless it has given notice of such disallowance within 365 days of 
receipt of the tribe’s single audit.1075 There are special rules for post-
award contract disputes.1076 The ISDEAA imposes criminal penalties, 
including fines and imprisonment, upon officials and employees of 
contract recipients who willfully misapply or embezzle funds.1077
An Indian tribe or tribal organization may retrocede a self-
determination contract, in whole or in part.1078 A “retrocession” is the 
voluntary return to the Secretary of a contracted program, in whole or in 
part, for any reason, before the expiration of the term of the contract.1079 
The Secretary may initiate a “reassumption” of a self-determination 
contract based upon a finding of gross negligence or mismanagement of 
the contract.1080
 
B.  Tribal Self-Governance 
 
Self-Governance is an extension of the self-determination program, 
whereby tribes assume even greater control over a larger range of 
 1069. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a) (2004); 25 C.F.R. § 900.18 (2004). 
 1070. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2004), 25 C.F.R. § 900.22 (2004). A contract may be declined only 
if the Secretary provides written notification that specifically finds, or is supported by controlling 
legal authority, that (1) the service to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries will not be satisfactory; 
(2) adequate protection of trust resources is not assured; (3) the function cannot be properly 
maintained by the proposed contract; (4) the amount of funds proposed under the contract is in 
excess of the funds available; or (5) the services cannot be lawfully carried out by the contractor. Id. 
 1071. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(m-1) (2004), 25 C.F.R. § 900.150-169 (2004). Appeal procedures for 
most contract disputes are covered at and Subpart L of the regulations. 
 1072. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(b)(3), (m-1) (2004). 
 1073. Id. § 450c(d) (2004). For each fiscal year during which a self-determination contract is in 
effect, any savings under a self-determination contract may be expended by the tribe in the 
succeeding fiscal year. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(4) (2004). 
 1074. Id. § 450c(f)(1). 
 1075. Id. § 450j-1(e). 
 1076. 25 C.F.R. § 900.215-230 (2004). 
 1077. 25 U.S.C. § 450d (2004). 
 1078. Id. § 450j(e); 25 C.F.R. § 900.241 (2004). 
 1079. 25 C.F.R. § 900.240 (2004). 
 1080. Id. § 900.247; 25 U.S.C. § 450m (2004). 
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programs, with minimal federal oversight. Congress created the Self-
Governance program under Title II of the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1994.1081 The Office of Self-
Governance (“OSG”) is the office within DOI responsible for 
administering Tribal Self-Governance as it relates to BIA programs.1082 
OSG may accept up to fifty tribes or consortia of tribes each year to 
participate in the program.1083 Separate regulations specify the process 
for tribes seeking entry into the program.1084
An Annual Funding Agreement (“AFA”) entered into by the BIA 
and a tribe specifies the programs transferred to the tribe and those 
retained by BIA.1085 An AFA may not include programs, services, 
functions, or activities that are inherently federal or where the statute 
establishing the existing program does not authorize the type of 
participation sought by the tribe.1086 The AFA must include an amount 
equal to what the tribe would have been eligible to receive under 
contracts and grants for direct programs and contract support costs under 
the self-determination program plus a negotiated share of any other funds 
otherwise available to tribes.1087 An AFA may also be negotiated for non-
BIA programs including DOI programs of special geographic, historical, 
or cultural significance to participating tribes.1088
Self-governance tribes also must negotiate a self-governance 
“compact” which differs from the AFA in that parts of the compact apply 
to all bureaus within the DOI rather than just a single Bureau.1089 DOI 
regulations detail the negotiation process for a compact and an AFA.1090
BIA funding of an AFA must not result in a reduction of services or 
funds for which another tribe is eligible.1091 All regulations that govern 
the operation of programs included in an AFA apply as well to self-
governance tribes unless waived by the Secretary.1092 DOI may reassume 
any program operated pursuant to an AFA upon a finding of imminent 
 1081. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa-gg). The amendments 
made permanent what had been a pilot “Tribal Self-Governance” program. See 25 C.F.R. § 1000.4 
(2004). 
 1082. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.2 (2004). 
 1083. § 1000.14. 
 1084. See id. pt. 1001. 
 1085. § 1000.82. 
 1086. § 1000.92, .94. 
 1087. § 1000.91. 
 1088. § 1000.120-148. 
 1089. § 1000.161. 
 1090. § 1000.160-182. 
 1091. See § 1000.190-198. 
 1092. See § 1000.220-232. An AFA that includes a construction program is subject to 
additional regulations. See id. § 1000.190-198. 
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jeopardy to a physical trust asset, a natural resource, or public health and 
safety.1093 A tribe may also retrocede a program included in an AFA.1094
Annually, each AFA tribe as well as the Secretary must prepare a 
report on the self-governance program.1095 Tribes may appeal 
Department decisions under the self-governance program to the IBIA for 
certain pre-AFA disputes and to the IBCA for certain post-AFA disputes 
though alternative dispute resolution is preferred.1096
The Secretary is required to publish annually: (1) A list of non-BIA 
programs, services, functions, and activities, or portions thereof, that are 
eligible for inclusion in agreements negotiated under the self-governance 
program and (2) programmatic targets for these bureaus.1097 
Nevertheless, there are only a handful of Annual Funding Agreements 
between self-governance tribes and non-BIA bureaus of the 
Department.1098
 
C.  Contractor Tort Liability 
 
For the first dozen years under the ISDEAA, tribal contractors 
generally assumed liability for accidents or torts (civil wrongdoings) 
caused by their employees. However, beginning in the late 1980s the 
federal government assumed this liability when Congress extended 
coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) to tribal ISDEAA 
contractors.1099 The FTCA permits the United States to be sued “under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred.”1100
DOI regulations explain the coverage of the FTCA for medical and 
non-medical claims and the procedures for filing FTCA claims.1101 A 
report by the General Accounting Office to the Senate Committee on 
 1093. See § 1000.300-318. 
 1094. See § 1000.330-339. 
 1095. See § 1000.380-382. 
 1096. § 1000.420-438. 
 1097. 25 U.S.C. § 405(c) (2004). 
 1098. List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2004 Annual Funding Agreements 
To Be Negotiated With Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other Than the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 71122 (Dec. 22, 2003). The Bureau of Reclamation and the National 
Park Service each have four such agreements with tribes. There are no such tribal agreements with 
the Bureau of Land Management, Minerals Management Service, Office of Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Enforcement, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. Geological Survey, although 
each of these agencies has programs that are eligible for such agreements. Id. 
 1099. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f, 2804(f) (2004). 
 1100. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004). 
 1101. 25 C.F.R. § 900.180-210 (2004). 
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Indian Affairs1102 identified 342 claims filed from 1997 through 1999 
with one-third of them against Indian Health Service contractors and 
two-thirds against BIA contractors that mostly involved law 
enforcement. The claims involved a small number of tribes but sought 
$700 million in damages.1103
The Report identifies, but does not attempt to resolve, four unique 
legal issues arising from FTCA coverage of tribal contractors: 1) the 
FTCA does not provide statutory authority for removing FTCA cases 
filed in tribal courts, unlike state courts, 2) questions have arisen whether 
adjudication of claims should be based on tribal law or state law, 3) it has 
been argued that tribal law enforcement officers should be considered 
federal law enforcement officers, thus subjecting them to claims for 
intentional as well as negligent torts, and 4) it is unclear to what extent 
tribal council members and other indirect tribal employees may be 
covered by the FTCA.1104
 
D.  Self-Governance and the Trust Responsibility 
 
The fact that a tribe performs BIA realty functions under a Self-
Governance compact does not diminish the trust responsibility of the 
United States for that tribe’s trust land even when the tribe provides BIA 
services to its own land.1105 The United States, not the Tribe, will be the 
trustee regardless of whether BIA or the Nation provides BIA realty 
services to the land.1106 The regulations include provisions for a system 
of trust evaluations when a tribe performs trust functions under an 
AFA.1107
Tribes naturally want to preserve the benefits of the trust, for 
example, assistance with management of tribal resources and the ability 
to sue the government for failure to protect resources. However, many 
tribes do not want even minimal government oversight of tribal 
management. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, the vice-president of the NCAI bitterly attacked 
 1102. GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, Federal Tort 
Claims Act Issues Affecting Coverage for Tribal Self-Determination Contracts, GAO/RCED-00-169 
(July 2000). 
 1103. Id. at 4. 
 1104. Id. at 17-18. For an argument in favor of applying tribal law as “the law of the place” 
under the FTCA, see Katherine C. Pearson, Departing from the Routine: Application of Indian 
Tribal Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 695 (Summer 2000). 
 1105. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(9); see also § 203(4) of the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, 25 
U.S.C. § 458aa (2004). 
 1106. Okla. Petroleum Marketers Ass’n et al. v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 35 IBIA 285 
(2000). 
 1107. See 25 C.F.R. § 1000.350-367 (2004). 
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recommendations by the National Academy of Public Administration 
that called for increased BIA funding in order to improve its 
management and administrative capacity in regard to Self-Determination 
and other programs.1108 NCAI vice-president W. Ron Allen suggested 
that a stronger BIA might imperil tribal self-governance and he 
challenged the Academy’s suggestion that lack of BIA oversight creates 
a potential for tribal abuse.1109 Allen dismissed much of the Academy’s 
report as being “more focused on the BIA’s loss of control over the tribes 
than the success of the devolution movement in the Self-Governance 
initiative.”1110
Yet without such oversight, it may be difficult to reconcile the trust 
responsibility with tribal self-governance, as recognized by the Tribal 
Government Task Force of the AIPRC. 
 
Clearly, the trust responsibility of the Federal Government, as exercised 
by BIA officials, requires that they have authority to control the use, 
management and disposition of tribal trust resources or income from 
trust resources. The theory for this source of authority is not viewed as 
objectionable by the tribes. They recognize that under the law, one 
simply cannot be a trustee and at the same time have no control over 
the corpus of the trust. If Indian Tribal Governments were to be 
recognized as possessing ultimate control over the use and disposition 
of tribal trust resources, then under the law, there is no way that the 
Federal Government could be held responsible. In effect, this would 
imply a termination of the trust responsibility.1111
 
Moreover, the courts have held that the federal government has a 
legitimate need and responsibility to ensure that federal and tribal trust 
resources are not misused, and that failure to do so may itself be a breach 
of trust.1112 Federal officials are frequently required to investigate 
allegations of financial mismanagement, corruption and abuse of power 
by tribal officials.1113 In a particularly shocking case, the long-time Chief 
 1108. NAPA, supra note 27, Testimony of W. Ron Allen, Vice President, National Congress of 
American Indians. 
 1109. NAPA, supra note 27, Testimony of W. Ron Allen, Vice President, National Congress of 
American Indians. 
 1110. NAPA, supra note 27, Testimony of W. Ron Allen, Vice President, National Congress of 
American Indians. 
 1111. AIPRC, supra note 39, TRIBAL GOV’T. REPORT at 14 (1976). 
 1112. Where a treaty required the United States to pay funds to tribal members, it was liable 
when it paid the money instead to the tribal government which was known to be misappropriating it. 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (The Government was to “be judged 
by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”). 
 1113. For example, three members of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and their 
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of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma allegedly oversaw a decades-long 
reign of terror, including sexual abuse of tribal employees.1114
Ongoing oversight by the BIA, combined with technical assistance, 
is essential to preventing and detecting such abuses, according to a report 
of a Special Committee on Investigations of the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee. 
 
While Indian citizens often live in poverty, bereft of the economic 
opportunities available to other Americans, they have fallen prey to the 
actions of certain corrupt officials. American Indians cannot afford 
corruption. Tribal governments, as well as the federal system in which 
they operate, must not spare any effort or expense to root out 
corruption, no matter where it is found.1115
 
Unfortunately, the Committee concluded, such vigilance has been 
lacking. 
attorney were charged with embezzlement and bank fraud after the four accessed more than $1 
million in tribal accounts during a tribal leadership struggle related to the small tribe’s plans to 
operate a multibillion-dollar storage site for high-level nuclear waste at its Skull Valley Reservation. 
See Judy Fahys, Goshutes, lawyer plead not guilty to embezzlement, fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 
10, 2004, at B3. The FBI and the NIGC are investigating alleged misuse of casino profits by 
Cheyenne and Arapaho tribal officials in Oklahoma. FBI agents interviewing 75 Cheyenne-
Arapahos, Indianz.com, June 10, 2004, at http://64.62.196.98/News/2004/002867.asp?print=1. 
Leaders of the Seminole Tribe of Florida allegedly misspent tens of millions of dollars for luxury 
cars and gifts. Jeff Testerman, Government Tells Tribe to Toe Line on Casinos, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2004/02/25/State/ 
Government_tells_trib.shtml. The Tulalip Tribes recently disbanded their housing authority after 
HUD said the housing authority has mismanaged more than $6 million in federal funds. See Emily 
Heffter, Tulalips Dissolve Housing Authority, SEATLE TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A1. 
 1114. In United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 
1108 (2000), the court portrayed an all-powerful and tyrannical tribal chief. 
Mr. Roberts was the longtime tribal Chief who could, and did, call subordinate female 
employees to his private office at the tribal headquarters where he then sexually abused 
them, secure in the knowledge the power and influence of his position would allow him 
to engage in these repeated attacks, over the course of many years, without oversight. 
Several women testified they did not initially report him out of fear he would use his 
power and influence to retaliate, either by terminating their employment, denying family 
members tribal benefits, or causing physical harm to them. When this case became 
public, family members of several victims acknowledged Mr. Roberts’ behavior, but 
urged the women not to participate. Because she agreed to testify, at least one woman no 
longer has contact with her parents, and others maintain strained relationships with 
family members. Beyond the victims and their families, Mr. Roberts appears to have 
exerted significant influence over employment, economics, politics, and daily life of all 
members of the Choctaw Nation and the entire town of Durant, Oklahoma. As a result, 
even after acknowledging the abuse and assaults, many individuals were wary of 
supporting the victims of the offenses, and, in fact, strongly encouraged the women to 
maintain their silence. 
Id. 
 1115. Special Committee on Investigations, FINAL REP. AND LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24, at 181. 
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The litany of examples uncovered by the Special Committee indicates a 
pattern of abuse that must be redressed. While these abuses occur in 
any government – federal, state or local – what is not normal is that no 
matter how flagrant the conduct, Congress and the entire federal 
government have ignored it, aiding and abetting in the cycle of despair 
among American Indians. If tribal governments are to function as 
representatives of their people, then they must also be strong enough to 
be accountable to their people by not tolerating corruption, no matter 
what guise it hides behind.1116
 
XVII.  TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT AND REFORM 
 
A.  Trust Funds Management 
 
Historically, the BIA manages certain funds on behalf of individual 
Indians and tribes, pursuant to a variety of federal statutes.1117 The 
current arrangement has its roots in historically shifting federal policies. 
Pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887,1118 lands that had 
previously been set aside for Indian tribes were allotted to individual 
Indians in fixed amounts and “surplus” lands were opened to non-Indian 
settlement. The Act created a system in which allotted lands would be 
held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years or more during 
which period an individual account (“Individual Indian Money” account 
or “IIM” account) would be created for each Indian with an interest in 
the allotted lands. The United States would manage the lands for the 
benefit of the allottees until the expiration of the trust period at which 
time each allottee would be issued a fee patent. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 19341119 ended the practice of 
allotment but extended indefinitely the trust period for already-allotted 
lands. Through the operation of these two statutes, the United States 
came to hold over ten million acres of land as trustee for, and with a 
fiduciary duty to individual Indian beneficiaries. 
 
Interior has responsibility for what may be the largest land trust in the 
world. The Indian trust today encompasses approximately 56 million 
acres of land – over ten million acres belonging to individual Indians 
 1116. Special Committee on Investigations, FINAL REP. AND LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24,  at 203. 
 1117. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 161a, 162a, 164 (2004). 
 1118. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331). 
 1119. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461). 
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and nearly 45 million acres owned by Indian tribes. On these lands, 
Interior manages over 100,000 leases for individual Indians and tribes. 
Leasing, use permits and sales revenues of approximately $300 million 
per year are collected and distributed to approximately 236,000 
Individual IIM accounts, and about $800 million per year is distributed 
to about 1,400 tribal accounts. In addition, the trust manages 
approximately $2.6 billion in tribal funds and $400 million in 
individual Indian funds.1120
 
Primary responsibility for the awesome task of managing these lands and 
the funds they generate fell to the BIA with some help from the 
MMS.1121 The Treasury Department also has some responsibilities that 
“include holding and investing IIM trust funds at the direction of Interior, 
as well as maintaining central records related to these functions.”1122
A 1992 congressional report harshly criticized the DOI and the BIA 
for mismanagement of the IIM trust accounts.1123 The Congressional 
Oversight Committee found: 
 
(1) inadequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund 
balances; (2) inadequate controls over receipts and disbursements; (3) 
absence of periodic, timely reconciliations to assure accuracy of 
accounts; (4) inability to determine accurate cash balances; failure to 
consistently and prudently invest trust funds and/or pay interest to 
accountholders; (5) inability to prepare and supply accountholders with 
meaningful periodic statements of their account balances; (6) absence 
of consistent, written policies and procedures for trust fund 
management and accounting; and (7) inadequate staffing, supervision, 
and training.1124
 
Noting the historic and pervasive nature of the deficiencies, the 
Committee expressed skepticism about the ability of the BIA to 
significantly improve its performance.1125
 
 
 1120. http://www.doi.gov/news/fiduciaryobligations.pdf (Fiduciary Obligations Compliance 
Plan, January 6, 2003), at 3 [hereinafter FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS COMPLIANCE PLAN]. 
 1121. Id. at 22. MMS manages the collection and accounting of royalties and rentals received 
from producing Indian mineral leases. 
 1122. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 1123. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MISPLACED TRUST: THE BUREAU OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS’ MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H.R. REP. NO. 102-499 (1992). 
 1124. Id. at 59. 
 1125. Id. at 65-66. 
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B.  Trust Fund Reform 
 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Indian Trust Fund Management 
Reform Act1126 that required the Secretary of the Interior to account for 
“all funds held in trust by the United States for the benefit” of Indians 
and Indian tribes, to report quarterly to account holders, and to conduct 
an annual audit.1127 Congress established within the DOI the Office of 
Special Trustee for American Indians (“OST”)1128 to oversee all reform 
efforts within BIA, BLM and MMS with respect to management of 
Indian trust funds.1129 These efforts have led as well to the creation of the 
Office of Trust Funds Management (“OTFM”) within the OST.1130
DOI regulations concerning IIM accounts and tribal trust accounts 
are found in 25 C.F.R. § 115 (2004). They provide that adults normally 
have the right to withdraw funds from their accounts upon request1131 
unless they are under a legal disability.1132 The BIA may apply IIM funds 
against delinquent debts to the United States or the individual’s tribe 
“and against money judgments rendered by courts of Indian offenses or 
under any tribal law and order code.”1133 The account holder is entitled to 
challenge the decision of the BIA to restrict or make payments from an 
IIM account.1134 The BIA supervises accounts established for minors in 
consultation with the custodial parent or guardian.1135 The OTFM 
establishes an estate account when it learns of an account holder’s death 
until it is distributed in accordance with a probate order. 1136
Only funds from specified sources, including certain payments from 
the United States derived from the administration of trust assets, may be 
placed into an IIM account.1137 The OTFM manages the investment of 
the trust funds.1138 The OTFM establishes a tribal trust fund account 
when it receives tribal funds derived from tribal trust assets.1139 Tribes 
 1126. Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 4001 
(2004)). 
 1127. 25 U.S.C. § 4011 (2004). 
 1128. § 4042. 
 1129. § 4043. 
 1130. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS COMPLIANCE PLAN, supra note 1120, at 3; see 25 C.F.R. pt. 
1200 (2004). 
 1131. 25 C.F.R. § 115.101 (2004). 
 1132. § 115.102. 
 1133. § 115.104; see also id. § 11.208. 
 1134. § 115.600-620. 
 1135. § 115.400-431. 
 1136. § 115.500-504. 
 1137. § 115.700-709. 
 1138. § 115.711. 
 1139. § 115.800. 
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may take an active role in the investment of their trust funds.1140 Records 
that evidence the management of trust funds, including those made by a 
tribe that is operating a federal trust program, must be maintained in 
compliance with Departmental procedures1141 and the Federal Records 
Act.1142 Under the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform 
Act,1143 Tribes may assume from the Department responsibility for 
managing their own tribal funds pursuant to Departmental 
regulations.1144 Tribes may also choose to assume management under the 
ISDEAA1145 or the Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000.1146 
Separate BIA regulations control the management of specialized trust 
funds.1147
 
C.  Cobell1148
 
Impatient with the pace of trust fund reform, Native American 
beneficiaries of IIM accounts filed a class action to establish their right to 
compel an accounting.1149 Both the District Court1150 and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit1151 have extensively set out the 
underlying facts of the case. The District Court has declared that for 
purposes of this litigation the primary duty with respect to trust fund 
management is that Interior, as required by the American Indian Trust 
Fund Management Reform Act,1152 “provide plaintiffs an accurate 
 1140. § 115.800-814. 
 1141. § 115.1000-1001. 
 1142. 44 U.S.C. §§ 29, 31, 33, 39 (2004). 
 1143. Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (codified by 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4061). 
 1144. 25 C.F.R. pt. 12 (2004). 
 1145. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2004). 
 1146. § 458. 
 1147. E.g., on behalf of members of certain tribes and funds the Osage Tribe who do not have 
certificates of competency (25 C.F.R. pt. 117 (2004)) and the management of Osage judgment funds 
for education (25 C.F.R. pt. 122 (2004)). All federal agencies and the State of Alaska are bound by 
regulations governing the deposit of proceeds derived from lands withdrawn for Native selection 
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2004). See 25 C.F.R. 
pt. 124 (2004). A series of regulations provide for the partial repayment of construction charges on 
Indian irrigation projects. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 134 (2004); see also 41 Stat. 409, 25 U.S.C. § 386 
(2004). More specific regulations apply to the Crow Indian Irrigation Project, 25 C.F.R. pt. 135 
(2004); 60 Stat. 333-338; Fort Hall Irrigation Project, 25 C.F.R. pt. 136 (2004); 46 Stat. 1063; San 
Carlos Indian Irrigation Project, 25 C.F.R. pt. 137 (2004); 43 Stat. 475; Wapato Indian Irrigation 
Projects, 25 C.F.R. pts. 138, 139 (2004); 41 Stat. 409, 45 Stat. 210. 
 1148. Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub. nom. 240 F. 3rd 1081 
(C.A.D.C. 2001). 
 1149. Id. 
 1150. See, e.g., Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27-29 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 1151. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086-92 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 1152. 25 U.S.C. §§ 162(a), 4011 (2004). 
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accounting of all money in the IIM trust . . . .”1153
Several years later, Interior has found itself still having to defend an 
alleged inability to adequately perform its responsibilities. According to 
a 2001 U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”) report the DOI was 
unable to assure trust account holders that their balances were accurate or 
that their assets were being properly managed.1154 In response to a GAO 
request for accurate information, DOI had to correct thousands of 
inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated entries.1155 Despite actions taken by 
the DOI to address management problems, in 2003 the GAO reported 
that additional weaknesses, including inadequate accounting and 
information systems and internal controls, still prevented the DOI from 
ensuring the proper management of funds.1156
Interior argues that the trust it manages is not the typical corpus 
managed by a private sector trustee where fees are charged as part of 
normal business practices for the services delivered: 
 
The Federal Government bears the entire cost of administering the 
Indian trust. As a result usual incentives found in the private sector for 
reducing or paying for the management of the trust do not apply to the 
Indian trust. For instance, thousands of accounts must be maintained 
for IIM account holders that contain less than one dollar. In order to 
meet its trust goals and obligations, Interior continues to request 
significant budget resources. However, to meet the expectations of both 
Interior and its beneficiaries, Congress must appropriate these 
funds.1157
 
Despite such claims of insufficient funding from Congress, the Secretary 
was found by the Cobell District Court to be in breach of trust for failure 
to timely perform fiduciary duties.1158 The D.C. Circuit agreed, finding 
that the Government “does not know the precise number of IIM trust 
accounts that it is to administer and protect” and “it does not know the 
proper balances for each IIM account.”1159
 
The government’s broad duty to provide a complete historical 
accounting to IIM beneficiaries necessarily imposes substantial 
 1153. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 1154. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES: 
MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS, at 8-9 (January 2001). 
 1155. Id. 
 1156. Id., at 14 (January 2003). 
 1157. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS COMPLIANCE PLAN, supra note 1120, at 6. 
 1158. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 1159. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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subsidiary duties on those government officials with responsibility for 
ensuring that an accounting can and will take place. In particular, it 
imposes obligations on those who administer the IIM trust lands and 
funds to, among other things, maintain and complete existing records, 
recover missing records where possible, and develop plans and 
procedures sufficient to ensure that all aspects of the accounting 
process are carried out.1160
 
The D.C. Circuit further affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the 
defendants were in breach of these fiduciary duties, finding that “the 
Department [of Interior] is still unable to execute the most fundamental 
of trust duties-an accurate accounting.”1161
Cobell has dominated the actions of the BIA for several years. The 
litigation has been unusually bitter, has driven a wedge between the 
tribes and the BIA, and has contributed to a significant breakdown in 
morale within Interior.1162 The toxic tenor of the litigation has also 
fractured the BIA’s relationship with Indian advocates to an extent not 
seen in decades.1163 One observer blames the District Court Judge for the 
extreme hostility engendered by the case citing his allegedly 
“intolerable” and “abusive” behavior toward the government parties and 
their attorneys.1164 Similarly addressing Judge Royce Lamberth’s 
 1160. Id. at 1105. 
 1161. Id. at 1105-08, 1110. 
 1162. See, e.g., Deirdre Davidson, Indian Trust Suit Takes Toll at Interior: Employees Fleeing 
Case, Buying Personal Liability Insurance, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at 1. 
 1163. The Cobell class plaintiffs are represented by the Native American Rights Fund 
(“NARF”), a non-profit organization that provides legal representation and technical assistance to 
Indian tribes, organizations and individuals nationwide. See http://www.narf.org. As the litigation 
continues the parties have begun to explore a mediated resolution at the urging of the Chairmen and 
Ranking members of both the House Resources Committee and the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs. However, these efforts have so far only served to illustrate and perhaps deepen the gulf 
between the parties as plaintiffs’ counsel has accused the government of breaking promises and 
refusing to negotiate in good faith. H.R. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON 
METHODOLOGIES FOR SETTLING THE COBELL V. NORTON CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (1st Sess. 2003) 
(Testimony of John E. Echohawk, Executive Director, Native American Rights Fund). See 
http://indian.senate.gov. The view is shared by some in the media. See, e.g., Settle a Shameful Case 
of Indian Trust Money, SEATTLE TIMES, supra note 15; A Continuing Shame, N.Y. TIMES, supra 
note 15.
 1164. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the Department of [the] 
Interior, 56:2 ADMIN. L.J. 235, 236 (2004). Professor Pierce notes that “Judge Lamberth has held 
two Secretaries of [the] Interior, a Treasury Secretary, and two Assistant Secretaries of [the] Interior 
in contempt” and that he “has compelled eighty government attorneys to defend themselves against 
charges of contempt.” Id. Professor Pierce also filed a judicial misconduct complaint that accused 
Judge Lamberth of “defamatory characterizations of numerous government employees,” holding 
officials in contempt with “no basis in law or fact,” threatening to hold others in contempt and 
ordering a computer shutdown “with no adequate basis in law or fact to support that extraordinary 
action.” Id. The D.C. Judiciary Council rejected the allegations on July 9, 2004, upholding an earlier 
decision written by David B. Sentelle, an appeals court judge who said the complaint was without 
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repeated findings that the government engaged in litigation misconduct 
in defending the case, another commentator found no evidence that the 
Court had abused its contempt powers, concluding instead that the 
government’s “vigorous defense” has been a disservice to the interests of 
the general public in having justice prevail.1165
Judge Lamberth of the District Court has indeed attacked the 
Department in decision after decision, noting in a relatively early opinion 
that “I have never seen more egregious misconduct by the federal 
government.”1166 Several years later, in a contempt ruling against the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian 
Affairs and several attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor wrote: 
 
Now, at the conclusion of the second contempt trial in this action, I 
stand corrected. The Department of Interior has truly outdone itself this 
time. The agency has indisputably proven to the Court, Congress, and 
the individual Indian beneficiaries that it is either unwilling or unable to 
administer competently the IIM trust. Worse yet, the Department has 
now undeniably shown that it can no longer be trusted to state 
accurately the status of its trust reform efforts. In short, there is no 
longer any doubt that the Secretary of Interior has been and continues 
to be an unfit trustee-delegate for the United States.1167
 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit broadly affirmed the district court’s first 
contempt order, describing the relief it granted as “relatively modest.”1168 
Although reversing the latest contempt ruling the Circuit Court did not 
condone the government’s conduct.1169 On December 10, 2004, in a 
much-anticipated ruling, the appeals court vacated parts of Judge 
Lamberth’s order that Interior perform an historical accounting of IIM 
funds, as well as his mandate that Interior produce a detailed plan to 
merit and didn’t have a cause of action. Professor Pierce “failed to provide any specific evidence that 
would case a reasonable observer to doubt the subject judge’s impartiality,” Sentelle wrote on May 
17. See, Lamberth exchanges harsh words with Cobell critic, Indianz.com, August 2, 2004, at 
http://64.62.196.98/News/2004/003652asp?print=1. Judge Lamberth filed his own thirty-seven page 
response, accusing Pierce of sloppy scholarship and worse, asserting the charges were filed “without 
benefit of research, without supporting documentation, and apparently without considering the 
consequences of doing so under penalty of perjury.” This document is available at 
http://www.indiantrust.com. 
 1165. Daniel S. Jacobs, The Role Of The Federal Government In Defending Public Interest 
Litigation, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2003). 
 1166. Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 38 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 1167. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (Opinion), vacated by, in part, 
remanded by Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 1168. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 1169. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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“fix” the IIM trust management system.1170   
 
Here we address a district court injunction issued September 25, 2003. 
Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Cobell X"). The 
decree, see id. at 287-95, imposes obligations on the defendants in two 
main categories. Duties related to "Historical Accounting" are intended 
to unravel the tangle resulting from past accounting failures, see id. at 
70-211; those related to "Fixing the System" are intended to compel the 
issuance of a plan for future trust administration as a whole, see id. at 
239-87. To assure fulfillment of both sets of duties, the court appointed 
a court monitor to oversee compliance and said it would retain 
jurisdiction until December 31, 2009. These two different sets of 
commands raise quite different issues.  
 
“Historical Accounting” we find, is governed by Pub. L. No. 108-108, 
a provision adopted after the district court opinion issued, which 
radically changes the underlying substantive law and removes the legal 
basis for the historical accounting elements of the injunction. We 
therefore vacate those elements. 
 
The core of “Fixing the System,” by contrast, requires the Interior 
defendants to produce a "plan" that would fix the IIM trust 
management system, and requires the Interior defendants to explain 
how the Department will comply with various constraints or objectives 
identified by the court, such as sixteen specific common law trust 
duties and tribal law. Although we agree that Interior is subject to many 
of the common law trust duties identified by the court, we find that 
much of the "Fixing the System" injunction exceeds the court's 
remedial discretion because the court failed to ground it in the 
defendants' statutory trust duties and in specific findings that Interior 
breached those duties. Aside from the requirement that Interior 
complete its so-called “To-Be Plan,” as promised in its Comprehensive 
Plan, we thus vacate the district court's injunction and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1171      
 
Judge Lamberth has been especially livid about security lapses in the 
Department’s electronic records management systems. The failure of 
Department to ensure security and maintenance of information regarding 
1170.   Cobell v. Norton, No. 03-5314, 2004 WL 25473 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2004). 
1171.   Id. at 5-7. The order to perform an accounting could be reinstated after the end of the year 
2004, however, upon lapse of the statute that barred the accounting. Id. at 18. 
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IIM funds was found to be a breach of trust.1172 On July 28, 2003, the 
Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Department of the 
Interior to “immediately disconnect from the Internet all Information 
Technology Systems within [its] custody or control . . . until such time as 
the Court approves their reconnection to the Internet.”1173 A preliminary 
injunction of March 15, 2004, superseded and replaced the injunction of 
July 28, 2003, requiring disconnection of substantially all of the 
Department of the Interior's computer systems from the Internet, and 
ordering the Secretary to submit a plan for secure reconnection of 
Interior's computer systems. Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77 
(D.D.C. 2004).1174
 
We hold, contrary to the Secretary's contention, that issuance of the 
March 15, 2004 injunction is not precluded by Pub. L. 108-108, 117 
Stat. 1241, 1263 (2003), which applies only to “historical accounting 
activities.” As the district court noted, “Interior's present obligation to 
administer the trust presents sufficient grounds for finding that 
Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured.” Cobell XI, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 96 
n.27. We further hold that the district court's jurisdiction properly 
extends to security of Interior's information technology systems ("IT") 
housing or accessing IITD [individual Indian trust data], because the 
Secretary, as a fiduciary, is required to maintain and preserve IITD. We 
nevertheless vacate the injunction because the district court erred by 
placing the burden of persuasion upon the Secretary, disregarding 
Interior's certifications on the state of IT security, and failing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing prior to entering the injunction.1175
 
The District Court also has sharply limited Interior’s ability to 
communicate with trust account holders, initially prohibiting DOI from 
communicating with class members to “discuss this litigation, or the 
claims that have arisen therein, without prior authorization from this 
Court.”1176 At the urging of plaintiffs, Judge Lamberth entered yet 
another order on September 29, 2004, specifically prohibiting DOI 
employees from communicating with any member of the plaintiff class 
“regarding the sale, exchange, transfer, or conversion of any Indian trust 
land unless such communication is conspicuously marked with a notice 
 1172. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 1173. Cobell v. Norton, 274 F. Supp. 2d 111, 135 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 1174. Cobell v. Norton, No. 03-5262, 2004 WL 2753197 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2004). 
     1175.   Id. at 2-3. 
 1176. Cobell v. Norton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19449 (Sept. 29, 2004).  See the Order at 
http://www.indiantrust.com.   
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that has been previously submitted to and approved by this Court.”1177 
The order further provides that communication may proceed only if the 
class member waives his or her right to consult class counsel after receipt 
of the court-approved notice.1178
Interior says the cost of managing the IIM trust and the additional 
cost of performing an historical accounting may far outstrip the amount 
of money contained in the accounts. According to Senate testimony of 
the Associate Deputy Secretary of Interior there was only $440 million 
deposited in the IIM trust fund for account holders as of September 30, 
1991; approximately 95% of the transactions are under $500 and about 
80% of the transactions are under $50.1179 “An historical accounting will 
cost, at a minimum, several hundred millions of dollars and take years to 
complete,” testified James Cason, adding that despite media and other 
statements claiming up to $176 billion are owed the IIM account holders 
“at the end of the accounting, many individuals may see very little, if 
any, additional money in their accounts.”1180 Counsel for plaintiffs reject 
Interior’s characterization of Cobell, insisting that the case is not just 
about money but also about fixing the IIM trust system, providing the 
IIM beneficiaries with an accounting, and correcting the IIM account 
balances to reflect their true value. John Echohawk, Executive Director 
of the Native American Rights Fund (“NARF”), told Congress that 
resolution of the case must address each of these objectives.1181
Proposals for reform of trust fund management have run the gamut. 
Senate leaders proposed that Indian tribes and beneficiaries directly 
manage or co-manage trust funds assets along with Interior.1182 After a 
tumultuous dispute over early DOI proposals, a DOI Task Force with 
some tribal representation has attempted to develop alternatives 
involving reorganization of Interior.1183 The Cobell plaintiffs have argued 
 1177. See the Order at http://www.indiantrust.com. 
 1178. Id; see also, John Files, U.S. Is Ordered to Tell Indians Before Selling Trust Property, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at A17. In subsequent orders the Court the Court set forth the proper form 
of the required notice, Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266 (D.D.C., Oct. 22, 2004), and provided 
further clarifications, Cobell v. Norton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23097 (D.D.C., Nov. 17, 2004). 
 1179. The Indian Trust Fund Lawsuit: Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 1st Sess., (July 30, 2003) (statement of James Cason, Associate Deputy 
Secretary) available at http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/073003hrg/cason.PDF (Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress - 1st Session, Hearing List). 
 1180. Id. 
 1181. Methodologies for Settling the Cobell v. Norton Class Action Lawsuit: Before the Senate 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 1st Sess., (July 30, 2003) (testimony of John E. Echohawk, 
Executive Director, Native American Rights Fund) available at 
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/073003hrg/echohawk.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
108th Cong. - 1st Sess., Hearing List). 
 1182. Indian Trust Asset and Trust Fund Management and Reform Act of 2002, S. 2212, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
 1183. Tribal Leader/Department of the Interior Task Force on Trust Reform Report For the 
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for placement of the IIM trust in the care of a receiver appointed and 
supervised by a federal court and operating under court supervision.1184 
A former Special Trustee for America Indians, Paul M. Homan, 
proposed the establishment of an independent government sponsored 
enterprise with responsibilities for trust resource management, trust 
funds management, and land title and records management.1185 So far, 
there has been surprisingly little scholarship concerning trust reform.1186
 
D.  Tribal Trust Funds 
 
Many tribes have become concerned that the Department’s 
preoccupation with Cobell has seriously drained limited resources and 
attention to other matters. One tribal leader – speaking on behalf of tribes 
that have relatively few IIM account holders - expressed this in rather 
blunt terms. 
 
Congress does not have the money to award the large settlement that is 
due them. A large award to the plaintiffs will inevitability hurt the rest 
of Indian country during these hard economic and budget restricted 
times. It is time to introduce legislation that will bring a fair settlement 
to the ongoing litigation. USET is in favor of looking at possible 
settlement legislation and working with Congress to develop a 
resolution to the case. The Cobell litigation is a drain on the federal 
government and is depleting funding that could go to other Indian 
programs or to enhance the re-organization effort. We must get beyond 
Cobell in order to realize true and lasting trust reform.1187
 
Other tribes have expressed a somewhat different concern that the funds 
Secretary of the Interior, June 4, 2002, available at http://www.doi.gov/news/finaltfreport.html. 
 1184. See Indian Trust: Cobell v. Norton: An Overview, at http://www.IndianTrust.com/ 
overview.cfm. 
 1185. SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG. – 2ND SESS., ON THE ROLE OF THE 
SPECIAL TRUSTEE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Paul 
M. Homan, Former Special Trustee for American Indians). 
 1186. But see, e.g., Christopher Barrett Bowman, Comment, Indian Trust Fund: Resolution and 
Proposed Reformation to the Mismanagement Problems Associated with the Individual Indian 
Money Accounts in Light of Cobell v. Norton, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 543 (Winter 2004); Billee Elliot 
McAuliffe, Comment, Forcing Action: Seeking to “Clean Up” the Indian Trust Fund: Cobell v. 
Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998), 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 647 (2001). For an analysis of 
congressional trust fund reform proposals, see Thomas V. Panoff, Legislative Reform of the Indian 
Trust Fund System, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517 (Summer 2004). 
 1187. The Reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 108th Congress – 1st Sess. (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Keller George, United 
South and Eastern Tribes, President and Member of the Oneida Indian Nation) available at 
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/052103hrg/george.PDF (Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
108th Cong. – 1st Sess., Hearing List). 
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at issue in Cobell relate only to IIM accounts, the amount of which pales 
in comparison to trust funds held by the government for tribes 
themselves.1188 The Chairman of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma made 
this point in testimony before Congress. “I want to make it very clear,” 
Chairman John Berrey testified, “that Tribal claims and Individual claims 
in the Cobell case are very different and I want to reiterate the clear 
distinction.” He emphasized that “Tribal governments represent ninety 
percent of the Trust Corpus vs. ten percent represented by the Cobell 
class.”1189 The DOI itself has reminded Congress that at least sixteen 
tribes have already filed lawsuits seeking an accounting of tribal trust 
accounts.1190
 
XVIII.   BIA REORGANIZATION 
 
A.  “As-Is/To-Be” 
 
The DOI has shaken up the entire structure of Indian affairs in the 
wake of the Cobell rulings.1191 BIA and OST leaders describe the goals 
and objectives of the Comprehensive Trust Management Plan as 
including the placement of both BIA and OST under the supervision of 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs; the implementation 
of a new land title records system to keep ownership records accurate 
and current; improved land and natural resource and trust fund asset 
management including a nation-wide plan for eliminating fractionated 
interests of land that are burdening the trust; promotion of tribal self-
 1188. Currently, OST says it maintains approximately 1,400 accounts for 315 Tribal entities 
with assets exceeding $2.5 billion and over 285,000 IIM accounts with assets of approximately $480 
million. Numbers are available at http://www.doi.gov/ost. 
 1189. Potential Settlement Mechanisms for Cobell vs. Norton:Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. – 1st Sess., (May 30, 2003) (testimony of John Berrey, 
Chairman, Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, Vice-Chairman ITMA, Tribal Representative Leader “To 
Be” Trust Process Reengineering Team). 
 1190. The Indian Trust Fund Lawsuit: Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Congress – 1st Sess, (July 30, 2003) (statement of James Cason, Associate Deputy 
Secretary, Department of the Interior) available at http://indian.senate.gov (Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. - 1st Sess., Hearing List). Since that testimony, additional tribal suits 
have been filed. See, e.g., Chet Brokaw, S.D. Tribe Files Trust Lawsuit, RAPID CITY JOURNAL, June 
29, 2004 at http://www.rapidcityjournal.com/articles/2004/06/29/news/state/top/news01.txt (“The 
Oglala Sioux Tribe has filed a federal lawsuit that seeks to force the U.S. Interior Department to give 
a full accounting of land and money it is responsible for managing for the tribe.”). 
 1191. As noted by one tribal leader, “[t]he Cobell case served as a wake-up call to the Federal 
government about its gross mismanagement of trust assets and trust funds that Indians have known 
for over a hundred years but whose efforts to rectify or reform the system were met with a deaf ear. 
The Cobell case set off a chain reaction of events, including the reorganization at the Department of 
the Interior that will reverberate for decades to come.” Reorganization of Trust Mgmt. at the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs and the Office of the Spec. Trustee, supra note 29, (May 12, 2004) (testimony of 
Jim Gray, Principal Chief of The Osage Tribe).
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governance and self-determination; and review and revision of trust 
business processes (known as “the As-Is/To-Be process”).1192 
In testimony before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, Special 
Trustee Ross Swimmer and Assistant Secretary Dave Anderson said the 
role of the Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs has been 
expanded and the position renamed. The newly established office of the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs has line authority 
over the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management, the Director of the 
Office of Indian Education Programs, the Director of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic 
Development Policy and a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Information Resources Management. In addition, administrative 
functions previously performed in a decentralized fashion at the central, 
regional and agency levels, have been consolidated under the new 
management structure.1193
Whereas, the BIA retains natural resource trust asset management, 
the management of the trust functions at the BIA regional and agency 
levels has been separated by creating the positions of Deputy Regional 
Director for trust services and Deputy Regional Director for Tribal 
Services. The Deputies will report to their Regional Director who, in 
turn, will report to the Director, BIA (formerly the Deputy 
Commissioner). A similar structure has been created at the agency level. 
Meanwhile, the OST continues to be responsible for the management of 
financial assets and certain reform projects and maintains its statutory 
oversight responsibilities with additional operating authority, including 
line authority over regional fiduciary trust administrators and fiduciary 
trust officers.1194
 
B.  Tribes Oppose Stripping the BIA of Trust Responsibilities 
 
Proposals to relieve the BIA of primary responsibility for the federal 
trust responsibility have been met with great resistance, in part due to 
fear that it is part of a larger effort to dismantle the BIA. The tribes also 
believe the administration has taken an office that was intended to 
oversee trust reform – the OST – and transformed it into an agency – the 
OTFM - that seeks to completely supplant the BIA. Testifying on BIA 
 1192. Department of Interior Comprehensive Trust Plan, supra note 51. 
 1193. Trust Initiatives for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. - 1st Sess., (March 10, 2004) (statement of Ross O. Swimmer, Special Trustee 
for American Indians, and David W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs, U.S. 
Department of the Interior) available at http://indian.senate.gov/2004hrgs/031004hrg/031004wit_
list.htm. 
 1194. Id. 
   
154 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 19 
 
reorganization before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Tex Hall, 
President of the NCAI, insisted that tribal leaders “understand better than 
anyone that the Bureau of Indian Affairs needs to change” and that they 
“are not opposed to reorganization per se.” However, he added, “Tribal 
leaders have repeatedly emphasized that funding needed to correct 
problems and inefficiencies in DOI trust management must not come 
from existing BIA programs or administrative monies.”1195 Hall decried 
administration 2004 budget proposals under which large funding 
increases for the OST would be offset by deep cuts to BIA programs. 
The NCAI called for adequate new funding, meaningful standards for 
performance, locally based service delivery, and tribal involvement in 
establishing organizational structures and processes involving trust 
administration. Most of all, the NCAI demanded that OTFM be placed 
under the administrative control of the BIA.1196
In subsequent Senate testimony, the NCAI reiterated its charges that 
the OST continues to expand at the expense of BIA programs for 
education and other services, pursuant to the President’s 2005 budget. 
Hall charged: 
 
Indian tribes are being forced to pay twice for the federal government’s 
mismanagement of our trust funds. First, when our trust funds and 
natural resources were grossly squandered and mismanaged, and now, 
when it is time to fix the system, the Department proposes to take the 
money out of other BIA programs and services.1197
 
Testifying on behalf of a Consortium of self-governance tribes in 
California, the Chairman of the Hoopa Valley Tribe also defended the 
BIA while criticizing the OST. Chairman Clifford Marshall said: 
 
It does not seem possible that the limited staff and expertise of OST 
could be successful in assuming the responsibilities and control of the 
BIA’s thousands of employees who carry out trust resource 
management issues on a daily basis, or to address the problems 
associated with the vast diversities in Tribal/Federal relationships that 
have developed through decades of Tribal and BIA conflict 
resolution.1198
 1195. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29, (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Tex G. 
Hall, President, National Congress of American Indians). 
 1196. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29. 
 1197. Proposed Reorganization of Major Agencies and Functions Related to Indian Trust 
Reform Matters Within the Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 29. (March 10, 2004) (testimony of Tex 
G. Hall, President, National Congress of American Indians). 
 1198. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29, (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Clifford 
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“[S]ince the creation of OST its primary mission appears to have been to 
either takeover or replace the BIA,” Marshall claimed, adding that “tribes 
across the Nation nearly unanimously demanded to keep the BIA system 
intact while fixing the resource management problems that need to be 
addressed.”1199
Similar sentiments were expressed by the President of the Oneida 
Indian Nation, testifying on behalf of twenty-four federally recognized 
Indian Tribes with 60,000 members in twelve southern and eastern states, 
the United South and Eastern Tribes (“USET”). Agreeing “that trust and 
other functions need to be separated,” Keller George testified that BIA 
re-organization had created “two competing organizations . . . OST and 
the BIA . . . (that) must compete against each other for authority, 
resources, and manpower.”1200 USET has called for elevation of Indian 
Affairs authority to a Secretariat level within the government and 
demanded that “BIA’s funding should not be diminished in order to fund 
the trust efforts of the OST.”1201 The Navajo Nation expressed similar 
concerns about reorganization proposals.1202
Testimony before the House Committee on Resources mirrored that 
in the Senate. Tribal witnesses were especially incensed that they felt 
effectively excluded from the reorganization process. Melanie Benjamin, 
the Chief Executive of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, expressed a 
typical tribal sentiment. 
 
Initially, tribes were part of the process through a task force of which I 
was a member of. Although that task force attempted to develop a tribal 
solution, the Department of Interior suddenly dissolved the task force 
and proceeded with the trust reform process without any further tribal 
involvement. That action has since set the tone for the trust reform and 
reorganization as we see it playing out today, creating an atmosphere of 
distrust, sporadic paralysis, and uncertainty. Consequently, the Interior 
and BIA tribal consultation policy has become, with all due respect, 
meaningless to tribes who reasonably expect to have a voice in policy 
matters and decisions that affect us . . . . Although the BIA and the new 
Office of Special Trustee (OST) have conducted “consultation” 
Marshall, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribe). 
 1199. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29, (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Clifford 
Marshall, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribe). 
 1200. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29, (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Keller 
George, United South and Eastern Tribes, President and Member of the Oneida Indian Nation). 
 1201. Trust Reform And Related Matters, supra note 29, (May 21, 2003) (testimony of Keller 
George, United South and Eastern Tribes, President and Member of the Oneida Indian Nation). 
 1202. Proposed Reorganization of Major Agencies and Functions Related to Indian Trust 
Reform Matters Within the Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 29 (March 10, 2004) (statement of Joe 
Shirley, Jr., President of the Navajo Nation, on Behalf of The Navajo Nation). 
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sessions throughout Indian Country on the trust reform and 
reorganization, the sessions are more accurately characterized as 
informational updates that tell tribes what changes have been made (as 
the result of prior policy decisions) and their effects upon tribes. From 
the tribal perspective, if a “consultation” takes place after the fact of a 
major decision that directly affects tribal interests, it is not a 
consultation. At most, it is an informational briefing . . . . This lack of 
meaningful tribal consultation is illustrative of the mixed messages that 
come from Interior and the BIA. On one hand, we are told that the BIA 
wants to work with tribes. On the other hand, the Department is 
overhauling an entire agency, and creating a new one in the process, 
without working with tribes at all.1203
 
The Chairman of the Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association 
testified “that a majority of Indian tribes were against reorganization, not 
only because it was put into effect without meaningful tribal consultation 
but also because a ‘one size fits all’ approach to trust management 
reform is certain to fail.”1204 Chairman Harold Frazier noted that several 
tribes had come up with their own proposals for trust reform designed to 
meet unique tribal needs and emphasizing self-governance. He reiterated 
concerns that trust reform may be code for centralizing BIA personnel 
and authority in Washington, while reducing the BIA’s local 
presence.1205
The Principal Chief of the Osage Tribe agreed that “the 
determination of how to best manage trust obligations to tribes and 
Indians should focus on the most local level, BIA agencies.”1206 He also 
expressed the fear that “[i]t remains to be seen whether the BIA and OST 
reorganization will refocus on providing better frontline trust services to 
tribes and Indians at the local level rather than hunkering down against 
potential trust liability.” Chief Jim Gray called on Congress to broaden 
its vision of trust reform, to include reforming the mineral leasing statute, 
addressing fractionation of Indian lands, promoting tribal self-
governance, establishing a mechanism short of litigation to hold federal 
decision-makers accountable for failure to properly administer trust 
 1203. Reorganization of Trust Mgmt. at the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Office of the Spec. 
Trustee, supra note 29 (May 12, 2004) (testimony of Ms. Melanie Benjamin, Chief Executive, Mille 
Lacs Band of Ojibwe). 
 1204. Id. (Testimony of Mr. Harold Frazier, Chairman, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Chairman, 
Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association). The Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association 
represents sixteen tribes in the Great Plains region, encompassing the states of North Dakota, South 
Dakota and Nebraska. Id. 
 1205. Id. 
 1206. Id. (testimony of Jim Gray, Principal Chief of The Osage Tribe).
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obligations, and appropriating sufficient funds to maintain the treaty and 
moral obligations of the United States to Indians and tribes. 
 
The shameful federal policies of yesteryear that presumed Indian and 
tribal incompetence and sought to control Indian and tribal resources 
and decisions are still found in today’s laws and therefore also the daily 
obligations of federal employees. The easy route for both Congress and 
the tribes is to scold the BIA and OST in harsh terms (which both 
usually deserve when it comes to trust management). The more difficult 
task is stepping back, taking a broader look at the problems, and 
seeking consensus from possible solutions.1207
 
The DOI denies that it has excluded tribes from BIA reorganization 
or that it is seeking to replace the BIA with the OST. Special Trustee 
Swimmer contends that it was the tribes, not the Department, that 
“walked out” on the process. He stated that once a decision was made on 
reorganization, the BIA and the OST jointly held presentations to explain 
the trust initiatives to local and Area staff and to Tribal leaders.1208 Mr. 
Swimmer’s testimony also stoked tribal concerns about local delivery of 
services, noting that “consistent with the President’s management 
agenda, administrative functions previously performed in a decentralized 
fashion at the central, regional and agency levels, have been consolidated 
under the management structure.”1209
The administration also contends that decreases in BIA budget lines 
have nothing to do with the ascension of the OST, but rather with the 
ineffectiveness of certain BIA programs, as demonstrated by an 
effectiveness rating tool used by the White House Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”).1210 Some BIA and other Indian programs received 
low effectiveness ratings from the OMB, including Indian Law 
Enforcement, Indian School Construction, and Tribal Courts. BIA 
programs receiving higher ratings include the Indian Forestry Program, 
Indian School Operations and Tribal Land Consolidation. Overall, 
however, BIA program ratings do not appear to differ dramatically from 
effectiveness ratings given to other Interior programs, nor do line items 
in the Presidential Budget routinely reflect program ratings.1211 The tribal 
outcry has at least moderated the reorganization juggernaut’s impact on 
 1207. Id. 
 1208. Id. (statement of Ross O. Swimmer, Special Trustee For American Indians and Aurene 
Martin Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary - Indian Affairs U. S. Department of the Interior). 
 1209. Id. 
 1210. OMB PART, supra note 350. 
 1211. OMB PART, supra note 350, at 2. 
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Indian preference hiring, however. In March of 2004, responding to 
criticism from tribal officials, Interior reversed a decision that would 
have eliminated Indian preference for dozens of BIA appraisal staff.1212
 
C.  BIA & OTFM: “Internecine Warfare” 
 
The battle between OST and the BIA has not gone unnoticed by 
Congress, or for that matter, by the Cobell court. Judge Lamberth has 
characterized relations between the OST and the BIA as “internecine 
warfare,” criticizing the “bunker mentality” and lack of cooperation 
alleged to exist among the different agencies of Interior.1213 Meanwhile, 
at the urging of Congress, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has 
begun a wide-ranging investigation of the OST.1214 The Chairman of the 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee, Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, said 
he has received numerous complaints about the reorganization process, 
including “forced retirements, unfair firings, nepotism, mismanagement 
of funds, ethics violations and civil rights violations.”1215
Amid such rancor, Congress ultimately rejected much of the 
President’s BIA/OST reorganization budget. The House of 
Representatives passed a FY 2005 budget of $19.5 billion for the Interior 
Department that restores some of the cuts the administration had 
proposed for Indian programs. The bill restored a $65.5 million cut to the 
construction of new schools and a $50.6 million cut for new IHS clinics 
and hospitals. Overall, the BIA is funded at $2.3 billion, $81 million 
above the White House request. Significantly, the bill reduces funding 
for the OST by $51.4 million.1216
 
 1212. See Swimmer to retain control of Indian appraisals, Apr. 6, 2004, available at 
http://indianz.com/News/archive/001587.asp; see also OST to Contract with NBC to Manage its 
Appraisal Program, Indian hiring preference will continue under program, PEOPLE LAND & 
WATER, June 2004, at 45. (PEOPLE LAND & WATER the DOI’s employee news magazine). 
 1213. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172, n.5 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Monitor Order” and 
“Special Master-Monitor Order”) (citing the Seventh Report of the Court Monitor), vacated by, in 
part, remanded by Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 1214. See Johnson promises “meaningful” investigation of OST, Indianz.com, June 21, 2004, 
available at http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/003036.asp. Senator Johnson’s letter requesting the 
General Accounting Office to investigate OST may be found at www.johnson.senate.gov. At an 
oversight hearing on the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the chairman and the vice-chairman of 
the Senate Indian Affairs Committee agreed that a GAO investigation is needed. See Complaints 
prompt probe into BIA education, Indianz.com, June 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/002973.asp. 
 1215. Complaints prompt probe into BIA education, Indianz.com, June 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/002973.asp. 
 1216. HOUSE RPT. NO. 108-542, at 85-86- Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Bill, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budget.html 
for complete budget details. 
  
1] BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 159 
 
XIX.  CONCLUSION 
 
Declaring that there is a crisis in the persistence and growth of unmet 
needs, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommends that Federal 
agencies take urgent action to more fully assess the extent of unmet 
needs in Indian Country, to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the 
delivery of federal services, to establish perennial adequate funding, and 
to promote tribal self-governance.1217 These goals mirror those voiced 
over recent decades by most tribal advocates. 
The Commission itself has taken a significant step forward in 
helping to identify the unmet needs of Native Americans. Whether 
adequate funding will be forthcoming from Congress is in doubt, 
however, considering that competing interests and priorities have rarely 
loomed so large, as tax cuts and war spending add to the greatest federal 
budget deficit in history.1218 However, there is a broad consensus on the 
remaining goals of a more efficient and effective federal services and 
expanding the concept of tribal self-governance. 
Tribes undoubtedly will assume a greater role not only in 
administration of federal and tribal trust resources but also in resolving 
the vexing issues of trust reform and reorganization of the BIA. Tribal 
voices are increasingly making themselves heard, partly due to newfound 
prosperity on the part of a relative few, partly through greater expertise 
and collective lobbying, and partly by holding the moral high ground. 
The editors of the New York Times saw even Congressional 
consideration of a long overdue apology1219 as a bow to the growing 
 1217. A QUIET CRISIS, supra note 46, at 110-19. 
 1218. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Concerns About War, Deficit May Curb Tax Cuts, 
WASHINGTON POST, March 17, 2003, at A4 (reporting that eleven House Republican moderates sent 
a letter to House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert objecting to a budget resolution “that fails to meet the 
needs of our domestic priorities, while reducing taxes by $1.4 trillion.”); Jonathan Weisman, 2006 
Cuts In Domestic Spending On Table, WASHINGTON POST, May 27, 2004, at A1 (reporting that the 
White House has put government agencies on notice that if President Bush is reelected, his budget 
for 2006 may include spending cuts for virtually all agencies in charge of domestic programs, 
including the Interior Department); T. Christian Miller, Pentagon Waste in Iraq May Total Billions, 
Investigators Say, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A12. Republicans as well as Democrats are 
rebelling against the stranglehold the tax cuts, in particular, have placed on the budget process. See, 
e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Budget Impasse Reflects GOP Schism, WASHINGTON POST, June 30, 2004, 
at A1. 
 1219. On May 6, 2004, Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas introduced “[a] bill to acknowledge a 
long history of official depredations and ill-conceived policies by the United States Government 
regarding Indian Tribes and offer an apology to all Native Peoples on behalf of the United States.” 
S.J. Res. 37, 108th Cong. There are increasing calls for more open acknowledgement of the harms 
done to Indian people by the federal government, many suggesting more than a simple apology. See, 
e.g., William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, 
and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002-2003); Rose 
Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic 
Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1017 (2001); 
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political muscle of tribes. 
 
Native Americans’ power is considerable in tribal bases like South 
Dakota, where their turnout was crucial in electing Senator Tim 
Johnson in 2002; in Alaska, where they are 16 percent of eligible 
voters; and in tight presidential states like Arizona, New Mexico and 
Nevada. Severe health, education and economic troubles still bedevil 
the reservations, despite the casino riches of a minority. Accordingly, 
the tribes must aim for more than an apology as they pursue ambitious 
voter-enrollment programs. An official apology is indeed words on 
paper. But approval by Congress would be an acknowledgment of 
modern tribal power, especially if the president presented it this 
September at the opening of the National Museum of the American 
Indian in Washington.1220
 
The growing tension between greater tribal self-governance and the 
continuation of the federal trust responsibility raises important questions 
for the future of federal Indian policy. Their resolution may present an 
opportunity to remedy an equally difficult dilemma: the persistent 
conflict between aggressive enforcement of the federal trust 
responsibility and competing government interests. 
Lindsay Glauner, The Need For Accountability And Reparation: 1830-1976 The United States 
Government’s Role In The Promotion, Implementation, And Execution Of The Crime Of Genocide 
Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002). 
 1220. The Long Trail to Apology, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A18. 
